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In this thesis, I explore and interpret ethical food consumption as a site of 
formation, negotiation, and articulation of individuals’ personal and social identities. 
Drawing on Margaret Archer's conceptualization of reflexivity as an essential human 
property and identity as a unique constellation of ultimate concerns about the world and 
our relationships with it, I develop an account of ethical consumer practices as 
subjective, reflexive, and intentional projects of morally concerned agents through 
which they attain their desired self-concepts and engage with corresponding social roles. 
 By exploring the origins of the participants’ concerns over food ethics and 
tracing the evolution of their dietary commitments, I yield an understanding of how 
people develop ethical consumers identities as well as how they negotiate their moral 
food projects within the constantly changing objective conditions and subjective 
circumstances. Coming from a critical realist perspective, I examine the ways in which 
agency and structure interact to give rise to idiosyncratic ethical consumer practices and 
pursuits, the role that both agential and structural properties and powers play in shaping 
individuals’ engagement in ethical food consumption, and how both the continuities and 
inconsistencies of subjective ethical food commitments might be explained, thus aiming 
toward a more comprehensive social theory about the underlying causal mechanisms 
and generative principles of ethical consumer practices and identities. 
In doing so, I seek to put critical pressure on the conceptual fallacies and 
methodological biases that reside in the field of consumer research and, in 
counterbalance, point to a more integrated and balanced approach to studying, 
understanding, and explaining consumer behaviour in general and ethical consumer 
practices in particular. I contribute to larger theoretical debates on the relationships 
between consumption activities and the construction of individual identities as well as 
the interplay between agential subjectivity and structural objectivity in human practices 
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This study is based on personal life and food stories of nine self-defined ethical 
consumers. The entire research process, which involved dozens of shopping trips and 
around 30 hours of in-depth interviews, was not just about meeting people from all 
walks of life and going shopping with them, visiting quirky food stores and discovering 
products I have never heard of, looking into subjects’ food baskets and getting the low-
down on their eating habits and needs. It was about learning people’s personal beliefs 
and most private concerns, observing the art of managing the fine balance between 
one’s ethical commitments and the exigencies of life, witnessing decision-making, 
revealing contradictions, and discovering the diversity of moral worldviews and ways to 
enact them. It is these experiences and the knowledge derived from them that I rely 
upon in fulfilling the key task of this thesis, that is to construe ethical consumption as a 
moral project, an identity-centred practice, and a means of achieving and displaying a 
distinct moral character. My key aim was, by soliciting first-hand accounts of morally 
inspired food practices and interpreting them in relation to individuals’ inner and outer 
selves, to explore and better understand the process of emergence and the conditions of 
development of ethical consumer identities. Guided by Archer’s concept of identity as a 
unique constellation of our ultimate concerns about the world, I began my investigation 
of ethical consumer practices by grounding them in the particular system of moral 
values and beliefs that subjects derive from their socio-cultural milieu and develop over 
the life course. I set myself the task of uncovering the underlying mechanisms that 
enable me to explain how identity-defining concerns over food ethics emerge, evolve, 
and translate into ethical food commitments which come to shape people’s courses of 
action up to the most mundane decisions, such as the choice of ingredients for a 
weeknight dinner. In interpreting ethical consumption as a subjective moral project 
through which people address matters of importance to them, I pursue the ambition “to 
do justice to this relation of concern, to lay normativity, and to the fact that we are 
sentient beings who can flourish or suffer” (Sayer, 2011, p. 3) depending on how 
objects of our ultimate concerns are faring. As Sayer (2011, p. 2), I am convinced that 
the notion of concerns is the one that enables social analysis to produce the most 
comprehensive and fair account of human practices: 
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Concepts such as “preferences”, “self-interest” or “values” fail to do justice to such 
matters, particularly with regard to their social character and connection to events and social 
relations, and their emotional force. Similarly, concepts such as convention, habit, discourses, 
socialisation, reciprocity, exchange, discipline, power and a host of others are useful for external 
description but can easily allow us to miss people’s first person evaluative relation to the world 
and the force of their evaluations.       
   
Thus, in choosing the notion of concerns as my conceptual beacon, I intended to 
steer away from “bland accounts of social life, in which it is difficult to assess the 
import of things for people” (Sayer, 2011, p. 6). To the contrary, through an exploration 
of subjective meanings attached to individual practices of ethical consumption I wanted 
to showcase “the power of personal identity to shape our lives around what we care 
about and commit ourselves to” (Archer, 2000, p. 355).     
 Yet, as the project unfolded, it has become critical to acknowledge and 
investigate the variety of ways in which the formation and evolution of individuals as 
ethical consumers is shaped not only by their intrinsic human properties and abilities, 
but also by the powers of external reality in which they are placed and with which they 
inevitably, ceaselessly, and simultaneously interact. My analysis of the participants’ 
narratives brought out the force of the argument that our relations with the environment 
in the natural world along with our interactions with objects in the practical order and 
other subjects in the social realm represent crucial constituents of our personal make up 
without which "we would not be recognisably human" (Archer, 2000, p. 215). This has 
enabled me to see that it is only by acknowledging the key role of both agential 
subjectivity and structural objectivity in shaping which courses of action individuals 
may pursue and hence what kind of persons they will become, that I can achieve a true 
understanding of how - through which inner workings and under which external 
conditions - subjects evolve into persons with particular moral concerns and dietary 
commitments thus developing the identity of an ethical consumer. While duly 
acknowledging the active agency of individual consumers and joining Archer (2007, p. 
6) in rejecting the logic of “social hydraulics”, which establishes the ascendancy of 
social powers over human subjectivity, I find it essential to “allow for a milder form of 
objective “social conditioning” (Archer, 2007, p. 10) of ethical consumption. 
Consequently, I have come to balance my original focus on the intrinsic capacity of 
human beings to actively and consciously shape their lives around ultimate concerns 
and desired identities with a pronounced emphasis on the embeddedness of agential 
actions and choices in the objective reality, whose properties can both promote as well 
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as constrain individuals’ ability to fulfil their ethical food commitments and live out 
their moral selves. By construing ethical consumption as a site wherein a continuous 
interplay between agential subjectivity and structural objectivity unfolds, I justified the 
centrality of the concept of reflexivity to the theoretical framework underpinning my 
research, while locating reflexivity in the space where incessant mediation between 
agency and structure occurs to enable successful realisation and ensure continuity of 
agential food commitments enabled me to secure the appropriate theoretical grounds on 
which the indispensability of human reflexivity to the formation and development of 
ethical consumer identities can be convincingly claimed.     
 Through the above refinements, which have been an integral part of my 
sociological pursuit, I have been able to achieve a clear vision of my main research goal 
and the key steps toward it. Exploring ethical consumer identities is an intellectual 
puzzle and a compound research exercise which poses the need to discern, acknowledge, 
and analyse each of the different phases - as elusively demarcated as they are - which 
individuals go through as they progress toward a desired moral image, as well as the 
key forces - agential powers and structural influences - that inspire, enable, and shape 
this complex and intricate process during every step of the way.    
 My key research aims are thus as follows: 
- To uncover the generative mechanism behind human concerns over the ethics of 
consumption; to demonstrate and analyse the relationships between moral 
concerns, ethical food practices, and individual identities  
- To explore how, once embraced, ethical consumer identity is preserved and 
sustained by the individuals in the constantly changing objective contexts and 
subjective circumstances 
- To establish and analyse the connections between personal and social identities 
and reveal the generative mechanism that explains how the social identity of an 
ethical consumer emerges and evolves through agential interactions with the 
social world 
- To showcase ethical consumption as a site of a continuous interplay between 
agential subjectivity and structural objectivity and demonstrate the central role 
of human reflexivity as a mediating force between the two 
I will fulfil these aims by following Sayer’s (2010) methodological appeal, i.e. 
to explore the relationship between the abstract - theoretical concepts, ideas, and 
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constructs - and the concrete – objects, events, and circumstances so that to achieve an 
understanding of the mechanisms, structures, and causal relations that explain the 
phenomenon under study. In accordance with this prescription, I will anchor my key 
abstract concepts, i.e. ultimate concerns, reflexivity, and identity, upon the concrete 
experiences, practices, and acts of self-defined ethical consumers and in doing so 
uncover the generative powers that bring ethical consumer practices and identities into 
being and the specific conditions upon which this causal relationship is contingent. 
Accomplishing this research mission would not have been possible without nine 
individuals who have generously shared their personal life and food stories granting me 
a rare insight into the private workings of the minds of morally concerned and ethically 
committed individuals. Relying on the participants’ revelations about the most intimate 
aspects of their lives and minute details of their consumption practices, I will uncover 
the deep connections between human concerns, emotional and mental capacities on the 
one hand and agential projects and commitments on the other, and bring them together 
as essential elements in the necessarily reflexive, because internally inspired but 
externally conditioned, process of becoming and being an ethical food consumer.  
Outline of the thesis          
The thesis opens with Chapter 1, in which I lay out the overarching theoretical 
framework of my research, present and discuss its key explanatory concepts, and outline 
its ontological underpinnings. I argue for the critical realist conception of the world as 
an approach that offers solid ontological and epistemological ground on which an 
exploration of ethical consumption as a practice in which the essential powers of 
structures and agents combine to produce particular individual and social outcomes can 
unfold and successfully reach its goals.       
 In Chapter 2, I position my research vis-à-vis the extensive literature on 
consumption in general and ethical consumption in particular. I provide a critical review 
of existent studies of consumer practices and challenge their ontological and 
epistemological assumptions which, as I argue, are standing in the way of developing a 
comprehensive, yet balanced view on the generative mechanisms of consumer 
behaviour. Having exposed the biases and misconceptions informing the dominant 
approaches to studying consumption, I will proceed to show how, through the 
consolidation of agency-focused and socio-centric perspectives on human behaviour, 
this thesis will offer a more integrated and nuanced understanding of the subjective 
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motives and objective drivers of consumer practices and identities.   
 In Chapter 3, I provide an outline of my epistemological position and 
methodological approach to data production and analysis. I begin by clarifying the 
relationships between my ontological and epistemological frameworks and proceed to 
discuss the two qualitative tools that I deployed to achieve my research aims: in-depth 
interviews and direct observations. The chapter also considers the epistemological and 
methodological challenges I encountered during the research process and indicates both 
the benefits as well as inevitable limitations of my chosen research strategies and 
techniques.         
 Chapter 4 introduces the ethical consumers of my research by means of 
individual vignettes - short biographies intended to demonstrate the range of 
personalities constituting my study sample and help the readers to locate the specific 
empirical examples that I will refer to throughout the research account in the contexts of 
the subjects’ lives and distinct personalities.       
 In Chapters 5, 6 and 7 I reveal and discuss my findings on the relationships 
between ethical consumer practices and identities. Since, however desirable, space 
precludes reproducing complete stories of all my study subjects, and because different 
participant accounts can most effectively be used as representations of particular key 
themes, I will be moving between the respondents’ narratives making selective use of 
the data and providing glimpses of life stories conveyed in the interviews so that to 
develop a compelling argument and achieve the specific goals that each chapter will 
pose.            
 Thus, Chapter 5 spotlights one particular participant, Lucy, whose story I will 
present in all its richness and complexity in order to lay the foundations on which my 
account of ethical consumer practices and identities can begin to unfold. By exploring 
the origins of Lucy’s concerns over the moral aspects of consumption and tracing the 
evolution of her dietary commitments, I aim to illuminate the agential pathway toward 
an ethical consumer identity, that is the emotional and cognitive workings of the mind 
through which individuals come to define their subjective relationship to the objective 
world as one of a moral obligation to pursue an ethical life.     
 In Chapter 6, while not losing sight of Lucy’s evolvement as an ethical food 
consumer, I provide more space for other participants to share their experiences and 
contribute to the argument. Building upon their accounts, I examine the complex ways 
in which morally concerned individuals continuously negotiate their relationships with 
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objective reality in order to successfully carry their ethical food commitments through 
the changing scenes of life. Through the collective voice of the ethical consumers of my 
research, I aim to achieve a rich and nuanced picture of ethical consumption as an 
identity-defining moral project that needs to be continuously and actively sustained by 
reflexive, creative, and self-aware agents.       
 In Chapter 7, I will demonstrate that ethical consumption as an identity-centred 
practice extends beyond individuals’ self-image and involves their performances in the 
social realm. This time, I will build the discussion around two specific participant cases 
– that of Lucy, with whom by that point we will have become closely familiar, and 
Solveig, whose contrasting account will enable me to most tellingly and convincingly 
illustrate my argument. Through a revealing juxtaposition of Lucy’s and Solveig’s 
experiences of enacting the social identity of an ethical consumer, I will reveal the 
connections between people’s ultimate concerns and social identities and demonstrate 
the all-important role of agential capacity to reflexively negotiate their relationships 
with the social world in producing a social subject out of an individual’s inner self. 
 Combined together, these three chapters will provide an integrated account of 
the process of becoming and being an ethical food consumer. As Archer notes, “since 
subjects can and do offer the pieces of information needed, the task (…) need not call 
upon depth psychology or detective work but is more like doing a jigsaw” (2007, p. 
232). In the same way, from each participant story I will select crucial pieces of 
information - snapshots of the different life stages, developments, and isolated 
experiences which have been key to the subjects’ evolution as ethical consumers and 
which, considered together, will allow to create a complete picture of this gradual and 
intricate process. In recounting the participants’ narratives, I do not intend to reconstruct 
their life stories in a biographically chronological order; rather, consistent with the key 
research questions, my goal is to reveal the generative forces and powers - both inherent 
in agents as well as those that emerge in the outside world - that incite and condition the 
development of ethical consumer identities. Yet, at the end of this research journey one 
important story will have been told: a story of an ethical food consumer – a human 
being with subjectively defined moral principles, values, and concerns; an active agent 
in possession of intrinsic properties and capacities and in pursuit of a reflexively 
devised life project; and a social actor embedded in the objective world and 
continuously interacting with it – an image in which any one of the participants of my 
research should be able to recognise him- or herself. This story, in which the leading 
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parts will be assigned not to the individuals but to ideas – those of ultimate concerns, 
reflexivity, and identity, as well as broader concepts of agential subjectivity and 
structural objectivity, will take us from the concrete realm of individual experiences 
back to the higher levels of abstraction where a truly deep understanding of the 
mechanisms that explain the development of ethical consumer practices and identities 
can be achieved. To set the stage for this account and render it meaningful, it is first of 
all essential to outline the theoretical, conceptual, and philosophical foundations 





























Setting the Conceptual Lens  
  
 
This thesis seeks to place ethical food consumption within the broad framework 
of reflexivity and, more specifically, reflexive construction of identity. In this chapter I 
provide the reasons for applying this particular approach to the study of individual 
ethical food practices, present the theoretical framework of the research and its key 
explanatory concepts, namely ultimate concerns and reflexivity, and, finally, outline the 
ontological assumptions which informed the study conceptually and guided its 
empirical implementation. Before this account can begin to unfold, clarification is 
called for regarding the essential notions and terms on which both my theoretical 
framework and discussion of the empirical findings rest.  
 
1.1 Clarification of concepts and terms 
 
The key concept around which my entire research account revolves is, of course, 
“ethical consumption” itself. Ethical consumption is a term used to describe the 
phenomenon for which many other terms exist and are used in the academic, media, and 
public discourses, such as ethical consumerism, green consumerism, responsible 
consumption, political consumption, political consumerism, critical consumerism, and 
so on. In this thesis, I will refer to all of these as ethical consumption. While I 
appreciate that “ethical” is a contested notion, all of my research participants self-
identified in this way. When I first set off on my research journey, I was guided by the 
idea of ethical consumption as a range of consumption practices and choices informed 
by individuals’ morals, that is their understanding of what is right or wrong with respect 
to the surrounding contexts, which usually include natural environment, animal welfare, 
and human rights. As my fieldwork progressed, significant variations between the 
subjects’ understandings of what ethical consumption or ethical in general means have 
been revealed. Not only did this discrepancy not undermine the consistency of my 
research or invalidate its conceptual framework, but it actually proved a critical finding 
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which has informed many of the theoretical arguments and constructs that will be 
presented in this study. Participants’ divergent and at times even contrasting 
perspectives on what the greatest good is and how to achieve it have shown the 
inadequacy of the view of individual morality as something inherent, universal, and 
fixed. Consequently, addressing the questions of how moral values emerge, develop, 
and come to define the minutiae of people’s daily existence, such as the choice of food, 
as well as how they get challenged, reconsidered, negotiated, and overturned has 
become crucial to fulfilling the aims of the project. Moreover, while the prevalent 
definitions of ethical consumption are linked to market contexts and shopping practices 
(Jacobsen and Dulsrud, 2007), such as Micheletti’s definition of political consumerism 
as “actions by people who make choices among producers and products with the goal of 
changing objectionable institutional or market practices” (2003, p. 2), my research has 
clearly shown that ethical consumption encompasses a wide range of more subtle 
practices and activities that cannot be reduced to purchasing ethical products in the 
marketplace. Devinney, Auger and Eckhardt go as far as to claim that “the notion of 
ethical consumerism is too broad in its definition, too loose in its operationalistion, and 
too moralistic in its stance to be anything other than a myth” (2010, p. 9). Whilst I agree 
that ethical consumption is not a definitive concept, I conceive of it as a real, 
multidimensional, and complex phenomenon which accommodates multiple 
interpretations and meanings and is presented by a variety of practices, acts, and 
activities situated in the contexts of objective reality. From this viewpoint, I find Barnett 
et al.’s (2005, p. 29) definition of ethical consumption as “any practice of consumption 
in which explicitly registering commitment to distant or absent others is an important 
dimension of the meaning of activity of the actors involved” more accommodating. Yet, 
an important correction needs to be made: the authors’ pronounced emphasis on distant 
or absent others as the key focus of commitment is not only unneeded but altogether 
mistaken since, as other studies have shown and as my own research findings suggest, 
ethical commitments are just as likely to be oriented towards those that are “closer to 
home”. Thus, local consumption is increasingly being framed and celebrated as the 
most ethical purchasing choice which, according to Adams and Raisborough, “works to 
disrupt any formulation linking the ‘good choices’ here with the livelihood of a 
producer ‘over there’ – ‘distant or absent others’” (2010, p. 271). Further, while a sense 
of responsibility in front of the poor and suffering resounded through the participants’ 
accounts, for some protecting the feelings of those who are closest, such as family and 
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friends, was the most obvious moral priority and the major part of the commitment to 
ethical living. With this in mind, I prefer to think of ethical consumption as "any 
practice of consumption in which explicitly registering commitment to others is an 
important dimension of the meaning of activity of the actors involved - a refined version 
of Barnett et al.’s definition which seems to me sufficiently precise without being 
suffocatingly prescriptive.       
 Another important term that re-emerges throughout the thesis is “moral”. In the 
context of this research, the words “morality” and “moral” are meant to refer to the 
principles of right and wrong behaviour or, to introduce a more formal definition, to 
“the internalized norms, values, principles and attitudes we live by in relation to other 
people” (Lindseth and Norberg, 2004, p. 145). This is a requisite clarification, for 
morality proved to be one of the core concepts in this research – the contested issue of 
right and wrong was raised unprompted and discussed extensively by all of the 
interviewees. It is also important to note that, albeit philosophers commonly draw 
distinctions of various degrees of sharpness between morality and ethics (one 
perspective suggests that “ethics is the science of the philosophy of morals, and morals 
is the practice or enactment of ethics” (Puri and Treasaden, 2009, p. 1223), my research 
subjects used the words “moral” and “ethical” interchangeably. Given that for the 
participants of my study the meanings of morals and ethics clearly overlap and 
following Andrew Sayer’s example, I chose to avoid the unhelpfully restrictive and 
often confusing ways of distinguishing between the two notions and use them 
synonymously “to cover all the things that others have associated with either term” 
(Sayer, 2011, p. 17). 
When talking about subjective meanings, I, as Creswell does, use the term 
“meaning” to refer to “intention, cognition, affect, belief, evaluation, and anything else 
that could be encompassed in what is broadly termed the “participants’ perspective” 
(2012, p. 137-138), which I treat as ontologically subjective, but objectively real mental 
processes and phenomena. 
 Finally, in relation to my use of the word “mind”, I deem it essential to guard 
against the narrow interpretation of the term as referring exclusively to human faculty of 
rationality or reason. Instead, I use it in its broader and, notably, primary sense to mean 
“the element of a person that enables them to be aware of the world and 
their experiences, to think, and to feel; the faculty of consciousness and thought” 
(Oxford Dictionaries online, 2016, my italics). By outlining these nuances of meaning, I 
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aim to prepare and encourage the readers of my work to welcome the particular account 
of human beings and their inherent properties and capacities. 
 
1.2 Theoretical framework: toward reflexive social agents 
 
 
It is not that “the unexamined life is not worth living”, but rather that it is 
unliveable (Archer, 2000, p. 220)  
 
In this section I draw on Archer's (2007) conceptualisation of human reflexivity 
and personal identity to explain how agential capacity for reflexive deliberations can 
help to account for individual practices of ethical consumption and interpret subjective 
food commitments as identity-related projects of morally concerned individuals.
 Archer construes reflexivity as an essential human property that is ontologically 
real, causally efficacious, and consequential for societal outcomes. In the context of 
identity, it might be helpful to think of reflexivity as “the act of an individual subject 
directing awareness towards itself; reflecting upon its own practices, preferences and 
even the process of reflection itself” (Adams and Raisborough, 2008, p. 1168). More 
generally, it represents “a generative ability for internal deliberation upon external 
reality” (Archer 2003, p. 20) which arises out of our inescapable involvement in the 
world and, more specifically, our relationships with its three different orders – natural, 
practical, and discursive. Our continuous interactions with outside reality present us 
with various worries and cares with each of the three realms giving rise to a distinct 
type of concerns which, due to the very nature of human life, we can neither sidestep 
nor ignore. As Archer argues, “all persons have to confront the natural world and (…) 
their embodiment ineluctably confers on them concerns about their physical well-being” 
(2000, p. 198). Likewise, “performative concerns are unavoidably part of our inevitable 
practical engagement with the world of material culture” (Archer, 2000, p. 198), and, 
finally, “participation in the social realm entails concerns about self-worth which cannot 
be evaded in this discursive environment” (Archer, 2000, p. 198). Subjects become alert 
to concerns by emotional reactions that matters and situations of non-difference provoke 
in individuals thereby urging them to take an appropriate action in response to the 
concern. In Archer’s terms, emotions represent “commentaries upon human concerns” 
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with each type of concern generating a correspondingly different cluster of emotions 
specific to the situation we confront and having particular imports for it (Archer, 2004). 
The role that emotions are assigned to play in relation to concerns is far from trivial; in 
fact, Archer holds human emotionality to be "central to the things we care about and to 
the act of caring itself" (Archer, 2000, p. 194) – the argument that will be brought back 
into focus later in the thesis and substantiated by my account of the generative 
principles of ethical food practices and identities. The idea of emotionality is of 
particular relevance to the matter of my research for it reveals the connections between 
concerns and reflexivity and explains the inner forces that bring concerns under the 
scrutiny of our reflexive powers and under the spotlight in our internal conversations. 
This is because reflexivity as an emergent property of human beings arises precisely out 
of the inescapable necessity of all individuals to simultaneously confront the three 
orders of the world, address different concerns arising from them, and attend to their 
emotional imports. Since none of our concerns can simply be put aside, we are faced 
with a pressing need to achieve “a liveable balance within our trinity of inescapable 
concerns” (Archer, 2000, p. 221), i.e. to ensure that our relationships with the practical, 
natural, and social orders are both satisfying and sustainable. The ideal equilibrium 
between three different sets of concerns that often burden subjects’ with conflicting 
demands cannot be achieved by simply settling our lives by first-order affective 
reactions – instead, it calls for elaboration of emotionality beyond initial responses or 
biologically prescribed standards and its re-evaluation in light of our other pressing 
concerns. This emotional elaboration occurs during reflexive conversations - internal 
self-dialogues in which people continuously engage in order to achieve and sustain a 
satisfactory balance between their competing concerns. Through such self-talk, agents 
discern concerns to which they feel emotionally attracted and which they consider 
worthwhile living through, evaluate and prioritise them in terms of their moral worth 
and practical feasibility, and, finally, embrace particular matters as their ultimate 
concerns - those that they deem to be most important, with which they feel they can live, 
and which they are prepared to turn into long-term commitments. Thus, the overarching 
aim of the internal conversation is for individuals to “work out their own modus vivendi 
within the three orders” (Archer, 2000, p. 220) and achieve a morally fulfilling and 
practically possible way of living.        
 This entire process of internal self-talk is summed up by Archer (2007) in the 
following formula: <Concerns → Projects → Practices> which represents the key 
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landmarks in the agential journey from concerns to commitments. In this way, paved by 
an essential human property of reflexivity, not only do individuals define their 
relationships with the outer world, but they also get to understand themselves, their 
values, desires, and goals, and thereby achieve unique personal identities. This is 
because our concerns, that is what we choose to care about most in life, define what 
kind of persons we are: “which precise balance we strike between our concerns, and 
what precisely figures amongst an individual’s concerns is what gives us our strict 
identity as particular persons” (Archer, 2000, p. 221). Thus, it is during our internal 
conversations in which we reflexively review and prioritise our concerns that we come 
to acquire our distinct personal identities: 
It is these acts of ordering and rejection - integration and separation - that create a self 
out of the raw materials of inner life (…) We have constituted ourselves by identifying the self 
as the being-with-these-concerns. The self and its reflexive awareness have been continuous 
throughout the conversation, but on its completion the self has attained a strict personal identity 
through its unique pattern of commitments (Archer, 2000, p. 241) 
  
People’s identity-defining concerns translate into practices through the “projects” 
that they reflexively design in order to address issues of most importance to them.  
These subjective projects must be fine-tuned to the natural, practical, and socio-cultural 
contexts in which people are placed and from which they pursue their commitments. 
The constant need to reflexively negotiate the enabling and constraining properties of 
external reality highlights the interplay between agential subjectivity and structural 
objectivity. It also affirms the everlasting nature of internal conversation – the need for 
reflexive deliberations never goes away because individuals have to continuously 
reassess their current commitments against their changing subjective states and 
objective circumstances.         
 Applied to the phenomenon of ethical consumption, the above account of human 
reflexivity provides for a conceptualization of ethical food practices as reflexive 
projects of morally committed individuals seeking to pursue their ultimate concerns 
from particular objective contexts. It guides an understanding of ethical consumption as 
a moral undertaking through which individuals reflexively forge out distinct identities 
out of the raw materials – primitive emotions and incipient concerns – of their rich and 
meaningful inner lives. To project Archer’s formula <Concerns → Projects → Practices> 
onto ethical consumption is to understand it as an identity-expressive moral 
commitment at which individuals reflexively arrive through the following steps in the 
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internal conversation with themselves: firstly, they define their ultimate moral concerns 
and in them and through them - their unique personal identities; secondly, they develop 
consumption projects in line with their subjective concerns and in tune with the given 
objective conditions; and, finally, they realise their moral food projects through 
appropriate shopping and eating practices. Every act of ethical consumption can then be 
construed as a material outcome of a particular consumption strategy, subjectively 
conceived and reflexively developed by an active and self-aware agent, and a practical 
manifestation of the moral concerns in which his or her identity is expressed. 
 While the specific model of social action that informs my perspective on ethical 
consumer behaviour, i.e. Concerns → Projects → Actions, may superficially resemble 
the process of rational decision-making performed by a goal-oriented actor, it is 
fundamentally different from the rational choice approach in that it denotes a reflexive 
process which is emotion-driven and value-motivated. Admittedly, this reflexive 
process is informed by both emotions as well as reason, since ethically inspired 
individuals will have to assess their potential consumption commitments both in terms 
of their emotional appeal as well as contextual feasibility, and agential decision as to 
whether or not to pursue a particular food project is inevitably contingent on their 
ability and preparedness to pay its associated costs. Such reflexive conversation of a 
morally concerned agent, however, is light years away from a cost-benefit analysis of a 
preference-driven actor - the rationality that is being exercised is not instrumental 
rationality (Zweckrationalitat) of an utility-seeking actor, but is value-rationality 
(Wertrationalitat) of a subject who treats values as ends in themselves, as Archer (2004) 
explains. The emotional and normative dimensions of our reflexive conversation, she 
argues, cannot be reduced to value-stripped rationalisations, for they are about the 
things that we care about most deeply in our lives: “right judgment stands in opposition 
to motivation by self-interest, idleness, self-aggrandisement, convenience and so forth” 
(Archer, 2007, p. 300). Hence, there is an unbridgeable gap between the image of a 
preference-driven rational actor and Archer’s concept of a human being whose 
relationship to the world is one of concern. While preferences represent a vehicle for 
achieving a specific goal (since whenever a rational agent acts on his preferences he 
does so in order to advance his personal wellbeing), commitments are not means to 
some further ends but ends in themselves: “someone does not forgo a blood transfusion 
in order to be a Jehovah’s Witness: the forgoing is an expression of being one” (Archer, 
2000, p. 86). This expressive aspect of the relationships between means and goals is 
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what is notably lacking in the rational actor, whose behaviour is expressive solely of his 
preference schedule and whose means are nothing more but a rationally selected 
instrument for achieving a desired end (Archer, 2000, p. 86). In contrast, Archer 
proposes an agent whose commitments are valuable in their own right for they are not 
“means to (…) flourishing but its constituents” (Hollis, 1989, p. 174 cited in Archer, 
2000, p. 79). Unlike rational preferences, these commitments are inherently affective 
since the ability to develop and pursue concerns beyond our own self-interest requires 
deep emotional involvement: 
What this implies is that Weber’s Wetrationalitat, far from being expelled from a 
disenchanted world, remains part of our lifeworld, which cannot be reduced to the bargain-
hunter’s bazaar (Archer, 2000, p. 79). 
 
It is this pronounced emphasis on emotionality and normativity that 
distinguishes Archer’s approach to explaining human behaviour and that makes it well-
equipped for providing an effective account of ethical consumption. The relationship 
between subjects’ emotions, concerns, and moral food practices can be neatly construed 
through conceptual lens offered by Archer, who holds emotionality to be "central to the 
things we care about and to the act of caring itself" (Archer, 2000, p. 194) and regards 
human emotions as the source of the “shoving power to achieve any ends at all” (Archer, 
2000, p. 225). However, while Archer’s idea of human emotionality allows to reveal the 
drivers behind the transformation of subjects’ concerns over food ethics into concrete 
consumption practices, what also needs to be understood and explained is how, where, 
and why these concerns actually originate. As Haidt (2012, p. 109) remarks,  
Our minds have the potential to become righteous about many different concerns, and 
only a few of these concerns are activated during childhood. Other potential concerns are left 
undeveloped and unconnected to the web of shared meanings and values that become our adult 
moral matrix.           
  
 In the context of this thesis, the question to be answered is how exactly, i.e. 
through which internal processes and under which external influences, individuals 
develop concerns over the moral aspects of consumption. My quest for an account that 
can comprehensively address this critical issue brings me to Coff’s (2006) theory of 
food ethics which offers a potential explanation of the generative mechanism behind 
people’s concerns over the moral implications of their consumption practices. To begin 
with, Coff makes an important distinction between short-range food ethics, i.e. the ones 
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that apply to people’s immediate geographical and temporal contexts, and long-range 
ethics - those which exceed the boundaries of one’s “here and now” (2006, p.107). The 
modern food system in which the distance between consumption and production 
processes is growing further and further apart both spatially and temporally and in 
which the implications of people’ diets extend far beyond their local surroundings calls 
for the latter type. However, the ethics of distance are problematic since the lack of 
first-hand experience of food production renders consumers oblivious to the 
consequences of their choices thus precluding ethical considerations on their part. 
According to Coff, consumers can only engage in the ethics of distance through the 
ethics of closeness: for subjects to fully appreciate the implications of their consumption 
practices, they must experience the production “in the local and in the present” (Kemp, 
1997, p. 99 cited in Coff, 2006, p. 99). Such experiences can be obtained either 
personally, e.g. by visiting a farm, or vicariously - from second-hand accounts. Both 
scenarios allow for a partial, “glimpsed” experience of food production which, 
according to Coff, is absolutely central to the ethical action: direct or mediated exposure 
to production practices renders consumers capable of extending their sense of food 
ethics over longer distances in space and in time. This becomes possible since personal 
experiences turn the production history into a narrative, a “hi-story” (Coff, 2006, p. 100) 
that gets inscribed into consumers’ own biographies. This narrative consists of the 
information about manufacturing processes, animal welfare, environmental issues, 
labour conditions, and so on and can be articulated through anything that awakens 
consumers’ minds to the production history. The food itself becomes “a silent document” 
(Coff, 2006, p. 133) – a reference to and constant reminder of the spatially and 
temporally absent conditions of its production. Such bringing of the absent into the 
present is precisely what enables the extension of people’s ethical considerations 
beyond their immediate contexts. Coff’s theory finds support in the literature: the idea 
of “glimpsed experiences” is echoed by McDonald (2000) who, in a study of the 
process of becoming vegan, talks about “catalytic experiences”, i.e. the events and 
circumstances through which subjects got introduced to the issue of animal cruelty and 
which have been key to their decision to go vegan.     
 In Coff’s account, I discern allusions to the idea of commodity fetishism (Marx, 
1976)	   - a condition which alienates consumers from the “true understanding of our 
relations with others, and with nature” (Pepper, 1996, p. 89) by concealing the social, 
environmental, and historical relations involved in the production of goods. Hudson and 
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Hudson (2003, p. 417) provide an eloquent summary of the idea which echoes Coff’s 
description of the growing estrangement between contemporary consumers and global 
food industry: 
Under commodity capitalism, the social, environmental, and historical relations that go 
into the production of a commodity are hidden. When a person wanders through the grocery 
store or shopping mall, what they see are the characteristics of the commodities themselves—
the attractiveness of the packaging, the cut of the fabric, perhaps the lifestyle associations 
stapled on by marketing departments, and, of course, the price. In this sense, the commodity has 
a life of its own, completely divorced from the process by which it was created. It becomes not 
a result of production on which people have worked under a wide variety of more or less 
acceptable conditions but an entity unto itself, with characteristics of its own.  
       
Glimpsed experiences, which in Coff’s view are key to consumers’ sense of 
food ethics, can thus be construed as a means to counter commodity fetishism by 
revealing “the world of meaning” behind a product, the “world beyond the commodity 
fetish” (Goodman, DuPuis and Goodman, 2012, p. 43). Insights into food production, 
whether direct or mediated, reveal the social and environmental relations invested in a 
product turning it from a fetishized commodity into a meaningful object of consumption. 
In doing so, they revive consumers’ sense of responsibility for social and environmental 
consequences of their food choices and instigate commitments to more ethical foodways.	  
Coff’s account constitutes an important element in my theoretical framework for it 
offers a potentially compelling answer to a key research question concerning the origins 
of consumers’ concerns over food ethics.   
Finally, as any agential project, ethical food commitments need to be reconciled 
with individuals’ subjective conditions and accommodated to the objective 
circumstances. Ethical consumption as a human practice offers a telling illustration of 
the complex ways in which agential enterprises are embedded in the different contexts 
of external reality, for it involves and affects individuals’ relationships with all the three 
orders of the world. In the natural realm, body-environment relationship is a necessary 
one given a direct link between food and health and can represent either an enablement 
or a significant constraint to a person’s decision to pursue a particular diet. In the 
practical sphere, being a responsible food consumer requires certain competence and 
skills, from acquiring and keeping up with essential knowledge and information to 
mastering cooking, gardening, etc. Lastly, in the social order, ethical consumers face the 
need to accommodate their dietary needs to their socio-cultural milieu and reconcile the 
requirements of their moral food projects with the responsibilities and obligations 
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arising from various positions and roles that they assume in their social life. The deep 
embeddedness of food practices in the objective reality exposes ethical consumption as 
a site wherein both agential subjectivity and structural objectivity manifest their distinct 
properties and causal powers. In light of this, Archer’s conceptualisation of human 
reflexivity as a mediating force between agents and structure seems prerequisite if the 
ability of ethical consumers to successfully sustain their moral commitments through 
on-going creative negotiation of objective enablements and constraints is to be 
understood and explained. However, it is important to make one final step toward 
making a convincing case for the reflexivity as a guiding force behind agential projects 
and practices, i.e. to establish a social ontology that will correspond to and support the 
conceptual framework on which this study relies.  
 
1.3 Ontological framework: toward a stratified social reality 
 
In the previous section, I have outlined the theoretical and conceptual 
frameworks underpinning my study. I have introduced the notion of reflexivity as a key 
explanatory concept which will guide my research toward fulfilling its key objective, i.e. 
to explore and understand the generative mechanism behind ethical consumer practices 
and identities. Relying on Archer’s theoretical ideas, I have described how our 
inescapable and concurrent interactions with practical, natural, and social orders of 
reality generate concerns related to our physical wellbeing, performative achievements, 
and sense of self-worth all of which require being attended to, although with different 
intensity at different times. I have presented a particular view on human emotions as 
commentaries upon people’s concerns emergent in the three spheres of life. I have then 
provided an account of the process of emotional elaboration that human beings 
reflexively perform in a ceaseless inner dialogue about the satisfaction of their ultimate 
concerns and realisation of their life projects. These theoretical constructs are the main 
building blocks of this thesis which give me grounds to argue that the concept of 
reflexivity holds enough explanatory potential to account for the intricate ways in which 
ethical consumers come to embrace ethical food consumption as their ultimate 
commitment thus attaining specific identities and becoming the unique moral characters 
that they are. Consistently, the question as to what fuels agential ability to design and 
implement consumption projects intended to address their moral concerns calls for no 
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better explanation than that provided by the notion of reflexivity.    
 It is well beyond the scope of this thesis to delve into the philosophy of mind 
and make a case for the indispensability of reflexivity to the functioning of social 
subjects and the very existence of society as a whole. I have been spared this task by 
Archer, who has argued compellingly that all humans have to engage in internal self-
dialogues and elaborate upon their emotionality to achieve a liveable balance between 
their various concerns and find a satisfying way to be (for an extensive discussion and 
defence of reflexivity as an essential human property and “a transcendentally necessary 
condition for the workings of any society” see Archer, 2007, p. 31). Thus, ontologically, 
it is my key premise that “a subjective mental world of personal experiences exists” 
(Popper, 1972, p. 136), and that all human beings possess “a generative ability for 
internal deliberation upon external reality” (Archer, 2003, p. 20), i.e. that they engage in 
private deliberations about themselves, their concerns, desires, intentions, and their 
relationships with the objective contexts in which they are involuntarily placed. 
Following Archer, I conceptualise such reflexive deliberations as “the mental activity 
which, in private, leads to self-knowledge: about what to do, what to think and what to 
say” (2003, p. 26). The idea of reflexivity that I advance in my thesis does not, however, 
intend to portray social agents as all-seeing and all-knowing actors whose reflexive 
capacities grant them full discursive penetration of both the subjective self and its 
objective context. Reflexivity that claims complete understanding of the self and its 
relationship to the world has been justly called into question by different theorists and 
on various grounds. In an article on the production of situated knowledge, Gillian Rose 
(1994) summarises some of the arguments against full agential knowledgeability. 
Elaborating upon Gibson-Graham’s (1994, p. 206) problematisation of the idea of 
herself as “a centred and knowing subject who is present to myself and can be spoken 
for”, Rose portrays a self as “un-centred, un-certain, not entirely present, not fully 
representable: this is not a self that can be revealed by a process of self-reflection”. 
Presenting identity as relational, that is grounded in one’s sense of being different from 
the others, she asserts the impossibility of fully knowing one’s “otherness” which, in 
turn, subverts the possibility of fully knowing oneself. Further, drawing on Kobayashi’s 
(1994) negation of essentialism in conceptualising people’s identities, she construes 
reflexivity as a process of self-construction rather than self-discovery: “if the process of 
reflexivity changes what is being reflected upon, then there is no `transparent' self 
waiting to be revealed” (Rose, 1994, p. 313).      
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 None of the above arguments, however, can be used to undermine the model of 
reflexivity developed by Archer and weaved into my theoretical framework. 
Kobayashi’s point, in fact, is in unison with Archer’s idea of human reflexivity as the 
force behind the process of personal morphogenesis, i.e. subjects’ development into 
individuals with unique constellations of concerns - reflexively discerned, evaluated, 
and embraced - and in pursuit of particular projects - reflexively conceived, developed, 
and sustained - through which agential identities evolve. Further, neither Archer’s 
approach, nor my application thereof in the actual research, presume “a sort of 
reflexivity that assumes a transparently knowable self separate from its transparently 
knowable context” (Rose, 1994, p. 314). The demand to recognize reflexivity as an 
essential human property is not a demand to affirm its claims for a full understanding of 
either one’s inner self, or the external world, or the relationships between them. In fact, 
Archer is eager to admit that human knowledge is incomplete, partial, and specific as 
“subjects do not and cannot know everything that is going on” (2007, p. 23), that 
individual experiences represent only “that which is accessible to actors at any given 
time in its incompleteness and distortion and replete with its blind spots of ignorance” 
(1998, p. 369), and that every agential enterprise hence inevitably runs the risk of 
unacknowledged conditions, misinterpreted situations, and faulty conclusions – people 
often realise that they have got their priorities wrong, or that their chosen commitments 
are, in fact, unsustainable in their given contexts, or that they come at too high a cost 
(Archer, 2007). Yet, the failure of absolute reflexivity - unlimited, unmitigated and 
unconstrained - does not suggest the failure of reflexivity as an essential human 
property and central force that mediates between the subjects and the objective world in 
which they live and act for, unless agents exercise their property of reflexivity to design 
personal projects and implement them within the given circumstances, the potential of 
social structures to enable or constrain their actions remains inactivated and unexercised. 
It is this argument that leads to the contention that “how people reflexively deliberate 
upon what to do in the light of their personal concerns has to form a part of a mediatory 
account” (Archer, 2003, p. 15). From this viewpoint, it does not matter that “agents can 
only know themselves and their circumstances under their own descriptions, which are 
fallible, as is all our knowledge” (Archer, 2003, p. 15). The fallibility of agential 
conclusions does not invalidate their role in shaping people’s courses of action, and the 
contribution of human reflexivity to particular social outcomes does not depend on 
whether agents’ subjective evaluation of their objective circumstances is right or wrong. 
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What matters is that it is through such reflexive deliberations that individuals arrive at a 
specific perception of how it would be best to pursue their desired projects from the 
particular contexts in which they are placed. As Archer contends, “a social influence 
can itself be immune to what people think about it, and yet what they make of it 
reflexively can profoundly influence what they do about it” (2003, p. 20). Thus, the 
impossibility of attaining full knowledge of one’s inner self and its external 
circumstances does not discredit our reflexive potential: it invalidates neither agential 
ability to engage in reflexive deliberations, nor their intrinsic propensity to do so. What 
is required is a “situated understanding of reflexivity” (Adams and Raisborough, 2008, 
p. 1169) as agents’ capacity to deliberate upon their circumstances and contexts while 
simultaneously being conditioned by them. The aim of such reflexivity is not to produce 
an omniscient actor, but to enable individuals to reflexively discern and define their 
ultimate concerns, to evaluate and progressively monitor their commitments in relation 
to their subjective concerns and objective conditions, and to recognise, assess, and 
negotiate the properties of the structure to achieve a satisfying way to live and to be. 
This is not to suggest that agential conclusions about themselves and their relationships 
with the world are complete, unerring, or immutable, but it is to suggest that individual 
actions and practices are always and necessarily a consequence of the interplay between 
agents and structure which reflexivity enables and propels. While, admittedly, subjects 
cannot and do not know everything, what they can and do do is continuously reflect 
upon themselves and their circumstances and repeatedly negotiate their relationships 
with objective reality in an attempt to see their projects through. In the inevitable 
fallibility of human judgment lie possibilities for the progressive evolution of subjects’ 
knowledge of the outer world and their inner selves – a key to agential ability to achieve 
and maintain a fulfilling life - always and necessarily through reflexive examination and 
monitoring of the self, its concerns, and commitments in relation to the objective reality 
in which they are placed.        
 It is such concept of reflexivity that will guide my account of the ways in which 
individuals reflexively develop into ethical consumers - in their own idiosyncratic ways 
and under given objective circumstances. However, before this account can begin to 
unfold, it is essential to lay the theoretical ground from which the concept of reflexivity 
can emerge and on which it can flourish. This means clearing the way from the 
ontological presuppositions and assumptions with which reflexivity as an essential 
human property and a mediatory force between people and the external world cannot 
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co-exist. This cleared space needs to be filled with a model of social reality that is able 
to accommodate human agents as bearers of distinct causal powers and active 
contributors to both their own make-up as persons as well as the constitution of the 
social world in which they live and act. To this end, it is necessary to address some of 
the most long-standing questions within social theory, that is, the relationship between 
structure and agency, the personal and the social, the objective and the subjective. I 
consider this to be central to my entire research enterprise for, in setting out to 
investigate individual practices of ethical consumption, I follow Slater’s appeal (1997, p. 
172-173): 
How can we investigate the social meaning of things, needs and uses without reducing 
them either to omnipotent social structures (semiotic codes, grids of social classification 
generated by the social order itself, the structures of commercial capitalism) or regarding them 
as socially unconstrained, indeterminate, open, as a space of self-determined activity so free that 
it looks increasingly like the space of the sovereign liberal consumer?    
     
I am preoccupied with a similar task, that is how to construe ethical 
consumption practices as intentional and conscious projects of reflexive agents while 
also duly acknowledging their inevitable conditioning by the structural and cultural 
properties of objective reality. First and foremost, it is essential to delineate the 
ontology of both social structure and human agency, for it is only from that basis that an 
understanding of their essential properties and the interplay between them can be 
attempted and achieved. As Archer rightly notes, “how structures are variously held to 
influence agents is dependent upon what “structure” and “agency” are held to be (2003, 
p. 1). In sociological theory, it has been common to ascribe ontological supremacy to 
either structure or agency thereby denying the other element any essential properties and, 
consequently, the capacity to exert causal powers. This produces two opposing, but 
equally deficient ontological models of social reality: the one with the downward 
conflation which sees “the “parts” dominate the “people”” (Archer, 2000, p. 1), and the 
one with the upward conflation which allows “the “people” to orchestrate the “parts”” 
(Archer, 2000, p. 1). Finally, the third way to relate structure and agency has been by 
attempting to transcend the antinomy between these two dimensions of the social reality 
through an outright rejection of their ontological dualism.  Bourdieu’s (1984) idea of 
habitus and Giddens’ (1984) theory of structuration are examples of the theoretical 
approaches that understand structure and agency as mutually constituting and hence 
integral to and inseparable from each other. Its proponents fall into the trap of the 
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“central conflationism” (Archer, 2000, p. 6) – an ontologically fallacious perspective 
that relates structure and agency “at the cost of their analytical integrity, disabling the 
capacity to capture either” (Maton, 2008, p. 61). The major implication of construing 
structures and agents as ontologically indivisible is the conflation of their distinct 
properties and powers which, in turn, precludes the possibility of any form of 
meaningful interaction between them. Such a theoretical approach renders it impossible 
to even attempt to understand either how structural properties impinge upon agents or 
how agents use their causal powers to mediate the effects of the structure, for all these 
powers and properties are held to be inseparable and indistinguishable from each other.
 Upwards, downwards, and central conflation represent three models of social 
reality none of which offers a sound theoretical framework to guide an analysis of 
individual ethical food practices and meet the specific aims of this research for, in 
Bhaskar’s words, “on Model I there are actions but no conditions; on Model II 
conditions but no actions; on Model; III no distinction between the two” (2010, p. 77). 
What is needed is an ontological model that neither reduces social reality to just one 
dimension of the individual versus social dichotomy, nor blends structure and agency 
into “an amalgam whose properties and powers are completely interdependent and 
ineluctably intertwined” (Archer, 2007, p. 41). I approach the complexity of social 
reality from the crtitical realist perspective that conceives of structure and agency as two 
separate strata of social reality. Specifically, I rely on Archer’s account in which agents 
are granted personal emergent properties - self-awareness, reflexivity, personal identity 
- that have a distinct ontology which is “both objectively real and subjective in nature” 
(Archer, 2003, p. 36, my emphasis). This is because reflexive conversations - as well as 
thoughts, desires, intentions, and identities emerging from them - exist only when and 
as experienced by people and are “ineluctably tied to the subject” (Archer, 2003, p. 37). 
This subjective or, to use Searle’s (1998, p. 42) term, “first-person” ontology of 
reflexive deliberations is preserved unless the agent decides to break the privacy of his 
or her internal conversation by sharing its workings with someone else (Archer, 2003). 
Structure, on the other hand, is held to pertain to a different level of reality and possess 
properties of a different kind, such as distribution of resources, interests, roles, doctrines, 
ideologies, etc. These properties have an objective ontology since they represent a part 
of the socio-cultural system which is pre-existent to and relatively autonomous from 
individuals. These postulates – pre-existence of social forms and causal efficacy of 
agents - represent the key ontological points of departure in Archer’s (1995, p. 5) 
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approach to conceptualising social change and are united in the concept of 
morphogenesis: 
The 'morpho' element is an acknowledgement that society has no pre-set form or 
preferred state: the 'genetic' part is a recognition that it takes its shape from, and is formed by, 
agents, originating from the intended and unintended consequences of their activities.  
  
Underlying the process of morphogenesis is the principle of emergence stating 
that on the basis of existing properties new properties emerge over time – a cycle of 
continuous change which spares neither structure: “society is characteristically 
transformable; it has no immutable form or even preferred state.  It is like nothing but 
itself, and what precisely it is like at any time depends upon human doings and their 
consequences” (Archer, 1995, p. 1), nor agents: “neither are we immutable as social 
agents, for what we are and what we do as social beings are also affected by the society 
in which we live and by our very efforts to transform it” (Archer, 1995, p. 1). Archer 
conceptualises morphogenesis as an unceasing set of cycles: structural conditioning => 
social interaction => structural elaboration (Archer, 1995, p. 16), during which the 
genesis and development of agents occur in the contexts which are neither of their 
making nor choosing (structural conditioning), while at the same time the activities and 
practices of socially situated agents change and transform the structure (social 
interaction and structural elaboration). Archer’s understanding of social change is 
essentially temporal: “temporality is not an option but a necessity” (1998, p. 375), she 
claims, for “structural properties were neither the creation of contemporary actors nor 
are ontologically reducible to ‘material existents’ (raw resources) and dependent upon 
current acts of human instantiation (rule governed) for all their current effects” (1995, p. 
138); it is fundamentally historical, for it allows to distinguish events, situated in space 
and in time, which “initiate or constitute ruptures, mutations, or generally 
transformations of social forms” (Bhaskar, 2010, p. 60); and it is deeply permeating, for 
it applies at all levels, or strata, of social reality - from social systems to personal 
identities. Archer’s theory of morphogenesis aligns well with Bhaskar’s (2010) 
transformational model of social activity which too contends that because social 
structure is pre-existent and “irreducible to the doings of contemporary actors” (Archer, 
1998, p. 359),  
(…) it is no longer true to say that human agents create it. Rather we must say; they 
reproduce or transform it. That is to say, if society is already made, then any concrete human 
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praxis or, if you like, act of objectivation, can only modify it; and the totality of such acts 
sustain or change it” (Bhaskar, 2010, p. 60, emphasis in original). 
 
In both approaches, human activity is seen as “consisting in the transformation 
by efficient (intentional) agency of pre-given material (natural and social) causes” 
(Bhaskar, 2010, p. 92). Thus, precursory structural properties supply and define 
contexts from which people pursue their subjective projects and hence have the 
potential to impinge upon individuals and shape their courses of action. At the same 
time, agential properties have causal efficacy towards structural influences and provide 
individuals with the capacity for reflexive “reinterpretations, modifications, 
transgressions” (Slater, 1997, p. 148) of the dominant social forms. Depending on how 
exactly subjects respond to structural influences, they may either reproduce or transform 
the social order thus inducing the processes of morphostasis or morphogenesis (see 
Archer, 1995; 1998). The objectivity of social structures and the subjectivity of agents 
are “two causal powers that are irreducibly different in kind and make relatively 
autonomous contributions to social outcomes” (Archer, 2003, p. 1-2).  
 Archer’s principle of analytical dualism, that is “distinguishing pre-conditions 
from present activities” (1998, p. 368), along with her conceptualisation of both 
structure and agency as inherently transformable provides essential theoretical ground 
and methodological toolkit for developing a more comprehensive grasp of social 
structures, a more nuanced understanding of individual action, and, crucially, an 
exploration of their interaction and its outcomes over time. What is particularly 
important in relation to the aims of this project is Archer’s application of the concepts of 
morphostasis and morphogenesis not just to the social order, but to the agents as well. 
Personal emergent properties, of which reflexivity is the key, play a critical role not 
only in giving rise to morphostasis or morphogenesis of the structure, but they also have 
causal efficacy toward agents themselves who, through continuous rounds of reflexive 
deliberations upon their values, concerns, projects and ways of their realisation, shape 
themselves as particular persons. Every agential decision about following a specific 
course of action or, to the contrary, changing its direction, becomes part of his personal 
morphogenesis or morphostasis. This is precisely the aim that my study purports to 
achieve - to investigate how, in an attempt to address their ultimate concerns, agents 
embark on and pursue “subjectively, because reflexively” (Archer, 2003, p. 16) 
designed projects representing their personal morphostasis or morphogenesis as unique 
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individuals and how, through reflexive mediation of structural opportunities and 
constraints that emerge on their way, they ultimately attain the desired ethical consumer 
identities. Archer’s ontological model is crucial to achieving this objective, for it is only 
such conception of social reality that is based on a clear separation between agents and 
structure and, moreover, their endowment with different kinds of properties and causal 
powers that presupposes a continuous interaction between the two strata of reality and 
calls for an examination of its causes, conditions, and outcomes. To analyse this 
interaction means to acknowledge and investigate both the ways in which structural and 
cultural properties bear upon subjects as well as how subjects, from the positions and 
situations “which are not of their making yet which condition much of what they can 
make of them” (Archer, 1998, p. 375), exercise their causal powers and respond to the 
structure to reproduce or transform it. By embracing the realist social ontology with its 
central tenet that “the causal power of social forms is mediated through social agency” 
(Bhaskar, 1979, p. 26) while also elaborating on it by introducing the concepts of 
reflexivity and internal conversation to elucidate how exactly this mediatory process 
occurs, Archer develops a theory of social reality that allows to achieve this crucial task. 
 Explaining the nature of interaction between structures and agents is key to 
understanding how exactly the notion of reflexivity makes its entry into the study’s 
theoretical framework and what role it plays in the shaping and moulding of the social 
reality. The first part of the story, that is how structural properties affect agents’ actions, 
can be decoded through the social realist concepts of “enablements” and “constraints” – 
the causal powers of the structural and cultural properties which have the potential to 
either facilitate or inhibit agents’ preferred courses of action. What distinguishes 
Archer’s conceptualisation of enablements and constraints is an emphasis on agential 
powers as being just as indispensable to the process of social conditioning as the 
structural properties themselves. As she highlights, the enabling or constraining 
potential of objective circumstances can only reveal itself in relation to a particular 
“agential enterprise”, or “project” (Archer, 2003, p. 6), since “constraints require 
something to constrain, and enablements something to enable” (Archer, 2003, p. 4). 
Because such projects are a product of human capacity to reflexively design specific 
courses of action in order to achieve desired outcomes (for we have already rejected the 
models of reality where a social subject is not “the producer and has no conscious 
mastery” (Archer, 2000, p. 42) over his choices and acts), then it follows that the 
activation of structural enablements and constraints is itself contingent on the human 
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property of reflexivity and requires its deliberate exercise by an active agent. Thus, 
social conditioning is “a process that involves both objective impingement and 
subjective reception” (Archer, 2003, p. 5).      
 The indispensability of reflexivity for the activation of the causal powers of the 
structure leads Archer to posit that no form of social conditioning can be completely 
void of the contributions of agential subjectivity. It manifests itself in individuals’ 
idiosyncratic responses to the structural influences based on their subjective evaluation 
of the objective circumstances in relation to the projects they wish to advance. 
Moreover, reflexivity enables agents not only to recognise, but to also foresee the 
objective forces that could be activated were they to pursue a particular pathway.  
Consequently, constraints and enablements can exert their causal powers on agential 
choice of actions through mere anticipation: the perceived ease of implementing the 
desired project may encourage subjects to go ahead with it, while the expectation of 
difficulties, to the contrary, may prevent them from attempting to realise it. The 
freedom of agents to pursue their chosen ways is limited and depends on the strength of 
particular constraints and enablements (and I would add, their nature, since the kind of 
sacrifices people are prepared to make varies significantly from person to person) that 
they face. Yet, reflexivity enables humans to not only acknowledge the constraining or 
enabling properties of their objective circumstances, but to also creatively respond to, 
that is counteract, accommodate, or circumvent their influences: 
The effect of these structural and cultural causal powers is at the mercy of two open 
systems; the world and its contingencies and human agency’s reflexive acuity, creativity and 
capacity for commitment (Archer, 2003, p. 7).      
  
These agential mental powers, and reflexivity in particular, are held to play a 
key role in the process of mediation between the causal powers of the structure on the 
one hand and social actors on the other. It seems obvious indeed that it is always and 
necessarily the case that “agential subjectivity reflects upon social objectivity” (Archer, 
2003, p. 133) and never the other way around, since self-consciousness and capacity for 
reflexive deliberations pertain exclusively to people, whereas structure is invariably 
non-reflexive and operates in an automatic way (Archer, 2003).  
By contending that social enablements and constraints only become active and 
powerful when entering into a relationship with agential projects (which are, of course, 
a manifestation of and testimony to human properties and capacities), and by 
introducing reflexivity as a mediatory force between the two, Archer essentially 
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accomplishes the goal of relating the structure and agency, the objective and the 
subjective, the social and the personal in the way that avoids both the pitfalls of 
reductionism as well as the fallacy of conflationist approaches. Her model keeps 
subjects separate from their circumstances thereby enabling an acknowledgement of the 
essential properties of individuals as well as those of the structure. It highlights the 
embeddedness of human practices in the social, practical, and natural orders of the 
world, and recognises the power of external reality to shape agential courses of action. 
At the same time, Archer emphasises the capacity of human reflexivity to mediate 
between people’s subjectively defined commitments and objective structural 
opportunities and constraints that they inevitably face on their way. It is because 
reflexivity plays this mediating role that the outcome – each person’s unique life 
choices and actions – will never be merely a passive reflection of social reality (Archer, 
2007).            
 The strong focus on agential properties and due acknowledgement of their 
ontological integrity and causal efficacy is what distinguishes Archer’s account from 
other approaches to agency and the role of human subjectivity in shaping both 
individual practices as well as the entire social order. Specifically, it compares 
favourably to Bourdieu’s idea of habitus and social practice theory – two conceptual 
lenses that are commonly applied to the studies of consumer patterns and practices 
despite being incapable to provide adequate space to accommodate either individual 
subjectivity or agential capacity of human beings. Practice-based approach construes 
personal values as mere derivatives of the dominant social discourses, which are held to 
be the sole prime determinants of subjects’ performance of practices. This idea reduces 
human beings to their sociality and deprives them of their essential property of personal 
identity, defined precisely by what people value and care about most in life (Archer, 
2000). Bourdieu’s theory is fundamentally flawed in a similar way – while purporting to 
build the bridge between the personal and the social, it ends up stripping human 
subjectivity of its ontological footing, since the personal is ultimately defined through 
the social… 
Persons, at their most personal, are essentially the personification of exigencies actually 
or potentially inscribed in the structure of the field or, more precisely, in the position occupied 
within this field (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 44)  
 
…and the individual is always related back to the common:   
Personal style . . . is never more than a deviation in relation to the style of a period or 
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class so that it relates back to the common style not only by its conformity . . . but also by the 
difference (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 86). 
 
Such merging of the personal and the social leads to Goffman’s (1959) view that 
personhood can never be developed or understood outside of the social world – the 
perspective that throws us right back into the ontological trap of conflating agential and 
structural manifestations. This is why I find any model of social reality in which people 
or their agential manifestations are seen as an integral part of the structure theoretically 
deficient and practically inept for the kind of research objectives that this thesis aims to 
achieve. Such approach denies humans, among other capacities, their essential property 
of reflexivity, since the ability of individuals “to consider 
themselves in relation to their (social) contexts and vice versa” (Archer, 2007, p. 4) calls 
for a clear differentiation between agents (the deliberating subjects) and their objective 
circumstances (the objects of deliberation). Not only does the loss of reflexivity leave us 
with social subjects who are deprived of awareness of the self, their own interests, 
values and goals, their objective circumstances and, ultimately, the ability to reflexively 
choose their courses of action; to surrender human capacity for reflexive deliberation 
also means that “the potential of such reflexivity for mediating the influence of structure 
upon agency is lost in advance” (Archer, 2003, p. 2). This is particularly the case with 
Bourdieu’s logic of practice, which replaces conscious deliberation on the part of social 
actors with non-reflexive workings of habitus and intentional actions by goal-oriented 
individuals with intuitive “feel for the game”, thus essentially depriving subjects of their 
agential powers to challenge and transform the social order. Indeed, how can agents 
become aware of their dispositions and induce disjunctions between habitus and the 
field, if habitus is developed tacitly and subconsciously through socialisation and 
experiences, and  “principles em-bodied in this way are placed beyond the grasp of 
consciousness, and hence cannot be touched by voluntary, deliberate transformation, 
cannot even be made explicit” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 75)? Further, if habitus functions to 
ensure the routine adjustment of subjective and objective structures, if, by default, 
“social agents (...) come to gravitate towards those social fields (and positions within 
those fields) that best match their dispositions and to try to avoid those fields that 
involve a field–habitus clash” (Maton, 2008, p. 58), then how do people come to 
challenge the social order? As Sayer contends, habitus “makes it impossible to 
understand how anyone could react against and resist at least some parts of their habitat” 
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(2005, p. 31). All in all, the theory of habitus, which “assumes an exaggerated 
continuity in the socialisation of personal identities” (Archer, 2007, p. 48) to the point 
of denying agents awareness of their dispositions and capacity to reflexively choose 
their courses of action, ultimately leaves us with the “world where behaviour has its 
causes, but actors are not allowed their reasons” (Jenkins, 2002, p. 97). In contrast, 
Archer’s perspective does not reduce individuals’ subjective dispositions, values, and 
beliefs to merely a product of semi-unconscious embodiment of social structures and 
facts in the way that Bourdieu’s notion of habitus does. Instead, it treats individuals as 
conscious masters of their practices  
who pursue the situational logic of “opportunity” (…) who, even if they come from the 
old héritiers, are highly aware that they must reflexively select, suppress and supplement 
features from their inherited repertoire of routines” and who develop the practices that “entail 
creative, reflexive thought about what courses of action do constitute mastery in and of the new 
context” (Archer, 2007, p. 49).  
For Archer, unlike for the exponents of the social practice theory, “the 
subjective agent is the ultimate and effective cause of social practice “(Archer, 2003, p. 
134). It is this concept of an agent - the one which accords individuals responsibility for 
and mastery over their actions - that the practice of ethical consumption calls for. 
Reflexivity, intentionality, awareness of the self and one’s ultimate concerns, values, 
and goals, which are more than internalised social discourses and facts, are essential 
human properties that any individual practice of ethical consumption is a manifestation 
of. To make ethical food practice a life-long commitment, an agent must reflexively 
discern and embrace his ultimate concerns, design a particular project to address them, 
and confront and negotiate the forces of external reality in order to see his commitment 
through. This is why Archer’s social ontology, which accords human reflexivity the 
primary responsibility for mediating between structure and agency, provides a 
springboard for a theoretically sound analysis of ethical consumer practices and 
identities. It is reflexivity that enables individuals to attain the desired personalities by 
furthering self-knowledge and awareness of their ultimate values and concerns. It is 
reflexivity that fuels humans’ ability to actively, consciously, and intentionally design 
projects to address their subjective concerns and realise them under the given 
circumstances.  It is this reflexive capacity that “enables us to be the authors of our own 
projects in society” (Archer, 2003, p. 34) and hence answers for the idiosyncrasies of 
individuals’ ethical food practices, the sheer variety of which being exactly what makes 
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investigating them worthwhile and interesting.     
 Archer’s conceptualisation of reflexivity thus illuminates why “consumption 
practices are neither passively structured, nor “inevitably conformist” (Slater, 1997, p. 
148). It allows to postulate that ethical consumer practices are a result of the interplay 
between agential subjectivity (manifest through subjectively defined values, 
commitments, and concerns) and structural objectivity (the properties of various 
contexts from which people pursue their projects) which is fuelled by human capacity to 
actively, consciously, and reflexively negotiate between the two. Moreover, it provides 
a theoretical groundwork needed to demonstrate how through idiosyncratic 
interpretation and enactment of practices subjects are able to challenge and transform 
the social order, which “is not just reflected but constituted and certainly changed 
through practices” (Slater, 1997, p. 152). Thereby, it manages to “integrate structures 
and agents in a single story” (Hollis and Smith, 1994, p. 250) while keeping them 
separate, hence enabling the production of a single yet bilateral account of their 
interplay necessitated by the a-synchronicity of structural properties and agential 
experiences (Archer, 1998). This is crucial, since  
 
… we cannot account for any outcome unless we understand the agent’s project in 
relation to her social context. And we cannot understand her project without entering into her 
reflexive deliberations about her personal concerns in conjunction with the objective social 
context that she confronts (Archer, 2003, p. 131).  
Likewise, I found it impossible to understand individuals’ ethical food practices 
and identities without considering the objective contexts in which they formed and 
developed, just as it proved impossible to understand people’s subjective commitments 
without shedding light on reflexive deliberations behind them. It is for these reasons 
that I consider Archer’s model of social reality ontologically and epistemically fit for 
enabling me, through a thorough analysis and interpretation of the participants’ life and 
food stories, to accomplish the challenging task posed by Slater and taken up in this 
thesis, i.e. to explore the meaning of consumer practices, “things, needs and uses” (1997, 
p. 172) while accounting for the ways in which “structures and agents combine” 
(Archer, 2003, p. 8) to shape and define them. It is such an exploration of ethical 
consumption intending to cast light on the development of subjects’ moral identities 
through particular food commitments while capturing the interplay between subjective 
and objective forces behind them that my research was ultimately aimed at and that this 
thesis will unfold. 
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Chapter 2  
 
Explaining Consumer Behaviour: Toward an Integrated Account  
 
 
An approach which integrates social influences and scope for reflexivity and responsibility can 
explain things which neither of these one-sided theories can (Sayer, 2011, p. 56) 
 
In the previous chapter, I have presented the theoretical framework underpinning 
my study and delineated its social ontology. I have proposed a realist model of the 
world in which agents and structure are conceived of as two ontologically different 
strata of reality and accorded their own emergent properties and causal powers. Such 
ontological anchorage is crucial for my research if its key aim – to construe practices of 
ethical consumption as structurally conditioned, yet reflexively developed projects of 
socially situated, yet active, intentional, and conscious agents – is to be achieved. The 
critical premises of such social ontology, i.e. pre-existence of social forms and causal 
efficacy of agents, are, however, at odds with the presumptions built into some of the 
most widely used approaches to conceptualising and studying consumer behaviour in 
general and ethical consumer practices in particular. Since ethical consumption came to 
the fore of consumer research, numerous studies have attempted to explain the 
phenomenon by conceptualising it as a collective consumer action in pursuit of social 
and political progress. Boström and Klintman (2008), Clarke et al. (2007), Micheletti 
(2003) have all approached ethical consumption as a means of political engagement and 
a vehicle for social change thus laying emphasis on ethical consumers as political agents, 
citizens, and responsible members of society and exploring external manifestations of 
the “consumer self” and its effectiveness in enacting social change. Within this 
framework, the intent of ethical food practices has been viewed as focused 
predominantly on the practical goals of addressing the deficiencies of modern food 
system and attaining structural changes in the organization of food supply (Lefferts and 
Heinicke, 1996; Jacobsen and Dulsrud, 2007). Consequently, very few concerted efforts 
were directed at producing an effective account of the aspects of individual engagement, 
personal commitment, and subjective meanings invested in the practices of ethical 
consumption. A wide-ranging review of academic literature on fair-trade undertaken by 
Tallontire, Rentsendorj and Blowfield in 2001 identified a gap in the contemporary 
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understanding of the meanings of ethical purchases for individual consumers and the 
ways these meanings translate into actions highlighting the need for more explorations 
into this area.  Since then, however, there has been an observable proliferation of 
research attempting to acknowledge and explore personal meanings, i.e. “the hidden or 
explicit purpose, motivation, intention, aspiration and expectation” (Cherrier, 2006, p. 
517) attached to ethical consumers’ choices, practices, and experiences (e.g. Cherrier, 
2006; Barnett et al., 2005). In this section, I will situate this burgeoning stream of 
literature vis-à-vis the dominant theoretical approaches to studying consumer behaviour 
that emerged and developed in the last several decades and whose core presuppositions 
have been informing empirical investigations of ethical consumer behaviour. I will 
critically review these perspectives to identify and expose their ontological and 
methodological biases that have been inhibiting a comprehensive and nuanced 
understanding of individual practices of ethical consumption and, building upon this 
critique, describe how by matching the complementary strengths and weaknesses of 
these contrasting approaches my account of ethical consumer experiences will help to 
advance such an understanding.        
 As Warde (1997) observes, from the 1980s onwards there has been a 
considerable increase in the scholarly attention to the subject of consumption. A 
theoretical view of consumer choices and activities as an outcome of material 
circumstances and reflection of class positions and social inequalities gave way to the 
new sociological understanding of consumption as shaped by a wide range of societal 
forces and personal motivations. Various perspectives have evolved which place the 
focus of conceptual and methodological concern at different locations along the 
structure-agency continuum depending on whether society or individual is seen as the 
ultimate author and key source of consumption practices. The tensions between 
divergent approaches to consumer agency, that is “the room for manoeuvre which social 
actors have when they act as consumers” (Sassatelli, 2007, p. 110) have since been 
fuelling academic debate about the engines of consumer behaviour. At one end of the 
spectrum are theoretical views that take consumer to be the prime mover of practice and 
chief focus of scientific investigation, while on the other side are socio-centric 
approaches within which the consumer is seen as “if not a dupe at least passive” (Warde, 
2015, p. 120). Agency-centred perspectives further differ in terms of the key properties 
attributed to consuming agents and the main goals that consumer choices and activities 
are seen as geared towards. Highly influential has been the theorisation of consumers as 
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reflexive individuals engaged in a continuous process of constructing a coherent self 
through creative appropriation of a range of commodities and goods (Giddens, 1991; 
Beck, 1992). The rise of the concepts of identity and reflexivity as a means of 
understanding consumption practices is linked to the unfolding of what has been termed 
a “post-traditional society” (Giddens, 1994) or “risk society” (Beck, 1992). It has been 
argued that the demise of the class structure as an organizing principle of social life has 
led to an intensifying process of informalization, described by Wouters (1986) as one of 
the most powerful social trends of the 1960-1970s and a prevailing condition of the 20th 
century. Expressed in the decline of moral, aesthetic, and social standards of behaviour 
(Warde, 1997), it has led to the state of social disembeddedness – the erosion of 
conventional ties of community, kinship, tradition, culture, and physical places and loss 
of connectedness between individuals in social environments (Barrera, 1986). In the 
absence of collective prescriptions for social conduct individual judgments have 
become key to attributing and maintaining social meaning (Wouters, 1986).  As Sörbom 
(2003, p. 3 cited in Shaw, 2007, p. 143) describes it:  
We have become released from collective and traditional authorities . . . it is now up to 
the individual to find whatever she or he perceives to be true – it can no longer be transferred 
from some higher power.        
  
Against this backdrop, reflexivity has been singled out as the key property that 
allows highly individualised subjects to attempt to solve the problem of self-identity, 
that is to “produce, stage and cobble together their biographies themselves” (Beck, 1994, 
p. 13) in a society where one has “no choice but to choose how to be and how to act” 
(Giddens, 1994, p. 75) and where consumption becomes the major medium in which the 
reflexive project of the self (see Giddens, 1991, p. 52-55) emerges and unfolds: 
Today, people define themselves through the messages they transmit to others via the 
goods and practices that they possess and display. They manipulate or manage appearances, 
thereby creating and sustaining a “self-identity” (Warde, 1997, p. 68).  
 
The view of consumption as an arena of reflexive self-production and consumers 
as active agents continuously negotiating their identities through a complex variety of 
consumption choices has penetrated into sociological thinking about individual food 
practices. Associations between what people eat and their personal and social identities 
have been claimed (Fischler, 1988; Warde, 1997; Lang and Heasman, 2004) and 
exemplified in research: Warde’s (1997) study of culinary recipes in popular women’s 
magazines, Goodman’s (2004) analysis of the contemporary nature of fair trade, and 
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Diner’s (2001) investigation of food practices of three distinct migrant groups in 
America all finely argue for the symbolic role and identity-enhancing potential of food. 
Further, consumer reflexivity has been summoned and introduced into the accounts of 
post-traditional societies to compensate for the “decline in “the spirit of discipline” 
(Warde, 1997, p. 13) in the sphere of consumption, including that of food. It has been 
argued that in the world where people are no longer embedded in traditional social 
contexts and no longer belong to familiar collectivities, “food selection and intake are 
increasingly a matter of individual, not social, decisions” (Fischler, 1980, p. 948). In the 
absence of “social and cultural framework of eating habits” (Fischler, 1980, p. 944), 
individuals lack reassurance about their dietary behaviour:	  
Denied is the sense of comfort and security that can be derived from knowing that our 
tastes and preferences, even in the humble field of food, are endorsed and shared by others, 
whom we respect and with whom we consider we belong (Warde, 1997, p. 173) 
 
In such conditions individual reflexivity takes over from traditions to provide 
guidelines for appropriate food choices and eating behaviour – a reflexive food 
consumer, that is the one exhibiting a “broader sense of agency in the realm of 
consumption choices, reflected in knowledge-seeking, evaluation, and discernment” 
(Guthman, 2002, p. 299), emerges. Another social factor claimed to be responsible for 
accelerating the transformation of individuals from passive consumers into increasingly 
reflexive agents is the proliferation of new kinds of risks, created by the modern welfare 
society and left to increasingly self-dependent people to negotiate and deal with (Beck, 
1992; Giddens, 1991) - a societal imprint that can be easily applied to the current food 
environment where safety scandals (of which salmonella in eggs in 1988, the Alar scare 
in 1989, BSE in 1996, E-coli outbreak in 2011, and the horsemeat scandal in 2013 are 
the most illustrative examples) and unprecedented advances in production technologies 
ceaselessly fuel public thinking about food in terms of danger and risk. The profile of “a 
discerning food consumer” (Murdoch and Miele, 1999, p. 469) - the one who plays an 
active role in the organization of food supply, as defined by DuPuis (2000) - has been 
further rising against the backdrop of mounting evidence and growing recognition of the 
adverse effects of the modern food system on our physical, societal, economic, and 
environmental wellbeing (Lang, Barling and Caraher, 2009; Fraj and Martinez, 2007). 
Concomitantly, studies began to appear suggesting that consumers are increasingly 
incorporating reflexivity in their daily food decisions and practices (Arvola et al., 2008; 
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Hilton, 2004; Torjusen et al., 2001). As Hilton notes, “there is evidence to suggest that 
an increasing number of consumers are beginning to think more closely and more often 
about the basis of their own comfort” (2004, p. 119).    
 Consequently, the figure of a reflexive consumer has made its entrance into 
sociological research on ethical consumption (see, for example, Adams and 
Raisborough, 2008; Cherrier, 2006; Gabriel and Lang, 2006; Barnett et al., 2005; 
Micheletti, 2003; Halkier, 2001). This, coupled with a sustained focus on the symbolic 
meaning and potential of goods and continuous academic efforts to get a better grasp of 
the deeper motives behind individual consumption decisions, has generated attempts at 
interpreting ethical practices in terms of identity investments and reflexive self-
production. Thus, Shaw’s (2007, p. 141) investigation of boycotting behaviour 
describes a group of consumers for whom an alternative approach to consumption was 
an important way of “marking your own identity”. Shaw and Shiu’s (2003) earlier 
enquiry into the factors influencing ethical choice as well as Newholm’s (2005) study of 
ethical consumers both argue for the integrity of personal identity to be an important 
motive behind consumer engagement in responsible shopping. Taking the identity 
theme further still, sociological research started to supply commentary on the potential 
of ethical consumption to serve not only as a tool for self-construction, but also as a 
mechanism of self-control whereby “individuals in the act of constructing and 
reconstructing their own biographies monitor their own behaviour and thereby, at least 
half-consciously, discipline themselves with a view to self-improvement” (Warde, 1997, 
p. 93). While still focused on consumption as a means of actualization of individual 
identities, this perspective tunes in with the argument that “life politics goes beyond the 
simple politicization of a personal agenda” and “covers more than selfishness or self-
indulgence” (Kim, 2012, p. 149) and shifts the spotlight from a consumer’s self-centred 
self to a consumer’s self-governed self – a binary used by Lekakis (2013) to distinguish 
between the neoliberal self-indulgent consumer and the citizen-consumer who actively 
manages his political and social participation. The quintessence of the argument is 
summarised in the concept of “moral selving”, devised by Barnett et al. (2005, p. 29) to 
describe the process of individuals' creation and display of different forms of selfhood 
through engagement with alternative consumption practices which, authors argue, 
represents an essential dimension of ethical consumption.     
 A body of empirical research buttresses this idea of ethical consumption as a 
moralizing strategy. Thus, in a study on consumer engagement in boycotts Kozinets and 
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Handelman (1998, n/p) highlight the powerful “individualizing” and “morally 
transforming” potential of ethical shopping behaviour. By engaging in ethical 
consumption, authors argue, individuals can materialize their “ideal self” through the 
activation of such values as compassion, care, reciprocity, responsibility, etc. These 
findings are echoed by Moisander and Pesonen (2002) who examine and describe how 
green consumerism enables individuals to manifest their personal ethics and moral 
agency and in doing so re-invent themselves as ethical subjects as opposed to the 
dominant materialistic consumers. They interpret consumer engagement in 
environmentalism through a Foucauldian lens, that is as a mode of self-formation, and 
approach the moral aspects of ethical consumerism as “an aesthetic of existence”, or as 
“arts of existence” (Darier, 1999) that involve “a permanent questioning and reinventing 
of the self” (Moisander and Pesonen, 2002, p. 330). Ethical consumer choices are thus 
presented as elements in the “politics of the self” geared at the formation of the 
individual as a moral subject. Similarly, based on her investigation of consumer use of 
eco-friendly shopping bags, Cherrier contends that ethical practices contribute to the 
formation and actualisation of desired identities – for her participants, carrying a 
reusable bag was a way to self-identify as “a recycler, a green voter, an environmentally 
conscious consumer or an ethical citizen” (2006, p. 520). These studies offer an 
empirical record of the potential of ethical consumption not only to tell “the story of 
who we are”, but also to fulfil the “fantasy of what we wish to be like” (Gabriel and 
Lang, 2006, p. 94). Such interpretation clearly presupposes consumer agency that 
manifests itself in the ability of individuals to resist and refuse materialist subjectivities 
imposed by the dominant consumer culture and imagine, create, and promote alternative 
forms of individuality.        
 Another stream of research exploring the relationships between ethical practices 
and consumer identities has drawn out lessons for understanding ethical consumer 
behaviour from the argument that “we use consumption symbolically not only to create 
and sustain the self but also to locate us in society” (Wattanasuwan, 2005, p. 179). A 
growing number of studies offer interpretations of ethical shopping through Veblen’s 
(1899) lens, i.e. as a form of “conspicuous consumption” aimed at projecting a higher 
social, cultural, or moral status through appropriation and display of commodities that 
confer particular qualities. The view of ethical consumption as a strategy for achieving 
social distinction rests on the assumption that being a reflexive consumer presupposes 
certain levels of financial and cultural capital. The argument has both been expressed in 
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the academic literature (e.g. Adams and Raisborough, 2008; Goodman, 2004) as well as 
supported by market reports which, despite somewhat discrepant findings, seem to 
suggest that the ethical goods market is dominated by consumers from the highest 
socio-economic groups (Key Note, 2012; Tallontire et al., 2001). In addition, Veblen’s 
original view of expensiveness as the key product characteristic that provides the 
impression of social superiority has been re-thought to argue that “class is not just a 
matter of money” (Warde, 1997, p. 175) and other symbols can offer channels for social 
distinction. The idea of materialization of meanings and values in goods and 
commodities is not new and has been well articulated, for example, in Miller’s (2014) 
study of the role of The Bon Marche department store in the French bourgeois culture. 
In his research, Miller describes how important cultural values of bourgeoisie, such as 
respectability, found material expression in a variety of goods from furnishings to 
clothing - “goods made these values concrete and gave them a “reality all their own”, to 
borrow McCracken’s (1988, p. 26) interpretation of Miller’s findings. This argument 
further raises the profile of ethical consumption as a strategy for status enhancement. In 
line with it, academic attention has turned to the potential of ethical choices to stand as a 
proxy for personal traits such as kindness, compassion, selflessness, etc., that are 
independent of financial success but, as Jaeger (2004) argues, can bring high status 
rewards. Barnett et al. (2005) and Allison (2009) both argue that in demonstrating 
commitment to products that symbolize and convey particular values, such as 
responsibility, solidarity, reciprocity, and care, ethical consumers are engaging in the 
construction and management of their social image. Micro-level research further 
exposes the association between products and values and the status-enhancing effect 
ensuing from it. The following quote from a participant of Shaw et al.’s (2005, p. 190) 
study of ethical shoppers encapsulates the argument: 
If you're putting Cafedirect [Cafedirect is a brand of fair trade coffee in the UK] 
in your trolley and driving around with it then you're saying to other people I'm clever 
enough to know the difference between this and Nescafe. 
 
Further, Kozinets and Handelman’s (1998, n/p) research on boycotts highlights 
the morally transforming potential of boycotting behaviour which consumers tap into in 
order to define “a personal morality that has "evolved" beyond hedonistic commercial 
interests”. In unison with this are findings of Cherrier’s (2006) study of green shopping 
bag users revealing consumer perceptions of re-usable grocery bags as a manifestation 
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of environmental awareness and concerns. This adds another line of empirical evidence 
to the argument that ethical choices can be used as a means of self-production as well as 
self-representation - “bulletin boards for internal messages and billboards for external 
ones”, in the words of McCracken (1988, p. 136). Such perspective on consumer 
behaviour rests on a number of important assumptions. Firstly, it reflects a shift in focus 
from the features and attributes of commodities to their symbolic meaning and, 
particularly, identity value, i.e. the potential to create and communicate consumer self-
concept (Warde, 1997). More importantly, it relies on the model of a reflexive, 
interpretative, and purposeful consumer and thus acknowledges individuals as active 
agents of choice and prime authors of consumption practices. Moreover, it spotlights 
reflexivity as the key driving force of consumer choice, “implying that conscious and 
intentional decisions steer consumption behavior and explain its sense and direction” 
(Warde, 2015). Adams (2003) defines such approach as “the extended reflexivity thesis” 
(p. 222) characterised by the attribution of “a heightened, transforming level of 
reflexivity” (p. 221) to consuming agents who are constantly engaged in their own 
reflexive production. The key contested features of this thesis lie in its neglect of the 
“social embeddeddness” of reflexivity (Adams, 2003, p. 224) and overemphasis on the 
freedom of choice at the expense of acknowledging the role of the structure in shaping 
the self and its practices. This positioning of reflexivity outside rather than within the 
boundaries of particular cultural and social contexts in which it is exercised by an agent 
has steered a lot of well-founded criticism toward the postmodernist model of the 
consumer self. Thus, Archer (2007) is highly critical of the belief in an unbounded 
reflexivity, symptomatic of late-modernist accounts of selfhood, and the ways in which 
Giddens and his theoretical allies gloss over the complexities of agential relationships 
with the external world. Far from subverting the centrality of human reflexivity to the 
construction of self and organisation of social life, Archer’s argument nevertheless 
demands that the causal powers of the structure be acknowledged and their role in 
shaping agential answers to the questions of “What to do? How to act? Who to be?” 
(Giddens, 1991, p. 70) accounted for. While Archer too places “an extended process of 
reflexivity at the heart of modern identity” (Adams, 2003, p. 221), she rejects late 
modernists' tendency to think of human reflexivity as an unconstrained force flowing 
freely in an unstructured environment and calls for an account of its relationship with 
objective reality. Her critique echoes Tucker’s warning that “[a] strong self which 
heroically creates narratives of personal development in uncertain times . . . gives short 
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shrift to the structural and cultural factors still at work in fashioning the self’ (1998, p. 
208) and resonates with Adams’ (2003, p. 224) caveat against the notion of identity as a 
reflexive project free from determination by external forces: “in imagining an 
unbounded reflexivity, it overlooks many crucial factors in identity formation, and 
misjudges somewhat the nature of the current age”. Sassatelli (2007, p. 106) joins the 
criticism, calling for an acknowledgment that 
The ongoing constitution of a personal style draws on commodities whose trajectories 
consumers can never fully control and it is negotiated within various contexts, institutions and 
relations which both habilitate and constrain subjects.     
    
In a critical analysis of the conceptual fit between fair trade consumption and the 
idea of reflexive self-production, Adams and Raisborough (2008, p. 1169) highlight the 
poverty of the extended reflexivity thesis which precludes “an understanding of the 
specific and localized ways in which reflexivity emerges from a complex interface of 
socially and culturally stratified contexts, dynamic interpersonal relations and 
psychodynamics”. They propose to replace the idea of context transcendent consumer 
reflexivity with a more situated understanding of ethical consumption as a reflexive 
practice which is contextually, that is socially, culturally, politically, and economically 
circumscribed. Adams and Raisborough’s (2010) empirical study of the relationship 
between ethics and consumption as articulated in the daily lives of ordinary people 
demonstrates an attempt to fulfil the potential of “the contextualisation project” (p. 256) 
to avoid “over-exaggerating the reflexive and self-conscious sensibilities” (p. 256) of 
ethical consumers and recognise “the perhaps fragmented or heterogeneous aspects of 
ethical consumption practice” (p. 257) by situating consumer practices in the 
complexities of the everyday.       
 Another agency-centred approach that has been widely applied in research 
aimed at gaining a better understanding of consumer behaviour is the rational choice 
theory (RCT). Like the followers of the extended reflexivity thesis, the proponents of 
RCT adopt an individualist position both ontologically and methodologically, that is 
they understand social reality in terms of actions of agents and take individual to be the 
key focus of empirical investigation and a basic unit of analysis. RCT rests on the same 
assumptions about the role of individual agency in shaping consumer behaviour as those 
implied in Giddens’, Beck’s and similar accounts, i.e. that consumers are active and 
teleological decision-makers operating in a highly individualistic and free-choice social 
environment. The distinctive feature of RCT is its pronounced emphasis on rationality 
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as the key single property of human beings – the view encapsulated in the image of a 
consumer as a rational and dispassionate actor making choices “on the basis of 
deliberate, systematic calculation of the maximum extent to which the ends can be met 
by using the inevitably scarce means” (Chang, 2014, p. 20). The limitless rationality 
assumed in the RCT parallels post-modernist belief in an unbounded reflexivity and 
leads to the same view (and is hence liable to the same criticisms) of consumption 
choices as subject to absolute control by consuming agents – identity-concerned and 
meaning-seeking individuals in one case; preference-driven and utility-maximizing 
actors in the other.  The rational choice framework, despite its empirical failings and 
ineffectiveness in providing adequate explanations of consumer behaviour (Levin and 
Milgrom, 2004), has spilled over into the subject area of ethical consumption to produce 
the readings of the phenomenon that move away from the notions of altruism, 
benevolence, and selflessness. From the viewpoint of RCT, consumer engagement in 
ethical practices is best construed as a form of self-pleasing behaviour on the part of an 
individual who does good not in order to be good but rather to feel good about him- or 
herself, i.e. in a rational pursuit of their own self-interest. An example of this line of 
thinking is Kate Soper’s (2007, 2008, 2009) notion of alternative hedonism which lays 
emphasis on the self-satisfying dimension of ethical consumption – the “sensual 
pleasures of consuming differently” (2008, p. 577), as Soper puts it. It is grounded in 
the idea that modern consumer society is bound to lead to the feelings of disaffection 
and dissatisfaction: “people are beginning to see the pleasures of affluence both as 
compromised by their negative effects and as pre-empting other enjoyments” (Soper, 
2009, p. 4). Conversely, through engagement with practices of sustainable and ethical 
consumption, Soper argues, one can attain the material simplicity of life and in doing so 
reclaim the more subtle forms of hedonist pleasures lost in the dominant materialistic 
lifestyles. The ultimate rational for consumer engagement in ethical practices therefore 
boils down to a pursuit of the life of pleasure, while reflexive engagement with 
environmental, social, and moral concerns is seen as a quest for “the self-massaging 
comfort of “doing good” (Lekakis, 2013, p. 78).  From this perspective, ethical 
consumer choices are void of altruistic component and represent little more than acts of 
selfish behaviour arising out of a rational desire to do good if doing good ranks high on 
the list of a subject’s preferences. As Archer remarks,  
Homo economicus can have a taste for philanthropy, in which case it is the task of his 
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reason to make him a well satisfied philanthropist, a cost-benefit effective benefactor and a 
philanthropic maximiser (2000, p. 54).         
A range of recent accounts tuned in to the alternative hedonism thesis and 
attempted to bring to the surface the self-interest presumably underlying individuals’ 
engagement in ethical practices. For example, Arvola et al.’s (2008, p. 445) study of 
organic shoppers reports a connection between “positive self-enhancing feelings of 
“doing the right thing”, anticipated by consumers, and their intentions to buy organic. 
Similarly, for the subjects of John, Klein and Smith’s (2002) research exploring the 
drivers behind boycotting behaviour the “clean hand motivation”, i.e. the desire to feel 
good about themselves, was a major impetus for participating in boycotts. Cherrier’s 
(2006) and Shaw’s (2007) research add more empirical evidence of the role of the “feel-
good” factor in inciting consumer engagement with ethical practices. In her book on the 
politics of fair trade consumption, Lekakis (2013, p. 78) too draws on the alternative 
hedonism thesis to construe consumer involvement in coffee activism as a pursuit of a 
morally satisfying “state of equilibrium between the self-centred self (the hedonistic 
consumer who seeks “the good life”) and the self-governed self (the responsible, 
civically minded political consumer)”.       
 Despite its wide application in consumption research, the utility-maximization 
approach to consumer choice has been subject to extensive criticism. RCT’s 
interpretation of human normativity and morality as merely a part of the cost-benefit 
calculations of a sensible actor who prefers that course of action which, alongside other 
utilities, also brings higher emotional rewards (Becker, 1996 cited in Archer, 2000, p. 
61) sits uneasy with the view of consumption as a value-laden, morally-charged practice 
which “always and inevitably raises issues of fairness, self vs group interests, and 
immediate vs delayed gratification” (Wilk, 2001, p. 246). The economic model of a man 
does not accommodate the simple fact that “people typically find within their activities 
both frustrations and satisfactions, anxieties and pleasures, not all of which are simple 
matters of calculation” (Warde, 2015, p. 121). Archer (2000) compiled a set of 
arguments, conceptual as well as methodological, which help to explain why the image 
of a self-pleasing rational chooser cannot be superimposed on the figure of an ethical 
consumer. To construe emotions as commensurable merchandise subject to a cost-
benefit analysis, Archer argues, means to essentially commodify human affectivity and 
leave no room to accommodate such widespread sociocultural phenomena as altruism, 
morality, and social solidarity. Neither does seem convincing the version of a social 
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agent as a tripartite being consisting of a superior rational actor and two “assistants” - a 
normative man, introduced as a source of the sense of interdependence and cooperation 
with other social subjects which arises when common good is at stake, and an emotional 
man, held accountable for the expressions of solidarity and collective action needed for 
the reification or transformation of the social order - the rational choice theorists’ 
attempt to explain away acts of charity, benevolence, and goodwill without conceding 
rationality as a dominant human property. 
The chain of rationality is not broken by the subsumption of action under normative 
expectations, because cultural dopery is avoided by asserting that the reasons for actions 
associated with a role, move an actor only when they are adopted as his own good reasons 
(Archer, 2000, p. 76) 
Archer advances several compelling objections to this theoretical construct. 
Methodologically, such a multi-layered model of a social actor makes rational choice 
theorists’ pronounced focus on an individual as the key constituent of the social world 
and a basic unit of analysis difficult to sustain. Conceptually, it is hard to imagine how 
and by what forces these three separate inhabitants of a single human can be kept 
hermetically compartmentalised and, furthermore, harmoniously orchestrated so that 
they manifest themselves at appropriate places and times. Moreover and, perhaps, most 
importantly, there seems to be incorporation of the social contexts into those of the 
individuals: distribution of economic resources is narrowed down to personal budgets; 
normative obligations and duties are presented as a result of subjects’ recognition of the 
need to cooperate with others when their personal welfare depends on the common good; 
social solidarity is conceived of as stemming from a subjective preference to team up. 
Subscription to social norms and expectations is also explained away in terms of “public 
means to private ends” (Archer, 2000, p. 78), that is as a rational pursuit of self-interest 
rather than an expression of a morally binding duty. Archer (2000, p. 67) strongly 
resists such theoretical move: 
On the one hand, in what recognisable sense are we still talking about “the individual” 
when he or she has now been burdened with so many inalienable features of social reality? On 
the other hand, can the social context really be disaggregated in this way, such that solidarity 
and protest are purely interpersonal matters, normative beliefs are only what certain people hold 
in their own interests, and resource distributions are just what each of us has on personal deposit? 
     
These presumptions of the rational choice theory are in a sharp disagreement 
with the ontological postulates of the realist model of the world which this thesis 
upholds and in which agents and their social conditions are kept distinctly separate from 
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each other. Equally disturbing is RCT’s toll on the essential human properties and 
capacities, such as reflexivity and personal identity. Its proposed model of a social actor 
replaces reflexively active agents with subjects whose ways are pre-defined by a set of 
preferences that “are assumed to be given, current, complete, consistent and determining” 
(Archer, 2000, p. 68) and that “are ranked, are transitive, and do not depend on the 
presence or absence of essentially independent alternatives” (MacDonald, 2003, p. 552). 
The idea of pre-given rationality denies the role of human interactions with objective 
reality in making us who we are and subverts the intrinsic propensity of all humans to 
engage in continuous reflexive deliberations about their relationship to the world. 
Devoid of the need to actively and subjectively define their values and concerns, i.e. 
what matters to them and how to achieve it, subjects are left with their emotions 
untriggered, normativity unexercised, and the workings of the mind reduced to cost-
benefit calculations. In Archer’s model of a human being, which I adopt and defend, 
this inner emptiness is filled with rich and meaningful processes – reflexive 
conversations during which people deliberate about their relationships with the world 
and define what they want and can commit to in life. The image of a being whose 
relationship to the world is one of concern and who can flourish or suffer depending on 
how the objects of his commitment are faring (Sayer, 2011) successfully accommodates 
human emotionality and normativity – the two stumbling blocks which the exponents of 
the rational choice theory have failed to successfully negotiate. For as long as 
the rational actor model entails “a flat denial of altruism, of voluntary activities and, 
underlying both, of free-giving” (Archer, 2007, p. 322), it cannot be applied to the 
ethical consumption phenomenon which implies at least a degree of interest-free and 
self-sacrificing morality, as my analysis of ethical food practices will demonstrate in 
due time. Similarly, this model runs counter to the claims about inherently moral nature 
of consumption which reverberate in a range of micro-level studies of consumer 
behaviour, such as Miller’s (2013) ethnographic research on shopping in North London. 
Contrary to the rational choice framing of consumer decisions, Miller asserts that even 
the most ordinary and routinized consumption involves complex negotiation of moral 
dilemmas and is best understood as a project about social relationships, particularly 
those of care, responsibility, and love. In a comparative study of the ethical wine 
industry in Australia and the UK, Starr (2011, p. 137) also comments on the limited 
potential of the rational choice model to explain consumer behaviour, which cannot be 
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reduced to “just the signaling of human demand”, and highlights the need to 
acknowledge that “consumers sometimes choose to relinquish their rational-sovereign, 
market-democratic role and make preference-decisions on non-market, even irrational 
grounds”. Starr’s another study (2009, p. 916), concerned with explaining the drivers 
behind the spread of ethical consumption, leads the author to the same conclusion:  
People purchase and use products and resources according not only to the personal 
pleasures and values they provide, but also to ideas of what is right and good, versus wrong and 
bad, in a moral sense. 
In a comprehensive review of the evolution of moral discourses around 
consumption during the last three centuries, Hilton (2004) draws a line under the above 
arguments asserting that consideration of morality is central to any understanding of 
human consumption in both the past as well as the present. Talking specifically about 
food consumption, the moral and ideological significance of food has been widely 
acknowledged in sociological literature (Warde, 1997; Mennell, Murcott and van 
Otterloo, 1992; Murcott, 1983). In a study of people’s sources of culinary recipes, 
McKie and Wood (1992) highlight the cultural and social significance of recipes and 
their role in setting standards for how and what people should eat, what level of cooking 
skills they should possess, how the meals should be presented, etc. Likewise, Warde’s 
(1997) study of culinary columns in women’s magazines offers an elaborate discussion 
of the nuanced symbolism of food choices that reveals itself through the four moral 
categories, i.e. novelty and tradition, health and indulgence, economy and extravagance, 
convenience and care, which dominate the food discourse and provide moral framework 
for consumer decisions. The rationality assumption also has important epistemological 
implications – as “a useful fiction” that aids in the creation of hypotheses about the 
observable world” (MacDonald, 2003, p. 551), it firmly grounds RCT in the 
instrumentalist-empiricist epistemology. The dismissal of the ontological importance of 
unobservable yet real entities and processes that can be neither scientifically measured 
nor empirically tested, but that profoundly affect human behaviour, such as affective 
reactions, moral concerns, and non-material values, renders empiricism-based rational 
choice approach ill-suited for achieving a nuanced understanding of consumption or, in 
fact, any other social phenomenon.       
 Finally, the rational choice model has been widely dismissed not only for its 
overly rationalised image of social actors and inability to adequately accommodate 
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human emotionality and normativity and hence effectively account for the moral, 
altruistic, and selfless aspects of ethical or, for that matter, any form of consumption, 
but also for its neglect of the role of structure in determining consumer choices. The 
embeddedness of consumption in the contexts of external reality is the blind spot which 
rational choice theorists share with the proponents of the extended reflexivity thesis and 
its model of a consumer choosing freely and reflexively "how to be and how to act" 
(Giddens, 1994, p. 75). Both approaches embody a neoliberal notion of consumers as 
“knowledge-grounded subjects who make rational choices to maximize their interests 
and their quest for identity” (Cherrier, 2007, p. 322). They take the agent out of the 
social contexts in which consumption acts and activities take place and which represent 
crucial determinants of consumer behaviour – a direct and inevitable consequence of 
methodological individualism and its key assumption that all social processes and 
outcomes can be reduced to the actions and interactions of individual actors. In ethical 
consumption, the model of a consumer who “self-creates through will, operates freely in 
its own construction, and consciously chooses elements in the marketplace that meet its 
need for a meaningful or authentic identity” (Cherrier, 2007, p. 322) has been widely 
problematized, as has been the idea of a free and all-knowing actor summoned to tackle 
a range of global problems one purchase at a time - “Robin Hood comes to town, latté 
in hand” (Goodman, 2004, p. 896).  The major criticism has been directed towards the 
assumption of consumers’ limitless capacity to freely appropriate and reflexively 
negotiate regardless of the wider social, economic, and political systems that frame 
consumer actions and restrict their options (Hilton, 2004). In response, a more context-
conscious approach to consumption practices has been promoted by many 
commentators on consumer behaviour. Thus, Stø et al. (2004) draw attention to the fact 
that consumption occurs not in a vacuum, but within certain contexts and frameworks 
created by businesses and political authorities. Askegaard and Linnet (2011, p. 381) also 
argue for the need to contextualize consumer experiences within structural forces of 
market and social systems: “there is a need to take into consideration the context of 
context”.          
 This brings the discussion right to the other end of the spectrum of perspectives 
on the engines of consumption behaviour. Here we find socio-centric approaches that, 
in contrast to favouring individual consumer as an empowered agent and author 
(whether reflexive, interpretive, and meaning-seeking or rational, preference-driven, and 
goal-oriented) of consumption practices, target the social roots of consumer behaviour. 
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The practice approach is, perhaps, the most influential of the theoretical developments 
which aim to correct the imbalances underlying the agency-centred, choice-based 
models of consumption by drawing attention to a wide range of social relations, 
interactions, and processes in which consumer practices are embedded. In analyzing 
consumer behaviour, theories of practice focus on consumption as a form of social 
practices, defined as “durable social structure(s) made up of a configuration of elements, 
including: ideas, emotions, and meanings associated with the activity; mental and 
physical skills required to perform it; and materials and equipment needed” (Shove and 
Pantzar, 2005). Contrary to the extended reflexivity thesis, practice-based approach 
emphasizes “doing over thinking, the material over the symbolic, and the embodied 
practical competence over expressive virtuosity in the presentation of self” (Warde, 
2014, p. 286). Further, it takes aims at the “market-democratic, sovereign consumer 
frame” (Starr, 2011, p. 137) and calls for an acknowledgement of “those aspects of 
consumption that are not reducible to individuals choosing what to buy or use on the 
basis of personal preference” (Warde, 2015, p. 119).     
 The key postulates of practice theories are highly consequential for how 
sociology conceptualizes and studies consumer behaviour and, more specifically, for 
how it understands consumer agency. Of particular interest to me, given my concern 
with revealing the underlying mechanism of ethical consumption, is the 
conceptualization of consumption as a moment in practice rather than a practice itself 
(Warde, 2005, p. 137) and individuals as carriers of various social practices rather than 
independent agents of choice. Within this theoretical paradigm, consumption is 
understood to be embedded in everyday practices, routines, and relationships centred 
around achieving other targets – it is, therefore, not the end goal and has no intrinsic 
value, but occurs within and for the sake of other activities (Warde, 2005). 
Consequently, consumer choices are conceived of as functional elements in social 
practices rather than as expressions of individuals’ wants, desires, and needs: “the logic 
of consumption is found not in the selection of items but in the practices within which 
they are utilized” (Warde, 2015, p. 118). Accordingly, a consuming agent is no longer 
taken to be a key unit of analysis; instead, scientific attention and empirical efforts are 
urged to focus on practices, their social constitutions, and contexts in which they take 
place:  
Interest moves away from attitudes and behaviours of an active consumer and instead 
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concentrates on the “do-ability” of practical performances and how these negotiated and shaped 
by social and institutional contexts (Wheeler, 2012, p. 91). 
Practice theories have quickly caught the wave of contemporary sociological 
thinking and become a large player in the field of consumer research. Since the 
beginning of the XXI century practice approach has been informing empirical work on 
sustainable consumption drawing attention to the use of environmentally problematic 
commodities such as energy and water in the course of reproduction of mundane, taken-
for-granted, symbolically inconspicuous practices and routines (Warde, 2015). In the 
latest review of consumer studies, Warde (2015) highlights some of the most significant 
examples of such research, such as Shove’s (2003a) investigation of the evolution and 
social meaning of domestic cleaning practices and Evans’ (2011) analysis of household 
food waste behaviour. Elizabeth Shove has been particularly influential in elaborating 
on the early theories of practice (Schatzki, 1996) and bringing them into sociological 
research on sustainable consumption. Shove’s social practice theory, developed in the 
landmark book “Comfort, Cleanliness and Convenience: the Social Organization of 
Normality” (2003b) and subsequent publications (see for example, Shove, 2010; Shove, 
Pantzar and Watson, 2012), is claimed to provide a response to an increasingly pressing 
need to understand the nature of social change and apply this understanding to achieve 
desired behavioural shifts in the spheres of consumption and sustainability (Shove, 
Pantzar and Watson, 2012). It does so, authors argue, by revealing the dynamics of 
emergence, reproduction, and transformation of social practices in the course of the 
daily routines and analysing the ways in which individuals are recruited to become the 
carriers of practices.          
 The socio-centric approach also finds its followers among those who attempt to 
understand and explain ethical consumption by moving away from the concept of a 
consumer as an active agent of choice and the governor of the market and ethical 
shopping as a consumer-created and consumer-driven phenomenon. Thus, Barnett et al. 
reframe ethical consumption as “a function of a whole set of infrastructures that serve as 
the background for more explicit forms of conduct and interaction” (2005, p. 73). 
Retreating from the understanding of ethical consumption as brought about and 
demanded by increasingly reflexive consumers, they look for the identifiable drivers of 
responsible shopping behaviour in the wider social networks which work to generate 
desire for ethical goods and drive the transformation of ordinary consumers into the 
carriers of ethical consumption practices. Thinking about ethical consumption in terms 
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of power relations and drawing on Foucault’s concept of governmentality, Barnett and 
colleagues (2010) situate the phenomenon within the systems of provisioning and 
background infrastructures and bring into the view various agents and actors who, while 
not ordinarily thought of as consumers, play a key role in the politicisation of 
consumption and recruitment of mainstream consumers into ethical practices. Jacobsen 
and Dulsrud (2007, p. 469), also responding to a call for an approach that takes account 
of  “the ways consumers and consumer roles are framed in interactive processes in 
markets, governance structures, and everyday life”, identify a wide range of 
strategically oriented actors who construct and govern ethical consumption, such as 
NGOs, charities, campaign groups and activists in pursuit of their own agenda, 
corporate sector seeking to open up and develop profitable markets, and governments 
looking for the ways to shed responsibilities for addressing environmental and societal 
challenges. Through deliberate strategies and techniques, these various actors and 
organizations work toward moralising consumption and mobilizing consumer’s sense as 
a citizen and “the bearer of a variety of responsibilities” (Barnett et al., 2010, p. 41). By 
reframing consumer subjectivities to instill concerns over societal and environmental 
wellbeing, they cultivate individuals as ethical consumers acting in line with the 
principles of sustainability, ecological well-being, and respect for human rights. This 
process of “the governing of the consumer” relies on particular strategies, e.g. 
environmental awareness campaigns, and technologies, such as product labelling, 
intended to incite and enable ethical choices. The use of calculative techniques such as 
consumer surveys and polls reflects the ways in which knowledge is constructed and 
used to campaign for ethical consumption: statistics tracking the growth of ethical 
market are presented by activist groups and organizations to help in raising public 
awareness, exert pressure on manufacturers and suppliers, and recruit support of policy 
makers (Barnett et al., 2010; Wheeler, 2012). Further, many commentators argue for the 
important role of the rhetoric and semiotics of ethical goods’ packaging and promotion 
materials in the production of a morally reflexive consumer. Thus, elaborating on 
Wright’s (2004) analysis of newspaper advertising for a fair trade coffee brand, Adams 
and Raisborough comment on the potential of fair trade discourses to undermine "the 
commodity fetishist lynchpin of the consumer capitalist psychic economy" (2008, p. 
1172) through the disclosure of exploitative relations of production. In an analysis of 
the role of organic food market in contributing to the rise of environmentalism, Allen 
and Kovach (2000) discuss how, by revealing information about food growing methods, 
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organic labelling helps to reduce the objectification of natural-social relationships and 
weaken commodity fetishism. Likewise, Bildtgård (2008) highlights the role of ethical 
labels as a symbolic device that transcends time and space to reconnect consumers with 
producers; Brown and Getz (2008, p. 1188) assert that ethical labels can offer “at least a 
partial antidote to the commodity fetish”; while DuPuis (2000) goes as far as to claim 
that reflexivity is turned on precisely on consumer’s reading of the label. Their 
arguments confute the view that:  
The main mechanism for labels (or brands) to work is not to change or make up the 
mind of a consumer in a shop, but to confirm an earlier decision made outside the market place 
influence by marketing, the media and, crucially, civil processes (Zadek, Lingayah and Forstater, 
1998, p. 35). 
 
On the contrary, it is claimed that symbolically meaningful texts and images 
create morally charged narratives that become “translation devices” pulling individuals 
in the direction of more ethical food choices (Goodman, 2004, p. 902). For Goodman 
(2004), they are material and discursive means which propel the enactment of the 
“political ecological imaginary” – “a sense of moral economy that entreats moral 
connections and responsibilities all along the commodity network in the pursuit of 
alternative development” (p. 903). Goodman and Goodman’s (2001, p. 111) insight 
about fair trade conveys the point: “through [labels and discourses] … fair trade 
networks seek to ‘lengthen’ across the spaces of consumption, to work against and 
translate actors from more conventional agrofood networks”. Similarly, Barnett et al. 
(2005, p. 23) highlight how the rhetoric and semiotics of ethical products’ packaging re-
articulate moral dispositions that “enlist ordinary people into boarder projects of social 
change”. The ultimate rationale behind such governing of consumers is the governing of 
consumption, that is a deliberate and concerted effort “to regulate the informational and 
spatial contexts of consumer ‘choice” (Barnett et al., 2005, p. 31) through a range of 
strategies, tools, and techniques intended to turn consumer “oughts into cans” (Barnett 
et al., 2005, p. 31). Importantly, recruiting individuals into practices of ethical 
consumption need not require creating and promoting particular consumer subjectivities, 
for it is “acts not identities or beliefs” (Clarke et al., 2007, p. 241) that the governing of 
consumption is concerned with (Barnett et al., 2010; Wheeler, 2012). The significance 
of ethical purchases, it is claimed, lies in the fact that they are “publicly observable acts” 
that can be “aggregated, measured, reported and represented in the public sphere” 
(Barnett et al., 2010, p. 59). Wheeler (2012) demonstrates this clearly by highlighting 
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the role of the systems of collective provision, from schools and workplaces to rail 
stations and entire towns committed to fair trade procurement, in ensuring consumer 
engagement with fair trade choices and, through this, creating and organizing fair trade 
consumption as a collective consumer action. In tune with this is Clarke et al.’s 
discussion of local shopping as a consumption practice which “indicates the degree to 
which the exercise of ‘choice’ is shaped by systems of collective provisioning over 
which consumers have little direct influence” (2007, p. 239). Trentmann’s (2006) 
collection of essays offering historical analyses of the evolution of a consumer as a 
social subject also underscores the crucial role of national institutions in creating and 
refashioning consumer roles and identities in different social and economic contexts. 
 Socio-centric perspectives, such as those of Shove and Barnett et al., are clearly 
juxtaposed against explanations of consumer behaviour in terms of the individual actor. 
In a battle against the “orthodoxy of the “active consumer” in the social sciences” 
(Trentmann, 2006, p. 3), their proponents erase the model of an ethical consumer as an 
agent of conscious choice and ethical acts and activities as expressions of individual 
liberty of conscience and thought. In the practice approach, for example, not only are 
practices presented as “the principal steering device of consumption”, but they are also 
taken to be “the primary source of desire, knowledge and judgment” (Warde, 2005, p. 
145). Among the studies that expound this view of particular interest for this thesis is 
Hards’ (2011) work drawing on the elements of the social practice theory to explain the 
process of formation and development of individual environmental values, i.e. “ethical, 
political and spiritual worldviews relating to the environment, and understandings of 
and relations with nature” (p. 26). Hards grounds her arguments in the practice-based 
understanding of values as essential components of social practices which form and 
develop not within persons, but through their continuous social interactions and, 
specifically, encounters with ideas circulating within society and commonly shared by 
its members. Importantly, these broadly shared meanings and understandings are argued 
to have a restricting impact on individuals’ performance of practices, meaning that 
people enact any given practice in the ways that conform to the social ideas by which it 
is defined. This conceptual position can be challenged on several grounds. Firstly, when 
tracing the origins of individual environmental beliefs, Hards describes a variety of 
personal experiences ranging from tending animals to taking hallucinogenic mushrooms 
that have played a key role in triggering participants’ concerns about environment. The 
obviously arbitrary nature of experiences from which the subjects of Hards’ study 
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derived their environmental ethics speaks against the argument that values are neither 
individually developed nor personally possessed, but are mere expressions of broadly 
shared social ideas. Secondly, the claim that individual values are merely expressions of 
the norms and ideas dominating the surrounding ethical, political, and cultural 
discourses calls for significantly greater degrees of social conformity than those that any 
society can boast. Application of this argument to environmental beliefs is especially 
problematic due to the lack of consensus about what is good for the environment and 
how to achieve it. Although Hards exemplifies the relationship between ideas and 
practices by referring to “a broadly shared conception of what it means to live a low-
carbon life” (2011, p. 26), the messages on how to shrink one’s carbon footprint 
circulating in the general public discourse are far from unambiguous. For instance, 
organic foodstuffs are commonly understood to have lower CO2 footprint than 
conventionally grown produce. At the same time, warnings abound that the 
environmental benefits of organic goods shipped over lengthy distances are, to say the 
least, questionable, if not altogether outweighed by the negative impact. As Cherrier 
argues (2007, p. 322), 
There cannot be, for example, a regime of truth about recycling when scientists disagree 
on the evidence, country representatives disagree on the out- comes, and commentators’ 
opinions change continuously (Volokh and Scarlett, 1997) (…) The pluralization of expert 
systems and greater access to information prompts multiple and often contradictory opinions 
about the ‘‘what’’ and ‘‘how’’ of ethical consumption (Beck, 1999) such that what seems good 
or ethical for one may not be so for another.  
Given this “inability to know” (Beck, 1999, p. 131 cited in Cherrier, 2007, p. 
322), an ethically minded person will have to exercise his own judgment as to which 
choices, out of those available to him, will bring the greater good. Depending on her 
personal values and concerns, she may either decide that investing in conventional but 
locally developed agriculture is a better way to support the environment or, alternatively, 
that buying organic produce from struggling growing communities in the developing 
world is morally justified. In either case, consumer engagements with practice will be 
dependent on subjectively defined values and commitments that may well have been 
developed prior to, independently from, and outside of the practice itself. As Cherrier 
(2007, p. 331) points out, “in a pluralistic and complex world, things that seem ethical 
to one person may not mirror the general stance on an issue”. Likewise, Adams and 
Raisborough’s (2010, p. 263) study of mainstream consumers concludes that the “fit 
between ethics and normative frameworks may not always be straightforward” with 
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participants’ responses indicating that “different positions are available for occupation 
in response to such demands”. Moreover, Hards’ own findings serve to support the 
point: as she observes, for some climate change activists nature-related values were not 
the primary motive for engaging in environmental practices – instead, issues of social 
justice were the priority. Thus, participants’ engagement with environmentalism was 
informed by their subjective concerns, that is what they considered to be the most 
significant issues to address and the most precious values to promote.  
 An important implication arising from this evidence is that consumer reflexivity 
regains its place in consumption acts and processes. This is critical, for as far as 
reflexivity is concerned, the proponents of social practice theory have largely denied its 
role in the creation, evolution, and transformation of consumption practices. Warde, for 
example, persists in the view that “consumption occurs often entirely without mind” 
(2005, p. 150). Others have taken a more loyal stance towards consumer reflexivity – 
thus, Wheeler contends that practice-based perspective accommodates both routines and 
reflexivity and provides enough room for consumer agency even in the context of 
systemic pressures and social governance: “the proliferation of information and 
discourses ascribing responsibility to consumers can create an occasion for agents to 
reflexively monitor and adjust their actions” (2012, p. 91). She attempts to guard the 
theory against a highly constrained image of consumption behavior which flows out of 
the practice-based understanding of social discourses as the key informants and 
determinants of consumer actions by highlighting that practices “are internally 
differentiated on many dimensions” (Warde, 2005, p. 138 cited in Wheeler, 2012, p. 89) 
and that their enactments are conditional upon “time, space, and social context” (Warde, 
2005, p. 139 cited in Wheeler, 2012, p. 90). This, however, seems a rather feeble 
defense – firstly, what is left of humans’ capacity to actively draw on their reflexive 
resources if reflexivity is only evoked when social conditions “create an occasion” and 
command agents to do so? Further, what possibilities are really left for individual 
subjectivity to contribute to the formation and evolution of practices if their meanings 
and forms are restricted by social organization and their internal variations arise solely 
due to the differing outer contexts? My objections are in tune with Soper’s criticism of 
the practice-based approach for its portrayal of consumption as a “relatively 
unconscious form of life” (2009, p. 12) and individual choices as “inculcated responses 
explicable only by reference to more objective social forces” (2007, p. 217). This seems 
unsurprising given the theory’s dismissal of a consumer as “the key agent in the politics 
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of consumption” (Barnett et al., 2005, p. 66) and its exclusive emphasis on the social 
organisation of consumption acts and activities. The social practice framework in which, 
as Warde admits, “the concept of “the consumer” (…) evaporates” (2005, p. 146), does 
not allow to explore the phenomenon of ethical consumption at the individual level and 
hence precludes an insight into the world of subjective meanings surrounding ethical 
consumer decisions. By taking socially shared practices as the fundamental unit of 
analysis, the theory inevitably limits its explanatory potential to meso-level processes, 
ignoring the multitude of micro-level issues that are critical for understanding patterns 
of consumption.          
 As the above review has shown, existing research on ethical consumption has 
rarely stepped out of the frameworks of the dominant theories of consumption in which 
consumer is presented as either an agent of free choice or a passive bearer of practice. 
Reproducing the core ontological and methodological presuppositions of these 
theoretical approaches, the vast majority of studies have focused on the role of either 
individual agency or social structures in creating and defining ethical consumption, thus 
achieving only partial understanding of the phenomenon and leaving important aspects 
and dimensions of ethical consumer practices and experiences unacknowledged and 
unexplored. The key reason of the failure of this body of work in producing an effective 
account of ethical consumption as an individual and social phenomenon has been the 
incapability to develop a theoretical approach that recognises the full spectrum of forces 
and powers shaping and moulding consumer practices. On the one hand, agency-centred 
perspectives have achieved noticeable progress in offering an enhanced understanding 
of the subjective motives and meanings attached to ethical consumer choices, but 
neither adequate account nor even an explicit acknowledgment of the contexts in which 
these choices are made and the external factors that determine them has ensued. On the 
other hand, practice-based approaches have encouraged recognition of the social 
underpinnings of ethical consumer behaviours and the embeddedness of individual 
choices in the social and material organisation of life, while staying oblivious to the 
ways in which consumer agency and individual subjectivity interact with and respond to 
the social order to either conform to or change it. They thus failed to account for aspects 
of individual engagement with ethical consumption and comprehensively explain the 
variations in its understandings and performances among the consuming agents. 
Inevitably, both approaches could only produce a distorted conception of ethical 
consumption: the first has reduced its social dimension to an aggregate of individual 
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actions, while the second has dissolved the consuming agent in society and reduced his 
decisions to structural imperatives and systemic prescriptions. As Soper describes, 
Consumer behaviour that is treated as a matter of existential choice, through the one 
optic, is viewed through the other, as the altogether less voluntary effect of transcendent 
economic and social structures and their systemic pressures and forms of social governance 
(2007, p. 217) 
Subsequently, there has been recognition among sociologists of the urgent need 
to overcome the apparent limitations of one-sided approaches to understanding 
consumer behavior and readdress the ontological and methodological assumptions of 
the dominant theoretical perspectives on consumption. Thus, Sassatelli (2007, p. 107) 
has urged consumer studies to “overcome that moralistic swing of the pendulum which 
(…) either celebrates consumption as a free and liberating act or denigrates at as a 
dominated and subjugated act”. Halkier (2010, p. 14) joins the call, advocating “the 
complexity position”, i.e. the one that acknowledges the everyday complexities of 
consumption and “seeks to unfold both agency capacities and the social conditioning of 
ordinary consumers”. In tune with them, Johnston (2007, p. 233) presses for a dialectic 
approach to ethical consumption that “helps us avoid naïve optimism, or determinist 
pessimistic accounts of consumer-focused projects for social justice and sustainability” 
and that “recognizes that meaning and agency are present in consumption decisions but 
takes seriously the structural conditions shaping consumer agency”. What remains 
problematic, however, is that too many sociologists continue to place hope in the 
theories of practice to steer consumption research toward a balanced perspective on 
consumer behavior (e.g. Spaargaren, 2011; Halkier, 2010; Jacobsen and Dulsrud, 2007; 
Sassatelli, 2007). Illustrative is Warde’s (2015, p. 129) unequivocal conclusion derived 
at the end of a comprehensive review of more than four decades of sociological research 
on consumption: 
From a sociological point of view, it is much better to unseat the dominant model of the 
sovereign consumer and replace it with a conception of the socially conditioned actor, a social 
self, embedded in normative and institutional contexts and considered a bearer of practices.
   
Yet, it seems to me that merely replacing the shortsightedness of agency-
centered perspectives with the partiality of practice-based approaches is not the way 
forward for consumer research if a much-needed recognition of the nuanced complexity 
of consumption is to be achieved. While Jacobsen and Dulsrud’s (2007, p. 469) appeal 
to reject the belief in the active consumer as “a universal entity, available across nations 
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and time” is clearly justified, this should not lead the field to dispense with the concept 
of agency altogether, or completely deny consumers the liberty of thought, conscience, 
and choice, or reduce individuals acts and decisions to involuntary effects of systemic 
pressures. As Sassatelli (2007, p. 54) remarks,  
The classic dimensions of social analysis – social stratification, cultural classification, 
power, institutions, rituals, interaction, identity, collective action, professions, etc. – are all 
crucial in understanding the phenomenon of consumption.    
  
Likewise, the biases implanted in the current understanding of ethical 
consumption by the dominant behavioural paradigms can only be redressed by 
rethinking the act of consumption as one where a complex interweaving of agential and 
structural powers emerges and unfolds. The questions of structure and agency should 
remain on the agenda of consumer research if a bilateral account of ethical consumption 
which matches the complementary strengths and weaknesses and integrates insights 
from both individual-focused and socio-centric approaches is to be achieved. Ultimately, 
what needs to be acknowledged is that “practices of consumption are meaningful for 
people even if they are not entirely free or always consequential; they are enclosed in 
mechanisms of power even if these are not deterministic” (Sassatelli, 2007, p. 107).
 It is this position that informs the approach that I develop and pursue in this 
thesis, which seeks to acknowledge and analyse the complex and continuous 
relationships between consumer agency and social structures, specifically as they 
manifest themselves in ethical consumption practices. I will construe ethical 
consumption as an arena where human agency and individual subjectivity manifest 
themselves while highlighting how consumer practices are inevitably conducted within 
the context of social, cultural, and economic possibilities and constraints. In doing so, I 
will put the figure of an individual consumer - decentred if not altogether displaced by 
the sceptics - back to the foreground in the story about consumption whilst avoiding 
replicating the caricature portraits of consumers as all-knowing or purely rational actors. 
Reflecting well-established criticism of the extended reflexivity thesis and responding 
to a call for a more situated and embedded understanding of reflexivity, I aim to 
develop a socially attuned framework for understanding ethical food choices of morally 
concerned individuals in a pursuit of desired identities. I intend to produce a 
sociological account of ethical consumption that, far from presenting consumer 
decisions as “acts of sovereignty over the world and things” (Sassatelli, 2007, p. 106), 
nevertheless leaves room for “the life of the mind, for personal decision and 
 
64 
responsibility” (Sayer, 2011, p. 13) and thus provides an understanding of the subjective 
meanings, identity investments, and moral aspects of ethical consumer practices while 
reflecting the complex dynamics between human reflexivity and objective reality that 

































Studying Consumer Behavior: Toward a Realist Paradigm  
 
 
Understanding consumer culture is a matter of social rather than textual analysis, not 
an enterprise of reading but rather of explaining and accounting (Slater, 1997, p. 148).  
 
In this chapter, I provide an outline of my epistemological position and 
methodological approach to data production and analysis. I begin by clarifying the 
relationships between my ontological and epistemological frameworks and proceed to 
discuss two qualitative tools I deployed to elicit the subjective meanings underlying the 
respondents’ ethical food practices: in-depth interviews and direct observations. The 
chapter also considers the epistemological and methodological challenges that I 
encountered during the research process and indicates both the benefits as well as 
inevitable limitations of my chosen research strategies and techniques.   
 
3.1 Epistemological approach – toward the first-person perspective  
 
Previously, I have outlined the ontological framework undergirding my study 
and discussed how the realist model of the world can help to pave the way toward a 
more nuanced understanding of ethical consumption by redressing the theoretical 
misconceptions and methodological biases that currently hold sway over sociological 
research on consumer behaviour. I would like to open this chapter by explaining how 
my ontological perspective aligns with my epistemological position and informs my 
methodological approach to generating and analysing the data, before providing a 
detailed outline of the research design.      
 Ontological, epistemological, and methodological paradigms are critical for the 
ways in which we conduct and assess research. Indeed, the specific conception of the 
world as consisting of two ontologically separate strata – causally efficacious agents 
and pre-existing social forms – has played a key role in determining the ways in which I 
designed and evaluated my research enquiry in an effort to ensure the valid pursuit of 
knowledge. The emphasis on non-conflationary theorising aimed at uncovering the 
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underlying causal mechanisms and generative principles of ethical consumer behaviour 
through an analysis of non-material entities and processes such as personal values, 
moral concerns, emotional reactions, and reflexive deliberations instantly ruled out 
empiricism as a philosophical paradigm that can aid in achieving the key aims of this 
project. Focused on empirical verification and testable predictions about concrete, 
readily observable, and easily measurable phenomena and seeking outcomes which are 
a product of formalised procedures and quantified processes (Goulding, 1999), 
empiricist approaches have nothing to contribute to our understanding of the actual 
processes of human emotionality and cognition, “which are unobservable and therefore 
viewed by instrumentalist-empiricists as outside the realm of science and empirical 
verification” (MacDonald, 2003, p. 554), but which are absolutely key to attaining a 
deeper comprehension of human behaviour. Concerned with the empirical content of 
theories, i.e. the accuracy and testability of their empirical predictions, rather than their 
general validity and potential to explain the underlying causal mechanisms of social 
phenomena (MacDonald, 2003), empiricism falls short of providing a valid means of 
exploring the drivers of individual behaviour, since no empirical test can measure or 
assess the subjective workings of the minds of individuals or their relationship to 
objective reality, for both are impossible to penetrate and explore merely “by direct 
perception of immediate facts, with no recourse to concepts” (Rand, 1963, p. 27). 
Moreover, value-free research as a golden principle of empiricist frameworks has been 
widely criticised and largely dismissed as not only an unattainable, but also undesirable 
pursuit which precludes an understanding of certain kinds of human experience, such as 
meaning making (Laverty, 2003). In consumer research specifically, Holbrook and 
Hirschman (1993 cited in Goulding, 2002, p. 33) highlight “the need to remind business 
scholars that those engaged in the humanities are human, and those engaged in the 
social sciences are social”.        
 Likewise, ethical consumption as a reflexive practice of affective, normative, 
evaluative human beings cannot be approached as a readily observable, empirical 
domain of enquiry where “the only relevant test of the validity of a hypothesis is 
comparison of its predictions with experience" (Friedman, 1953, p. 8-9). To the contrary, 
a valid account of ethical consumer behaviour, as that of any other social phenomenon, 
should acknowledge that “an appeal must be made to something non-observable" 
(Brown, 1982, p. 234) and that "the imperative to explain is sometimes an imperative to 
posit theoretical entities" (Brown, 1982, p. 234) which are more than “hand-maidens to 
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the larger goal of prediction” (MacDonald, 2003, p. 554). In defending reflexivity as an 
essential property of agents and internal conversation as an integral part of the private 
workings of the mind of human beings, this thesis essentially subscribes to the argument 
that all individuals have inner lives that are private, covert, and only available and 
knowable to their self-examination (Archer, 2003). The focus on immaterial, 
unobservable, and subjective entities and processes such as values, concerns, emotions, 
and reflexive deliberations calls for a method which acknowledges the subjective 
meaning of human experiences and actions and recognises that people’ inner processes 
and states cannot be deduced or learned simply from observing their external behaviour. 
These requirements provide the rationale for my choice and application of 
interpretivism as a methodological approach that is well suited to the nature and aims of 
the study. As a scientific method, interpretivism emphasises subjective understanding 
over objective knowledge and offers the potential to improve our comprehension of 
how people think, feel, and behave in given contexts (Marsh and Furlong, 2010). 
Interpretive paradigms, particularly phenomenology and hermeneutic phenomenology, 
have affirmed their relevance to consumer research and are widely used in studies of 
consumer practices and identities (e.g. Ahuvia, 2005; Arnold and Fischer, 1994; 
Thompson, Pollio and Locander, 1994; Thompson, Locander and Pollio, 1989;).  The 
value of interpretive analysis in consumer research lies in its ability to go beyond a 
narrow focus on consumer buying behaviours and bring to light the experiential and 
meaningful aspects of people’s consumption acts and activities. Holbrook and 
Hirschman (1993) highlight the importance of using interpretive approaches in 
analysing consumer behaviour, while McQuarrie and McIntyre (1990) and Thompson, 
Pollio and Locander (1994) specifically argue for the adoption of phenomenological 
positions in consumer research. In a study of consumption experiences of married 
women, Thompson, Pollio and Locander (1994) evidently demonstrate the potential of 
phenomenological analysis to provide valuable insights into consumer behaviour. While 
both phenomenology and hermeneutic phenomenology represent a way of researching 
social phenomena through subjective experiences of individuals and groups and are 
intended for studying human behaviour, experiences, and meanings (Kafle, 2013), 
phenomenological research tends to be largely descriptive and concentrates on the 
structure of experience, while hermeneutic perspective places a premium on 
interpretation and seeks to elucidate the meanings of experiences and their effects on 
both individuals and social forms (Laverty, 2003). Moreover, hermeneutic model of 
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understanding allows to contextualize “the meaning of particular life events (…) within 
a broader narrative of self-identity” (Thompson, Pollio and Locander, 1994, p. 451). In 
an article discussing the application of hermeneutical framework in consumer research, 
Thompson, Pollio and Locander (1994, p. 448) highlight how a hermeneutic 
interpretation  
(…) explicates the personalized meanings by which consumers understand the 
characteristics of their (perceived) actual identities, ideal identities, and undesired identities 
(Markus and Wurf 1986) and the ways in which these identity perceptions (and their underlying 
meanings) are manifested in everyday consumption activities.     
  
The approach, therefore, is able to support my pursuit of an understanding of the 
relationships between moral food practices and people’s identities and the ways in 
which these relationships manifest themselves in the subjective experiences of self-
perceived ethical consumers. The pertinence of the hermeneutic framework to consumer 
research also ensues from its distinctive view on researcher’s “pre-understanding”, i.e. 
his or her prejudice and prejudgements (Arnold and Fischer, 1994). In contrast to other 
paradigms, including phenomenology, hermeneutics sees pre-understanding as what 
facilitates rather than hinders interpretation and “counsels us to capitalize more fully on 
[pre-]understanding rather than trying to put it aside when we take up our research” 
(Arnold and Fischer, 1994, p. 57). In consumer studies, researchers’ pre-understanding 
derives both from their position as academics having theoretical knowledge about 
consumer behaviour as well as their first-hand experiences as consumers.  The 
incorporation of hermeneutics in consumer research allows the researcher “to draw 
more consciously, critically, and powerfully on their own [pre-] understanding of the 
everyday phenomena that we study” (Arnold and Fischer, 1994, p. 66). This facilitates 
the task of the investigator which is to re-experience, recognize, and re-think what 
participants felt or thought (Bleicher, 1980) thereby achieving an understanding at 
intellectual, emotional, and moral levels (Betti, 1990). Thus, hermeneutic perspective 
resonates with the study’s emphasis on human reflexivity, affectivity, and normativity 
and thus offers an effective approach to exploring ethical consumption as a meaning-
rich, emotion-inducing, and value-laden experience. As a scientific method, 
hermeneutic phenomenology accommodates the constants of qualitative research, i.e. 
comprehension, synthesising, and theorising (Morse, 1994). While focused on the 
subjective meanings, it is ultimately geared toward the development of a social theory 
through revealing the common structures of people’s experiences and is therefore well-
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suited for achieving the principal goal of this study, i.e. to identify and explain the 
causal mechanisms and generative principles of ethical consumption as a subjective 
project of morally concerned individuals.      
 As an epistemological approach, interpretivism successfully teams up with the 
critical realist ontology for both positions accept that many alternative perspectives on 
and valid accounts of a single phenomenon may exist and that “there is no possibility of 
attaining a single, “correct” understanding of the world, what Putnam (1999) describes 
as a “God’s eye view” that is independent of any particular viewpoint” (Maxwell, 2012, 
p. 5). As Maxwell notes, critical realists, while maintaining the view of objective reality 
as existing independently of our understandings of it, at the same time accept that these 
understandings are always and inevitably a product of people’s subjective perspectives 
and views: “all knowledge is thus “theory-laden”, but this does not contradict the 
existence of a real world to which this knowledge refers” (2012, p. vii). Such position, 
he argues, has been widely accepted as “a commonsense basis for social research” 
(Maxwell, 2012, p. 6). Frazer and Lacey (1993, p. 182) also defend the compatibility of 
the two philosophies:  
Even if one is a realist at the ontological level, one could be an epistemological 
interpretivist . . . our knowledge of the real world is inevitably interpretive and provisional 
rather than straightforwardly representational. 
In providing philosophical defence for the integration of ontological realism and 
epistemological interpretivism, I cannot hope to be more lucid than Barth in his 
anthropological research on indigenous communities of Papua New Guinea: 
Like most of us, I assume that there is a real world out there — but that our 
representations of that world are constructions. People create and apply these constructions in a 
struggle to grasp the world, relate to it, and manipulate it through concepts, knowledge, and acts. 
In the process, reality impinges; and the events that occur consequently are not predicated on the 
cultural system of representations employed by the people, although they may largely be 
interpretable within it (1987, p. 87) 
The realist ontology of this research, therefore, successfully accommodates my 
epistemological position that the data I am interested in is contained within the 
perspectives of those being studied, i.e. self-defined ethical food consumers. In fact, the 
subjective ontology of reflexive conversations defended in this thesis calls for a 
recognition of what Archer (2003, p. 46) refers to as a “first-person perspective”, i.e. 
that only individuals themselves have unconstrained and unmediated access to their rich 
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and meaningful inner lives. The “first-person perspective”, in turn, automatically 
assumes the “first-person authority”, i.e. that individuals’ self-investigation and self-
understanding always have an epistemic privilege over any third person’s analysis. As 
Archer (2003) contends, one can only access - always indirectly and in no other way 
than by means of interpretation - the inner repositories of individuals’ authentic self-
knowledge by soliciting people’s subjective accounts of their deeds and examining the 
reflexive workings behind them. The declared emphasis on the subjective ideas, 
understandings, and meanings surrounding ethical consumption does not pose a threat 
to its ontological status as a real social phenomenon. Firstly, accepting the 
epistemological privilege of individuals’ own narratives does not mean “substituting 
how agents take things to be for how they really are” (Archer, 2003, p. 15). To assert 
that human reflexivity plays a central role in the process of mediation between agents 
and their objective circumstances does not mean elevating people’s subjective ideas and 
perceptions about the world over the actual reality: “the ontological status of something 
real is not impugned by allowing that it can be valued differently by different subjects” 
(Archer, 2003, p. 140). Neither does my reliance on subjective accounts means reducing 
social reality, or my study of a particular domain of agential practices, to the individuals’ 
ideas and perceptions of it. I recognise and appreciate the distinction between the 
ontological realm of what exists and the empirical domain of what can be experienced 
and observed thus safeguarding my research from the epistemic fallacy of reducing the 
questions of ontology to those of epistemology. As Spencer (2000, n/p) notes, the study 
of reality and, more specifically, social practices, cannot be limited to understanding 
individuals’ conceptualisations of their actions, for “there remain ontological questions 
about society since much of society lies outside the realm of thought itself”, i.e. there 
are all sorts of other factors in people’s experiences that need to be acknowledged and 
made intelligible. This is a crucial point to recognise if this study, or any social research 
for that matter, is to go beyond merely providing descriptive narratives of agential 
experiences of the social reality and, instead, capture the dynamic processes that 




3.2 Detailed research design 
3.2.1 Research ethics 
This research project was reviewed and approved by the Research Ethics 
Committee of the University of Leeds. During every step of the research process, from 
approaching and recruiting participants to handling personal data, I was guided by the 
University of Leeds Research Ethics Policy. All respondents received electronic and 
paper forms (Appendix A) outlining the details and conditions of the research process to 
ensure that they understood the nature of the study and their right to withdraw from the 
project at any time. I assured the participants that their identities would be protected 
through the use of self-chosen pseudonyms and anonymisation of sensitive details, and 
that all personal data relating to them would be destroyed in a secure manner when no 
longer required. Prior to the start of the fieldwork, I requested the respondents’ signed 
consent for the following: to take written notes during the observations, to audio record 
the interviews, to transcribe the interview data verbatim, to include anonymised data 
and interview excerpts in the thesis as well as any future academic publications and 
conference papers that may result from the research.  
3.2.2 Selecting participants - a targeted approach 
When describing the process of choosing the research participants, I accentuate 
the qualitative nature of my study by using the term “selection” rather than “sampling”, 
which, as many have noted, is better suited for the description of quantitative survey 
designs (Emmel, 2013; Maxwell, 2008; Stake, 1995). This might be considered as 
convenience approach to participant recruitment which in usual textbook terms is 
regarded as less rigorous (Patton, 2001). However, selecting participants from my 
personal network was not a necessity that arose due to lack of interest in the study, but 
an expression of a more targeted recruitment strategy seeking information-rich, but also 
accessible cases. Maxwell defines targeting respondents who “are most accessible and 
conducive to gaining the understandings you seek” (2012, p. 94) as a justified and valid 
approach that is sensitive to “the real conditions that will influence how data will be 
collected and the ability of these data to answer your research questions” (2012, p. 94) 
and takes into account “the realities of access, cost, time, and difficulty” (2012, p. 94). 
So, for instance, I had responses from ethical consumers based in cities other than Leeds, 
such as Manchester, Sheffield, and York, and while it would have been desirable to 
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cover a larger geographical area to ensure a more diverse range of participants, factors 
such as travel times and costs ruled out these opportunities. This was not a result of a 
less rigorous approach to research, but an unavoidable effect of what Emmel refers to as 
external powers bearing on the recruitment process: “there is invariably an element of 
constrained choice in the sampling choices we can make” (2013, p. 77). At the same 
time, my decisions about how and where to find prospective research participants are far 
from contingent – they are theory-laden and informed by the particular theoretical 
assumptions which frame my research. Distributing flyers in specific locations, such as 
health food shops, vegetarian and vegan cafes and restaurants, and ecological housing 
developments was considered a legitimate way to access ethical consumers because, 
drawing on Archer’s insights that “subjects acquire their personal identities through the 
constellation of concerns that they endorse” (2012, p. 22) and that  “it is not possible to 
have a genuine concern and to do nothing about it” (2007, p. 231), I assumed that self-
identities of ethical consumers must be tied to concerns about the implications of their 
lifestyle choices and that these concerns must translate into concrete actions – decisions 
about where to buy groceries, where to eat, and where to live. These are not just random 
and ungrounded assumptions, but a manifestation of the internal powers, i.e. the ideas, 
concepts and theories chosen or developed by the researcher, which inevitably affect 
participant recruitment (Emmel, 2013). In reflecting upon and discussing the internal 
and external powers of my approach to selecting ethical consumers, I aimed to reveal 
the “causal processes that govern the salient features of the sample” (Emmel, 2013, p. 
78) – an essential element of a realist approach to research design and conduct.  
 Overall, nine self-defined ethical consumers were selected to take part in the 
study. Using a small number of respondents is a general guideline in qualitative and, 
particularly, hermeneutic phenomenological research (Creswell, 2012). Polkinghorne 
(1989) specifies a range of 5-25 respondents, Dukes (1984) recommends focusing on 
three to ten subjects, while Boyd (2001) considers two to ten participants to be 
sufficient. Such small numbers are justified by the purpose of qualitative research which 
is not to yield generalizable findings but to focus on “information-rich” cases – those 
“from which one can learn a great deal about matters of importance” (Patton, 2001, p. 
242). From this viewpoint, the empirical data generated by my nine participants proved 
exceptionally nuanced, multi-layered, and rich and, in fact, the desired level of depth 
and detail in the analysis and interpretation of the respondents’ accounts would have 
been hard to achieve with a larger number of interviewees. Ultimately, I am in 
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agreement with those who contend that “sample size is not the issue, but how 
researchers convince their audiences with the cases they are able to collect given the 
resources available to them” (Emmel, 2013, p. 1). 	   	   	     
3.2.3 Data production: the rationale, limitations and benefits of chosen research 
methods  
In line with my anti-empiricist approach to sociological enquiry, I abandon the 
use of the term “data collection” when describing the research process. As opposed to 
upholding the inherently empiricist assumption that social “facts” are lying about 
waiting for the researcher to spot them” (Ramazanoglu and Holland, 2002, p. 154), I 
conceive of the process of generating empirical data in qualitative research as “data 
production” implying that “information gathered by the researcher is produced in a 
social process of giving meaning to the social world” (Ramazanoglu and Holland, 2002, 
p. 154). This is not to support the social constructionist view of reality as contrived by 
social agents or forces, but to emphasize that the researcher’s knowledge is “produced 
through repeated practices of imagining and constituting “data” (Ramazanoglu and 
Holland, 2002, p. 154).        
 As a scientific approach, hermeneutic phenomenology is non-prescriptive in 
relation to methods of data production and allows the use of various research techniques 
(van Manen, 1997). However, my focus on the agential meaning-making around ethical 
food practices and acknowledgment of its subjective ontology necessitates the use of in-
depth interviews as a research strategy that can provide a desired insight into the inner 
worlds of the respondents and cast light on the reflexive work behind their consumption 
commitments. Following Archer (2003, p. 22) in negating the possibility of 
“exteriorising our interiority” implying that “everything inner can be read from its 
public behavioural manifestations”, I maintain that it is only by giving voice to the 
individuals, recognising the authority of their first-person accounts, and acknowledging 
the epistemic prerogative of the investigated over the investigator that one can hope to 
bring to light the subjects’ “inner self” and approach the underlying meanings of their 
actions, practices, and experiences. I rely on personal accounts as “an important means 
and product of inquiry because these stories treat the human being and his/her mind as 
invaluable to understanding and explaining social behaviour” (Orbuch, 1997, p. 468). 
Thus, my choice of in-depth interviews as the main research method ensues directly 
from my recognition of reflexivity as an essential human property which plays a key 
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role in shaping agential decisions and actions. In contradistinction, approaches that deny 
agents self-awareness and responsibility for their own life courses, such as Bourdieu’s 
theory of habitus, render subjects’ accounts of their practices worthless, for how can a 
person give an explanation for the acts that “are the product of a modus operandi of 
which he is not the producer and has no conscious mastery?” (Archer, 2000, p. 42). 
Such perspectives, therefore, make in-depth interviewing unfit for penetrating the 
meaning making of social actors for they invite subjects “to reflect verbally upon 
matters that are inaccessible, because unconscious, and ineffable, because embodied 
rather than discursive” (Archer, 2000, p. 43). Conversely, my epistemological position 
in relation to this study stipulates that “we have to take the agent very seriously indeed 
because he or she is a crucial source of self-knowledge” (Archer, 2003, p. 33). This 
contention has been key to my choice of in-depth interviewing as the main strategy for 
generating data. At the same time, I guard against what Atkinson and Silverman (1997, 
p. 304) criticise as a naïve and simplistic treatment of interviews as a “uniquely 
privileged means of access to biographically grounded experiences and meaning of 
social actors” by reflecting upon and recognising the inevitable limitations of the 
interviewing method and, wherever possible, mitigating their effects on the final 
research account. 
3.2.3.1 Interviews 
Interviewing strategy. My primary method of data production was qualitative 
interviews integrating a life-history approach with elements of in-depth 
phenomenological interviewing. Such combination of strategies has been previously 
used in consumer studies and proved to serve well the researcher’s objectives (see, for 
example, Fournier’s (1998) study of consumers’ relationships with brands). Life history 
interviews have a focus on participants’ biographies and require interviewees to 
reflexively draw connections between their past, present, and future. They are informed 
by respondents’ subjective perceptions and interpretations of their lived experiences and, 
therefore, align with the interpretive perspective and intentions of phenomenological 
research (Belk, 2007, p. 160).  I inquired into the participants’ biographies in order to 
understand how and under which internal impetuses and external circumstances their 
ethical consumer commitments and, concomitantly, subjectivities have developed and 
analyse the ensemble of objective and subjective factors that played a key role in 
determining the trajectories of their social and personal identities. I compliment the 
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focus on the respondents’ life stories with a phenomenological emphasis on the 
subjective meanings of their ethical consumer practices and experiences for their inner 
and outer self. My overall concern, therefore, is with the meanings of the participants’ 
ethical food commitments in relation to their actual and desired identities pursued in 
particular social conditions and personal circumstances.    
 All interviews were conducted within a time frame of two to four weeks after 
completion of observations, which was my complementary data production technique. I 
aimed to allow myself a sufficient amount of time to review the observational and field 
notes and build a tentative mental portrait of each participant based on what I had 
already learned about him or her as a means of ensuring an effective interview process. I 
deliberately avoided having more than one interview in one day or combining interview 
encounters with any other type of fieldwork, keeping in mind that one-to-one 
interviewing is an intense process (Gray, 1995) that can be very demanding for both 
respondents and researcher (Hesse-Biber, 2007). All interviews were arranged to take 
place at public venues, either in coffee shops or at my university department. Due to 
trustful relationships established with the participants during extensive prior 
communication, I found it very easy to establish rapport in the interviews and conduct 
conversations in a relaxed and friendly environment. I explained to the respondents that 
I would like them to begin by recounting their life story and that I would ask some 
follow-up questions which they are under no obligation to answer, should they not wish 
to. Finally, I asked the participants to confirm their permission to be tape-recorded.
 Interview guides. The interviews were designed to generate two types of 
information: first-person descriptions of the development of the respondents’ ethical 
consumption commitments within the larger narrative of their lives with a focus on the 
objective contexts and personal circumstances in which this process unfolded; 2) the 
subjects’ understandings and interpretations of the meaning of their ethical food 
practices in relation to their inner and social self. Accordingly, I began each interview 
by asking the respondents to recount their life story focusing on a particular aspect of it, 
i.e. the evolution of their ethical food commitments, and followed up with questions 
inviting the interviewees to reflect on the meanings of their ethical consumption 
practices and experiences. At the end of the interview, I asked questions from a tailored 
list of discussion prompts based on what I had previously learned about the respondent 
from observations and prior communication. In conducting the interviews, I aimed to 
adhere to the principle of emergent dialogue which ascribes to the respondents the 
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leading role in setting the direction and steering the course of the conversation 
(Thompson, Locander and Pollio, 1990). While closely following the lines of the 
narratives told by the respondents, I tried, as much as possible, to preserve the 
conversation in the realm of the relevant themes and elicit stories describing the 
formation and evolution of the subjects’ ethical concerns and commitments and the 
contexts in which this process took place. Such interviewing strategy enabled me to 
give voice to the participants while maintaining focus on their experiences of ethical 
consumption and their meanings in terms of the subjects’ relationship with the self; this 
has allowed me to achieve effective in-depth interviewing.    
 Data transcription. The interviews varied in duration from one to five hours, 
but generally lasted for around two and a half hours. I transcribed all interview data 
verbatim myself in order to facilitate the analysis of data by increasing the level of 
closeness between the interpreter and the text (Halcomb and Davidson, 2006) and to 
enable the use of the respondents’ own terms as a means to increase the validity of 
interpretation (Maxwell, 2012). All interview transcripts were stored on the secure 
university network, in password-protected files and under pseudonyms. Print copies of 
transcripts, which I used for the purposes of analysis, were kept in a locked drawer at 
my university department. Although the use of verbatim quotations in academic texts is 
sometimes advised against (Corden and Sainsbury, 2006), I decided not to edit excerpts 
from participants’ narratives as a means of giving the voice to the respondents and in 
order to reiterate the emphasis on their subjective interpretations and meanings. 
 The limitations of the interview method. The use of interviews as a key 
strategy for eliciting data which, as I argued, only agents can claim knowledge about, 
presents significant challenges that need to be explicitly acknowledged and carefully 
considered. The life-history approach is inherently problematic for, as Archer (2003, p. 
31-32) notes, when we ask people to recall and account for something from their past, 
         
… we are asking for attentive retrospection. This is not like taking a second look at a 
filed photograph; it is much more like police procedure where witnesses are asked to recall “any 
detail, however trivial”. 
This raises several concerns. Firstly, the question arises as to whether and to 
what extent we may expect people to retain memories and impressions of past 
experiences, which at the time might have gone unnoticed, and reproduce them at the 
investigator’s request with the precision needed to inform an accurate analysis? 
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Secondly, even if it is possible for a person to revive past events and imagine 
experiencing them again, can he also reanimate the same mental and emotional states 
that he once lived through? Has Lila, one of the most self-reflexive participants of my 
research, succeeded in “trying to go back to my younger self and see how it felt then” or 
has she failed in her effort, proving that “the life of the mind is fundamentally 
Heraclitan, for it never descends twice into the same stream” (Archer, 2003, p. 60)? 
Thirdly, if James (1950, p. 234) is right that “experience is remoulding us every 
moment, and our mental reaction on every given thing is really a resultant of our 
experience of the whole world up to date”, does it then follow that whatever a person 
makes of his past decisions and actions can never be held as a true reflection of his 
former self, since our interpretation of any given moment from the past is always and 
inevitably refracted by all our subsequent experiences? Lawler (2008) holds precisely 
this view, arguing that “significance is conferred on earlier events by what comes later” 
(p.16), and that in telling their life stories people always engage in “memoro-politics” – 
a process by which the past is interpreted in the light of the knowledge and 
understanding of the subject’s “present” (p. 18). As she contends, “it is not simply that 
memories are unreliable (although it is): the point is that memories are themselves 
social products. What we remember depends on the social context” (Lawler, 2008, p. 
17). Steedman (1986, p. 5) conveys the same point – of note is her description of how 
memory makes the current self through the interpretation of the past: 
We all return to memories and dreams… again and again; the story we tell of our life is 
reshaped around them. But the point does not lie there, back in the past, back in the lost time at 
which they happened; the only point lies in interpretation. The past is re-used through the 
agency of social information, and that interpretation of it can only be made with what people 
know of a social world and their place within it. 
  
It is noteworthy that the inherent fallibility of human memory and the traps 
involved in relying on people’s accounts of the past were recognised by my participants. 
Lila, for instance, expressed doubts in relation to her mother’s account of Lila’s 
childhood: “I am not sure if it is true because sometimes people kind of re-write 
memories to fit their ideas”, she said, unwittingly fuelling my concerns over the 
reliability of her own narrative.        
 Finally, if the overarching goal of my research can only be fulfilled by gaining 
knowledge that is being kept in the sole possession of the participants, how can I 
ascertain the truthfulness of their accounts and ensure that no important facts, details, 
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and subjects’ feelings about them have been deliberately or inadvertently 
misrepresented or withheld? Is it possible to rely on a person’s narration of the past to 
understand his way toward his present self if, as Goodson and Sikes (2001, p. 6) 
contend, life stories are always “lives interpreted and made textual” and inevitably 
present only “a partial, selective commentary on lived experience” and if, as Goffman 
(1959) famously suggested, people are actors engaged in a incessant process of 
impression management and presentation of self?      
 These methodological hurdles, while demanding most careful consideration, 
need not stand on the way of a rigorous sociological enquiry or prevent attempts at 
gaining a genuine understanding of the inner worlds and lives of human beings. Upon 
deep reflection, neither the inevitable limitations of retrospective interviewing nor my 
concern with the knowledge that cannot be directly accessed or ascertained should 
create barriers to fulfilling the goals of the study. In the context of this research, I am in 
agreement with Lawler (2008) that, ultimately, it does not matter whether participants’ 
life stories are objective accounts of facts and events (and as Biesta et al. (2001) are 
emphatic, they never are) for their value lies in how the authors use them to create a 
particular identity. Even untruthful, the life story “speaks a different kind of truth about 
its author”, Lawler (2008, p. 26) argues, drawing on Haraway’s understanding of 
narratives:          
   
Stories are not ‘fictions’ in the sense of being ‘made up’. Rather, narratives are devices 
to produce certain kinds of meaning. I try to use stories to tell what I think is the truth – a 
located, embodied, contingent and therefore real truth (1997, p. 230, my emphasis) 
 
What this position opens up is the view of a person’s self “as made up through 
making a story out of a life” (Lawler, 2008, p. 11), that is “through a series of creative 
acts in which she interprets and reinterprets her memories and experiences, articulated 
within narrative” (Lawler, 2008, p. 12). This perspective has important methodological 
implications. Firstly, it underscores that focus of life history research is not on the lives 
themselves, but rather “text of lives” (Freeman, 1998, p. 7 cited in Goodson and Sikes, 
2001, p. 16). Further, it presupposes a particular way of understanding the relationships 
between individuals’ self-narratives and their identities, i.e. seeing identity as being 
produced during the storytelling “through assembling various memories, experiences, 
episodes, etc. within narrative” (Lawler, 2008, p. 11) rather than treating the narrative as 
a reflection of identity development independent of the act of storytelling. Thus, it is 
 
79 
“not that autobiography (the telling of a life) reflects a pre-given identity: rather, 
identities are produced through the autobiographical work in which all of us engage 
every day” (Lawler, 2008, p. 13). This perspective informs the approach that I take in 
relation to my participants’ life stories: I treat them as compilations of episodes, each 
being a reflection of the respondents’ particular concerns and the ways in which these 
concerns played out in their lives, the conflicts and struggles they generated and the 
directions in which they steered their courses of action. These episodes are not 
randomly chosen, they “have a place in the plot and so they produce the narrative” 
(Lawler, 2008, p. 12); together, they constitute a life story which is “always the same 
story in the end, that is the individual’s account of how she got to be the way she is” 
(Steedman, 1986, p. 132). Inevitably, of course, the narration of the life story relies on 
the current interpretation of past experiences and events and hence “the “now” is (…) 
always present in one’s story of the past” (Biesta et al., 2011, p. 9). Understanding and 
taking into account the present contexts from which individuals reconstruct, interpret, 
and recount their biographies, therefore, is not only the study’s key research objective, 
but also a methodological imperative dictated by my intention to explore the evolution 
of the participants’ identities through the telling of their lives. 
3.2.3.2 Direct observations 
I designed direct observations to serve as a complimentary research method to 
assist in the process of data production. My original plan was to accompany the 
respondents on their weekly grocery shopping and observe their shopping activities, 
choices, and behaviours. However, this plan was later adjusted to accommodate the 
variety of ethical consumer practices, shopping routines, and ways of food provisioning 
that have been revealed in the course of the fieldwork, and while most of the 
observational trips focused on grocery shopping, they also included visits to allotments, 
sustainable communities and co-housing developments, charity shops, and even a 
virtual experience such as online shopping. The number, frequency, and destinations of 
trips were negotiated with each respondent on an individual basis. Such responsiveness 
to the demands that the actual research context places on the study design and openness 
to renegotiating relationships with participants is a crucial component of the critical 
realist approach to planning and carrying out qualitative research (Maxwell, 2012).
 Informal conversations that occurred naturally during observations proved an 
important source of information contributing to my understanding of the phenomenon 
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and people under study, in line with methodological literature (e.g. Patton, 2001). I 
chose not to audiotape these conversations to allow for a less formal interaction as well 
as due to the likelihood of high levels of background noise and frequent interruptions, 
but notes were taken of any cues arising from participants’ physical and verbal 
behaviour. As soon as possible after each trip, I reviewed the notes and made essential 
clarifications for the ease of use at a later stage. Such observational and field notes are 
considered an effective way to retain gathered data in qualitative research (Lofland and 
Lofland, 1999). I approached observations as an opportunity for discerning important 
issues and themes to be further explored and elaborated upon via in-depth interviews. 
Thus, careful revision and analysis of all relevant data generated in the course of the 
observations constituted an integral part of my preparation for the formal interview with 
each participant.          
 In adopting a multi-method approach, I was guided by the literature suggesting 
that drawing on different sources of evidence is a powerful strategy that can increase the 
credibility of the research account and enhance confidence in the validity of the findings 
(Denscombe, 2014; Bryman, 2008). It was my aim to use triangulation, i.e. combine 
interviews and observations as mutually reinforcing qualitative techniques (Patton, 2001) 
in order to illuminate the respondents’ consumption practices from different 
perspectives and secure an opportunity for the corroboration of their accounts, thereby 
reducing the uncertainty of my interpretations and enhancing the validity of my 
conclusions. However, as my understanding of the nature of the knowledge I was 
seeking progressed and my focus on the real but unobservable phenomena and 
processes heightened, and as key strengths and limitations of my chosen research 
strategies started to manifest themselves in the course of the fieldwork, the real value of 
observations as a research technique in the context of my study became evident. Thus, I 
never used the data yielded from observational trips to verify or contest participants’ 
narratives. Firstly, as I argued above, their truthfulness is thought to be of little 
consequence for understanding the respondents’ accounts of their ethical food 
commitments and interpreting them in relation to their identities. Secondly, such use of 
observations would subvert the study’s appeal to “something non-observable” (Brown, 
1982, p. 234) and its focus on the immaterial, invisible, and impalpable phenomena 
such as reflexive transactions between human emotions, concerns, and commitments. 
As a research method, observations could offer no valid means of penetrating the 
subjective meanings, considerations, and intentions, both fulfilled and unrealised, 
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behind consumer choices and acts. It is only by listening to the participants’ stories that 
I have been able to penetrate beyond what could be learned from simply observing their 
shopping behaviours and purchase decisions. Thus, I have found that similar or even 
identical consumer practices may be inspired by different moral values, manifest 
different ethical concerns, and reflect different structural circumstances; that seemingly 
value-laden consumer acts and choices may be completely void of ethical motives; and 
that the most deeply held moral principles may never manifest themselves in behaviour 
due to the subjective conditions and objective circumstances that prevent individuals 
from acting on their beliefs. While of no benefit as a means of comparison and contrast, 
observations proved absolutely critical in enabling me to approach the standards of 
rigour of interpretive and, more specifically, hermeneutic phenomenological research. 
One of the key methodological prescriptions of hermeneutic phenomenology is that 
individuals’ experiences must be related to and understood in light of the specific “life 
worlds” in which they arise (Thompson, Locander and Pollio, 1990). The aim of the 
researcher, therefore, is to approximate the research process to the studied experience as 
it is lived. Direct observations of participants’ ethical activities, from shopping for 
ethically labelled products in supermarkets and health shops to digging over an 
allotment site, have been key to enabling me to better understand the contexts in which 
ethical food choices were made and ethical consumption activities took place, and thus 
achieve the needed level of closeness to the real experiences of ethical consumers as 
they were being lived. Each of these observations provided a direct insight into the ways 
in which the subjects lived through the experience of acting as an ethical food consumer 
and brought their consumer agency into play with their moral concerns. They have also 
presented an opportunity for participants to talk about their ethical consumer 
experiences while simultaneously creating and living through them, thus providing for a 
better “involvement of the researcher in the world of the research participants and their 
stories” (van Manen, 1997 cited in Kafle, 2013, p. 196). Through “bathing in the 
experience as it occurs” (Grbich, 2007, p. 88), I have been able to observe the diverse 
forms and subtle nuances of ethical consumer activities which played an important role 
in enhancing my frame of reference, i.e. the background knowledge and understanding 
of the phenomenon under study - a key determinant of the quality and credibility of 
hermeneutic phenomenological research (Thompson, Pollio and Locander, 1994).  
 Furthermore, spending time with the participants prior to formal interviews has 
laid the foundations for developing rapport and reducing the distance between the 
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researcher and the researched. Lawrence-Lightfoot and Davis (1997) indicate the 
importance of the amount of time spent and the frequency of encounters with 
respondents as a key factor contributing to productive and trustful research relationships. 
Through extensive communication with my respondents, I managed to build the level of 
trust that is needed for individuals to feel comfortable to share their life stories with an 
outside person. Interviewees’ comments highlight the level of openness and trust that 
characterised my relationship with the participants: “I will tell you anything”, 
responded Maggi to my request to provide as much detail about her life as she feels 
comfortable with; “this is quite personal, but I don’t mind telling you”, said Mary when 
discussing her personal family circumstances. This “environment of safety and trust” 
(Laverty, 2003, p. 19) established through prior communication during observational 
trips allowed me to fully harness the potential of my primary research method, in-depth 
interviews, to achieve the desired depth and breadth of information and access the 
reflexive workings and subjective meanings underlying the participants’ ethical food 
commitments. Retrospectively, what was meant to serve as a complimentary data 
collection technique and a tool for corroboration of findings proved to be an essential 
means of ensuring the quality, credibility, and trustworthiness of my research. Through 
this methodological experience, I have come to recognise the value of a realist approach 
to assessing research methods, i.e. not “as context-independent criteria for quality” 
(Creswell, 2012, p. 148), but “as a means of obtaining evidence that can deal with 
plausible threats to validity of the study’s interpretations and conclusions” (Creswell, 
2012, p. 148). I will further elaborate on the issues of validity in the relevant section of 
the chapter.  
 
3.3 Researcher positionality  
3.3.1 Understanding and negotiating my subjectivity  
Both critical realism and hermeneutic phenomenology underscore the role of the 
researcher as a co-producer of information and the inevitable effects of researcher 
subjectivity, i.e. his or her experiences, beliefs, values, and personal characteristics, on 
the analysis and interpretation of data. Critical realist approach to research design 
demands that the researcher’s identity and perspectives be taken into account (Maxwell, 
2012); likewise, hermeneutic phenomenological tradition requires the researcher to 
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accept the impossibility of “bracketing”, i.e. suspending “all previous ontological 
judgment about the situation in an attempt to gain access to the common-sense 
knowledge and practical reasoning used by the group under study” (Goulding, 1999, p. 
863). In consumer studies more specifically, Wallendorf and Brucks (1993) and Gould 
(1995) reject the notions of objectivity and distance and call for an acknowledgement of 
the part that researcher subjectivity plays in shaping both the process and conclusions of 
research. Accordingly, it was my aim as an investigator to recognise my subjectivity, 
make implicit assumptions explicit, and identify the potential “interpretive influences” 
(Laverty, 2003, p. 24) on my research account thereby enhancing its credibility. 
However, while sharing the view that “rather than engaging in futile attempts to 
eliminate the effects of the researcher, we should set about understanding them” 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, p. 16), I found it challenging to work out “how, 
specifically, one becomes aware of this subjectivity and its consequences, and how one 
uses this subjectivity productively in the research” (Maxwell, 2012, p. 98). Following 
methodological prescriptions, I engaged in reflexive self-analysis and writing which 
involved describing, exploring, and explaining my assumptions, feelings, and beliefs 
about the phenomena and people under study. The result of this on-going introspective 
exercise has been extensive notes, what Maxwell (2012) refers to as “researcher identity 
memos” and Preissle (2008) calls “subjectivity statements”. Some of these notes I used 
solely for personal reflection, while others were published on my online blog 
(www.ediblematters.wordpress.com) where I have been continuously documenting the 
progress of my study and concomitant evolution of my academic and personal 
knowledge of the research subject. This “public account of the self” (Denscombe, 2014, 
p. 89) offers evidence of my incessant reflexive effort to “explore and embrace the role 
of subjectivity” (Tolman and Brydon-Miller, 2001, p. 5) and effectively incorporate it 
into my research design and conduct.  It testifies to my persistent efforts to go beyond 
mere private reflections on my relationship to the research and with the researched and, 
as Denscombe (2014) emphatically prescribes, to present them publicly in order to 
support the study conclusions and outcomes.  From this viewpoint, every weekly post 
published on my blog, “open to public scrutiny and amenable to evaluation” 
(Denscombe, 2014, p. 284), contributed to my accountability and transparency as a 
researcher, an analyst, and a writer. To borrow from Johnstone (2007, p. 113), this 
reflexive record enhances the legitimacy of my research “by establishing a vantage 
point for critically assessing the researchers themselves, their integrity, their decisions 
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on questions of research design, strategy, methods and theoretical framework and the 
data that result”.         
 Finally, in the field I engaged with and negotiated my subjectivity by making it 
an integral component of my communication with the participants, an essential 
constituent of the process of listening and understanding their narratives (Maxwell, 
2012). Like Tolman and Brydon-Miller, I made a conscious effort to “bring myself 
knowingly into the process of listening, learning from my own thoughts and feelings in 
response to what [a participant] is saying in her story” (2001, p. 132) and in doing so, 
improve  “my ability to stay clear about what my own ideas and feelings are and how 
they do or do not line up with [participants’] words, thus avoiding “bias” or imposing 
my story over [theirs]” (2001, p. 132). By maintaining such reflexive consciousness, I 
was able to stay more attuned to the effects of my subjectivity on my interpretation and 
representation of the respondents’ experiences, concerns, and identities and thereby 
enhance my accountability and transparency as the author of the research. 
3.3.2 Research relationships: situating myself in relation to the ethical consumers of my 
research  
Engaging with the literature addressing the relationships between researcher and 
researched was an essential step in the process of designing this study. In setting out on 
the fieldwork, I was aware of the importance of establishing rapport with respondents 
for the successful accomplishment of the research goals. In practice, however, building 
a harmonious relationship with the study subjects and achieving a sense of trust to allow 
for the free flow of information (Spradley, 1979) involved more than managing my 
position as a researcher and interviewer. Upon the very first contacts with the ethical 
consumers of my research, I recognised the need to reflect upon my moral positionality, 
i.e. who I am and what my position is in relation to the phenomenon under study, and 
engage with - perhaps, even bring under control - the participants’ perceptions of me as 
an individual and a person of certain principles and beliefs. I was first prompted to think 
about the ways in which the participants’ view of my personal stance on ethical 
consumption may affect our research relationships by a prospective respondent who, in 
the process of negotiating her participation in my study via email, requested that I 
refrain from sending her files and forms as Microsoft Word Documents as she was 
boycotting the corporation on ethical grounds. Despite that this lady did not eventually 
become my research subject, our communication has been very important in terms of 
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revealing how the participants could bring their ethical identity and consumer agency 
into our relationships and how my handling of these sensitive issues could affect the 
research process and its outcomes. These considerations became increasingly prominent 
in the course of the fieldwork, of which casual conversations and meetings with 
participants have been a significant part. Somewhat unexpectedly, I found that the 
respondents often approached and potentially even assessed me in exactly the same way 
as I approached and assessed them, that is as an emotional, reflexive, and evaluative 
human being whose relationship to the world is one of concern.  Given the focus of my 
study, some of the participants assumed that I identified as an ethical consumer and 
pursued moral food commitments myself. In reality, despite that over the last couple of 
years under the inevitable influence of my research and as the result of continuous 
engagement with the subject I have become increasingly mindful about the implications 
of my personal consumption style, I have never explicitly committed or actively 
engaged with any practices of consumption that could be defined as ethical and cannot, 
therefore, claim an ethical consumer identity. I initially assumed that this difference 
could contribute to the distance between me and my participants, undermine the 
relationship of trust, and inhibit an open dialogue thereby posing a threat to the validity 
of my research account. I have, however, responded to Maxwell’s appeal that 
researchers “need to avoid assuming that solidarity is necessarily a matter of similarity, 
and to be prepared to recognise the actual processes through which difference can 
contribute to relationship” (2012, p. 102). In my case, honesty about my own consumer 
position contributed to my pursuit of symmetric and reciprocal research relationships – 
those which “reflect a more responsible ethical stance and are likely to yield deeper data 
and better social science” (Lawrence-Lightfoot and Davis, 1997, pp. 137-138). Besides, 
acknowledging my lack of engagement with ethical consumption was not merely a 
matter of being honest with those whom I expected to be honest with me, it was also a 
means of ensuring a comfortable space between me and my participants and avoid the 
“danger” of “too much rapport” (Seidman, 1998, pp. 80-82). By highlighting that my 
interest in ethical consumption was of academic as opposed to personal nature, I was 
able to subtly accentuate my role as a researcher and attain a balanced relationship 
needed for ensuring credible research (Seidman, 1998). At the same time, I strove to 
prevent potential clashes between my participants’ ethical commitments and my lack of 
such by making a conscious effort, wherever possible, to ensure that my personal 
lifestyle and consumption choices do not disrupt the environment of comfort, safety, 
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and trust that I managed to establish. For instance, I deliberately refrained from wearing 
leather shoes, having regular milk with my coffee, or exposing branded items such as 
the iPhone or Macbook when meeting with the participants so that not to disturb their 
feelings or inhibit an open discussion. This called for not only emotional sensitivity, but 
also careful considerations of a more practical sort, such as my dress code, and required 
me to engage with the “whole webs of signification (…) built up around apparently tiny 
clues” (Gray, 1995, p. 162), up to the choice of an e-mail attachment format, which 
could be scrutinized, assessed, and interpreted by my ethically minded participants. This 
deliberate effort ensued from my recognition that “the relationships that the researcher 
created with the participants in the research are real phenomena; they shape the context 
within which the research is conducted, and have a profound influence on the research 
and its results” (Maxwell, 2012, p. 100, my emphasis). In hindsight, managing research 
relationships has been a highly reflexive and emotionally demanding experience which 
has triggered my sense of presence in the research process as a person and not merely as 
a detached investigator. Staying attuned to the effects of my subjectivity on the research 
conduct and engaging with my positionality in relation to the participants have been key 
elements of my approach to enhancing the validity of my research account.   
 
3.4 Data analysis  
 
 I approached the transcription of interviews as the first stage of data analysis. 
While transcribing the participants’ narratives, I made notes on the relevant concepts, 
recurrent patterns, and dominant themes. In this way, I compiled a summary sheet for 
each interview transcript to be added to the respective “ethical consumer case” – a 
comprehensive profile of each of the respondents which I had been building throughout 
the research process. Each such case consisted of the background information about the 
participant, detailed observational and field notes, verbatim transcription of the formal 
interview, and any other documents and materials that provided insight into the 
respondent’s ethical consumption concerns, practices, and experiences (Joe’s case 
folder, for instance, included excerpts from his personal journal containing a reflexive 
account of his shopping and eating practices which he generously shared with me). 
From these documents, textual data for analysis and interpretation ensued.  While 
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hermeneutic phenomenological tradition emphasizes that the process of textual 
interpretation is irreducible to a set of methodological procedures (Gadamer et al., 2004; 
van Manen, 1997) and thus none is offered, scholars (Arnold and Fischer, 1994; Laverty, 
2003; Thompson, Pollio and Locander, 1994) suggest that the data be analysed through 
a hermeneutic circle – a series of iterations between the parts and the whole of the texts. 
In a study of the sociocultural meanings underlying consumer experiences, Thompson, 
Pollio and Locander (1994) provide detailed methodological guidelines for the 
application of hermeneutic phenomenology to the research process, emphasising that a 
thorough analysis should aim at the thematic interpretation of the data through 
hermeneutic endeavour, that is an iterative reading of the text and on-going revisions of 
prior interpretations in light of the constantly developing understanding of the 
relationships between the text as a whole and its parts. Authors distinguish between 
intra-textual movements, whose aim is to achieve an understanding of the text as a 
whole, and inter-textual iterations, which seek to establish distinctions and similarities 
across different texts. The purpose of this strategy of interpretation is through each 
subsequent reading of the text to elicit a broader range of essential meanings until an 
integrated understanding and a coherent interpretation of the text is achieved 
(Thompson, Pollio and Locander, 1994), at which point the hermeneutic cycle may stop 
(Kvale, 1996). Guided by these prescriptions, I conducted the analysis by engaging in 
iterative readings of the participants’ ethical food stories, focusing on the flow of events 
and looking for their antecedents, consequences, and interdependencies. My analysis 
strategy did not involve coding of data as I wanted to avoid what Maxwell refers to as 
“context-stripping” (2012, p. 115), i.e. neglecting the contextual relationships within 
which different data segments originally belong and which are usually lost as the result 
of the categorizing analysis. Concerned with the actual contexts in which the 
phenomena and processes of interest emerged and unfolded, I sought to preserve the 
diverse and complex contextual ties and relations and hence refrained from segmenting 
participants’ narratives into discrete and decontextualized data units. As Atkinson, I was 
interested in “reading episodes and passages at greater length, with a correspondingly 
different attitude toward the act of reading and hence of analysis. Rather than 
constructing my account like a patchwork quilt, I [felt] more like working with the 
whole cloth” (1992, p. 460). For the same reasons, that is to avoid cutting up “the whole 
cloth” of the participants’ stories, I did not rely on any computer software that is often 
used to facilitate and organise data analysis. Instead, I used printed copies of interview 
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transcripts and notes and a highlighter pen - the old paper-and-pencil method which I 
found not only an effective, but also a more satisfying way of immersing myself in the 
data and connecting with the participants’ stories on both mental and physical levels. In 
the words of Saldaña (2012, p. 22),  
There is something to be said for a large area of desk or table space with multiple pages 
or strips of paper spread out to see the smaller pieces of the larger puzzle – a literal perspective 
not always possible on a computer’s monitor screen.       
A small number of participants enabled me to avoid categorising the data 
without losing the ability to compare and find connections between different interviews 
and reveal patterns and commonalities in the subjects’ accounts. I moved back and forth 
across different ethical consumer cases to highlight similarities and differences in the 
participants’ experiences first at the level of concrete, but moving further beyond the 
explicit physical and mental phenomena described in the data to discern subtler 
conceptual processes captured in it. The analysis was geared towards comprehension, 
synthesising, and theorising and involved continuous revisions of the previously 
achieved understandings and tentatively drawn conclusions. The hermeneutic circle 
continued until the data was rendered meaningful and turned into credible evidence to 
which I could bring my theoretical constructions in order to develop a social theory 
about common structures and underlying mechanisms of ethical consumption practices. 
  
3.5 Assessing the validity of research: a realist approach  
 
Maintaining the continuity of my philosophical position, I adopt a realist 
approach to assessing the quality of my research. Arguing from a realist perspective, 
Maxwell rejects the procedure-based approach to validity indicating that validity 
“pertains to the accounts or conclusions reached by using a particular method in a 
particular context for a particular purpose, not to the method itself” (2012, p. 130). 
Neither can judgements of validity be applied to data for, as Hammersley and Atkinson 
point out, “data in themselves cannot be valid or invalid; what is at issue are the 
inferences drawn from them” (2007, p. 223). Assessing the validity of research, 
therefore, is a matter of evaluating the credibility and trustworthiness of the 
understandings and conclusions reached by the researcher. From this point of view, 
“understanding is a more fundamental concept for qualitative researchers than validity” 
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(Maxwell, 2012, p. 133). To apply the notion of validity to researcher’s interpretations 
and understandings, Maxwell emphasises, is not to suggest that “only one correct, 
“objective” understanding” (2012, p. 133) of the phenomena under study has the right to 
exist, but to indicate the importance of assessing the relationship between the research 
account and the things that it claims to account for. 
Given the nature of my study, of primary concern is its interpretative validity, 
that is the degree to which its conclusions are based on the comprehension of the 
phenomena under study from the perspective of those being studied, rather than that of 
the researcher: “accounts of meaning must be based initially on the conceptual 
framework of the people whose meaning is in question”, argues Maxwell (2012, p. 138). 
Addressing threats to interpretive validity is challenging because the inner workings of 
people’s minds can be neither directly observed nor straightforwardly accessed, and 
researcher’s understanding thereof is inherently “a matter of inference” (Maxwell, 2012, 
p. 138) from respondents’ own accounts and behaviours. Moreover, as Maxwell points 
out, judgements of interpretative validity pertain as much to participants’ conscious 
concepts as to their unconscious motives, values, and beliefs, and it is the task of the 
investigator to reveal, understand, and interpret not only actions, feelings, and beliefs 
which participants acknowledge as their own, but also those that they might be unaware 
or oblivious of. Thus, while acknowledging that all understandings are inevitably partial, 
fallible, and incomplete, and that absolute certainty is impossible to achieve, I sought to 
maximize the degree of legitimacy of my analysis and the trustworthiness of my 
conclusions by adhering, as much as possible, to the standards of rigour of qualitative 
and, more specifically, hermeneutic phenomenological research. As a methodological 
approach, hermeneutic phenomenology offers potential to mitigate the validity threats to 
researcher’s interpretations through a set of guidelines for gaining access to the life 
worlds of those being studied and developing an understanding from participants’ 
perspectives. In line with a realist perspective, hermeneutic phenomenology considers 
comprehension a prerequisite to credible interpretation and theorising. Thompson, 
Pollio and Locander (1994, p. 441) are emphatic that a hermeneutic study should start 
with a thorough background research on the subject of interest, while van Manen (1997) 
considers researcher’s orientation to the phenomenon under study to be central to an 
effective hermeneutic analysis. The hermeneutic approach instructs the researcher to 
attain comprehension by identifying and reflecting on her own experiences of the 
phenomenon, gaining experiential descriptions of it from the study subjects, and 
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engaging with relevant literature to enhance understanding and refine conclusions 
(Goulding, 1999). In keeping with these prescriptions, I began my pursuit of the highest 
possible degree of comprehension by engaging in self-reflection aimed at the revision of 
my personal experiences of ethical consumption and with ethical consumers. This effort 
yielded sparse results due to my very limited prior exposure to ethical consumption as a 
social phenomenon and ethical consumers as a personality type – a gap which I attribute 
to the specifics of the socio-cultural environment, informational context, and 
consumption opportunities prevailing in Azerbaijan, the country where I was born, 
raised, and spent almost my entire life. This has presented a challenge on my way 
toward producing a rich and trustworthy research account given the hermeneutics’ acute 
emphasis on the “interpretative orientation” or “frame of reference” (Thompson, Pollio 
and Locander, 1994, p. 441) of the researcher as a key determinant of the quality of 
interpretation and credibility of research findings. I have addressed this potential 
weakness in a number of ways, all intended to enhance the scope of my contextual 
knowledge and understanding of ethical consumption and ethical consumers. Thus, 
throughout the research process I have continually engaged with the topical issues and 
debates dominating both academic and general public discourse on ethical consumption; 
subscribed to a range of ethical consumer magazines and newsletters; and maintained an 
online blog documenting the evolution of my apprehension of the phenomenon as well 
as the progress of my research. Along with theoretical understanding, I was also 
actively developing my experiential knowledge of ethical consumption. Particularly, I 
found it necessary to obtain a more specific idea about ethical products available on the 
market, the range of issues they address and the types of moral concerns that they speak 
to. Thus, I started to buy ethical foods (on an occasional basis) to have a direct 
experience of searching for, identifying, and choosing between products with ethical 
credentials. In the process of getting familiar with the ethical foods market, I have 
compiled a list of the ethical labelling schemes that appear to dominate the UK food 
market; this gave me an understanding of the types of ethical labels that the UK 
consumers are likely to come in contact with as well as the kinds of ethical concerns 
they promote.          
 Finally, in building my frame of reference I actively used observations as an 
opportunity to immerse myself into the life worlds of ethical consumers and learn about 
their practices, experiences, and behaviours. Not only has this improved my 
understanding of the phenomenon of interest, but it also allowed to mitigate the validity 
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threats inherent in my primary research method, i.e. interviews. As Maxwell (2012) 
highlights, relying on insights gained from a brief and limited interaction during the 
interviewing process to make inferences about the rest of the respondent’s actions, 
feelings, and thoughts inevitably raises concerns about internal generalizability, that is 
the investigator’s ability to project conclusions about processes studied onto those that 
remained outside the interview situation. From this viewpoint, observations provided 
me with an opportunity to gain enhanced insight into the participants’ attitudes, 
characters, and behaviours and reveal aspects of their ethical consumer practices and 
identities that were not expressed or exposed in the interviews, thereby enhancing the 




The burden of this chapter has been to provide an overview of the 
methodological approach adopted in the thesis, outline its specific research strategies 
and techniques and situate them in the context of my epistemological perspective and 
the purposes of the study. In it, I have explained the rationale behind my research design 
and indicated the ways in which it enabled me to achieve the goals of the project. I have 
reflected on the benefits and limitations of my chosen research methods, both according 
to textbooks and, most importantly, in terms of how they played out in practice and 
affected the outcomes of the study, and described and explained the practical steps that I 
was required to take in order to harness the potential as well as mitigate the weaknesses 
of my approach to generating and analysing the data. In designing this study, I was 
guided by the claim that the first requirement of social research is “fidelity to the 
phenomenon under study, not to any particular set of methodological principles” 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, p. 7). Thus, while my methodological procedures 
were consistently oriented toward the standards of rigour of scientific enquiry in general 
and qualitative research in particular, I approached the research design as “a “do-it-
yourself” rather than “off-the-shelf” process” (Maxwell, 2012, p. 76). Reminded by 
Sandelowski (1954, p. 56) that “rules of method serve us, but only to a certain point, 
after which they may enslave us”, I tried to preserve the “art in science” by adjusting 
methodological prescriptions to the demands of the actual research context rather than 
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“simply proceeding along a predesigned path” (Maxwell, 2012, p. 103), and exploring 
the potential of established techniques to serve new purposes and offer enhanced 
benefits. For instance, I observed the phenomenological principle of respondent-led 
interviewing only as far as it did not interfere with my pursuit of the knowledge needed 
for achieving the goals of the study. Also, I found that the principle of data triangulation 
was neither applicable to nor of concern for my study given its philosophical and 
epistemological underpinnings and research aims. Instead of relying on observations for 
the purpose of data verification, I used them as a source of opportunities for establishing 
rapport and laying the basis for an open, honest, and trustful relationship with my 
participants. These relationships have themselves become an integral component of my 
chosen methods of data production and essential part of the overall study design, as 
prescribed by a realist approach (Maxwell, 2012). Moreover, I harnessed the potential 
of observations to address potential validity threats to my research account through 
developing the frame of reference that I brought to the data and improving the internal 
generalisability of my interpretations and conclusions. Hence, my approach to the 
techniques and procedures deployed in the study is that of a realist researcher who 
assesses her methods “in terms of the actual context and purpose of their use” (Maxwell, 
2012, p. 148) and the ways they have contributed to a valid research account. Further, in 
performing data analysis, I refrained from subjecting the texts to the commonly 
prescribed categorizing procedures, such as coding, which I perceived as too 
mechanical, reductive and, most importantly, destructive for the valuable connections 
between data and their context which I considered critical to understanding the 
respondents’ accounts. Thus, the process of analysis has been “primarily an interpretive 
act” rather than “a precise science” (Saldaña, 2012, p. 4) and was aimed at achieving a 
complex, systemic view of the ensemble of the underlying processes and mechanisms 
captured in the data. Most importantly, at every step of the research process I have 
maintained commitment to an anti-empiricist approach to social enquiry – this has been 
evident in my sustained focus on the non-material processes informing the ethical 
consumption phenomenon rather than its directly observable and measurable 
manifestations; in my genuine concern with explaining the underlying generative 
principles of ethical consumer practices and identities rather than producing empirically 
testable predictions thereof; and my persistent pursuit of this knowledge through an 
interpretative analysis of the subjective workings of the minds of the participants rather 
than a direct perception of their inevitably limited behavioural expressions.    
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 The outcome of the above described research process is a small-scale study of 
ethical consumer practices and identities. Its empirical findings are based on qualitative 
in-depth interviews with nine self-defined ethical consumers and direct observations of 
their ethical consumption activities and pursuits. While my selection of participants 
reflects a range of differently positioned subjects and various forms of ethical 
consumption, this research is not representative of all individuals who may self-identify 
as ethical consumers and does not generate what Yin (1993) calls “statistical 
generalisations”. As any qualitative research, the purpose of this study was “not to 
generalize but rather to provide a rich, contextualized understanding of some aspect of 
human experience through the intensive study of particular cases” (Polit and Beck, 2010, 
p. 1451). The value of this thesis lies in its potential to drive social theory, to promote 
an understanding of ethical consumption which goes beyond the concrete level of 
particular actions of individual agents and extends to the level of conceptual relations, 
theoretical mechanisms, and causal processes underlying this complex social 
phenomenon. This theory is a means to what Yin (1993) calls “analytic” and Seale 
(1999) refers to as “theoretical” generalization – that which enables making projections 
about the driving factors, contextual effects and likely outcomes from one ethical 
consumer case to others. As Muys (2009, p. 43), drawing on Stake, puts it: 
The full and thorough knowledge of the particular is also a form of generalization, not 
in the sense of scientific induction but as a naturalistic generalization that is arrived at by 
recognizing the similarities of objects and issues in and out of context. 
The value of this research, therefore, is not in its capacity to “enumerate 
frequencies”, but in its potential “to expand and generalize theories” (Yin, 2009, p. 15). 
By demonstrating that the concept of reflexivity can be applied to open up a new 
perspective on ethical consumption, I enhanced the applicability of an existing theory 
and showcased its capacity to explain a specific social phenomenon, reveal its further 
aspects, and enrich our current understanding of it. Not only does thesis shows that 
moral concerns and reflexive capacities of social agents generate subjective 
commitments to ethical consumption, but it explains how exactly they do so, thus 
fulfilling an essential task of a realist research, i.e. to go beyond mere description and 
interpretation to engage with causality and achieve explanation of the phenomenon 
under study. Admittedly, this explanation only invokes a particular set of structures and 
powers which generate and define ethical consumer practices and identities. As Brown 
(2014) points out, realist researchers are limited in their ability to uncover and grasp the 
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totality of the complex system of myriad of discrete structures and powers that 
determine the causes of emergence and shape the conditions of existence of social 
events, forms, and activities. In synthesizing the results of my analysis of local and 
specific ethical consumer cases into a unified social theory about the generative 
mechanisms of individuals’ ethical concerns and identities, I am inevitably constrained 
by the very specificity and locality of these cases. The particular contexts from which 
the participants understood their lives and constructed their narratives and in which I as 
a researcher accessed and interpreted them automatically limit the reach of my scientific 
enquiry and draw boundaries around what I was able to reveal, explore, and invoke in 
my explanation. Yet, this context-specific research endeavour is, undoubtedly, a 
worthwhile undertaking for, as Brown (2014, p. 118) notes, “we are never going to find 
out about the system as a whole without local and specific enquiry”. The investigation 
of local and specific cases, Brown acknowledges, enables realist researchers to 
hypothesize specific underlying structures and retroduce real causes or conditions of 
social phenomena – the key goal of my research which, as I hope, by the end of this 













Chapter 4  
 
Introducing the Ethical Consumers to My Research 
 
 
Previously, I have outlined the ontological and epistemological presuppositions 
in which my study is grounded. By highlighting distinct properties and causal powers of 
both structure and agency and their role in determining social outcomes, I have justified 
the indispensability of a stratified model of social reality for guiding the analysis and 
achieving an understanding of the complex interplay of subjective and objective 
influences which shape and mould individual practices of ethical consumption. I have 
introduced the concept of reflexivity which forms the core of my theoretical framework 
and holds the key explanatory power for ethical consumption as an identity-concerned 
project of active, creative, and self-conscious agents. It is now time, following Sayer’s 
(2010) methodological appeal, to relate these abstract theoretical notions to the concrete 
– the experiences, decisions, and practices of self-defined ethical consumers – in order 
to explain the generative mechanism which produce ethical consumer commitments and 
identities as well as the subjective and objective factors that determine them all along. 
 When presenting the story of an ethical food consumer in this thesis, I take a 
specific position toward my audience. In trying to fulfill yet another of Andrew Sayer’s 
methodological prescriptions, I intend and hope to be able to overcome the tendency of 
social researchers to treat readers “more as fellow spectators of social life than as 
possible co-participants” (2011, p. 11), that is to describe and explain social issues and 
processes through third person accounts of other people’s behaviour without explicitly 
asking or even tacitly encouraging readers to assess presented portrayals in light of their 
personal life experiences. Since my study focuses on the issues that are near and dear to 
the heart of every human being (for no one can possibly live a life without ever 
considering the questions of morality, ethics, and the right way to be and act), I find the 
urge to follow Sayer’s appeal to “address the readers as fellow participants in life” 
(2011, p. 11) particularly justified. I therefore want to invite my readers to step out of 
the position of detached observers and, as I walk them through the life stories of nine 
ethical food consumers, reflect back on their own experiences and feelings – as 
emotional beings, as moral characters, and as humans constantly facing the challenge of 
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achieving and maintaining a satisfying life. To be able to assess my account of the 
subjects’ inner processes and their outward manifestations, one does not have to be or 
even try to put himself in the shoes of an ethical food consumer. To identify with the 
participants of my study and comprehend their moral pursuits, it is sufficient to 
understand yourself as a person whose relationship to the world is one of concern. For 
any of us, this should not be a difficult task for we all have our own worries and cares 
which, whether we wish it or not, incessantly feed into our deliberations about what to 
do with our life, steering us towards certain courses of action and away from the others. 
A certain amount of self-reflection is all it takes for a person to discern the presence – or 
absence – of particular concerns in every deliberate action she takes or refrains from 
taking. The moment one starts seeing her own behaviour in terms of a wider picture of 
her concerns, it suddenly becomes very easy to understand someone else’s decisions, 
choices, and actions, and it does not matter in the least that the reader’s subjective 
concerns and those of the person whose practices I am trying to render meaningful may 
be about completely different things. Regardless of which domain of life our concerns 
belong to, the effects they exert on us – human beings – remain the same: they stir up 
our emotions which make us aware of the things that we care about and value most; 
they provoke reflexive deliberations through which we define our ultimate concerns and 
devise ways to address them; and they prompt us to continuously monitor the course of 
our life to ensure the fit between our chosen moral projects, subjective concerns, and 
objective circumstances. Thus, having recognised themselves as humans whose 
emotional and mental wellbeing is dependent on the state of the things they truly care 
about and having projected this image onto the ethical consumers of my research, the 
readers of this thesis should have no difficulty in following my account of individuals’ 
ethical food commitments and understanding the ways in which they shape subjects’ 
personal identities and social lives.       
 Despite not being able to present complete narratives of all participant of my 
research, I feel it is necessary to introduce each of the interviewees and give a glimpse 
of their personal characters and life stories. The identity of the respondents is protected 
through the use of pseudonyms, all of which except one (Lucy) were chosen by the 
participants themselves. In four out of nine participant cases, however, I adhere to the 
expressed desire of the respondents to use their real first names (Darren, David, Maggi, 
and Joe). The participants’ age at the time of the first meeting is given. By introducing 
the ethical consumers of my research through short vignettes, I aim to set the 
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background for the forthcoming analysis and discussion of the empirical evidence, 
provide the readers with an opportunity to see unique individuals behind the data, and 
duly acknowledge all those who have contributed to my study and made the ambitious 
undertaking of illuminating the inner worlds and minds of ethical food consumers 
possible and, I hope, successful.  
 
Vignette 1: Lucy 
Lucy is one of the self-selected participants of my study. She learned about my 
research from the promotional flyer which she picked up at one of the ethical grocery 
stores in town. Our communication included two separate shopping trips to Sainsbury’s 
and Waitrose and a two-and-a-half hour interview.      
 Lucy is 48 years old and works in the field of career guidance and occupational 
therapy. She is university educated and tends to identify with middle class. Lucy shares 
responsibility for food provision with her husband who also takes care of most of the 
cooking, which has always been a burden for Lucy. She grew up in a suburban area as 
the youngest of five children. Her family’s diet was a mix of convenience foods - “stuff 
from cans and packets” - during weekdays and traditional English meals served at 
weekends when her working mother had time to cook from scratch. Lucy was raised in 
a household full of pets and has developed an affinity with animals at a very young age. 
Her idea of food ethics has been, and still is, centred around animal life and welfare. It 
doesn’t take Lucy long to pinpoint the origins of her moral concerns - she links them 
firmly to her personal experiences with animals which had very tangible implications 
for how she went on about her diet. At the age of 12, she proclaimed herself a 
vegetarian on moral grounds and has been sustaining a meatless diet ever since. Three 
years ago, she took her moral project to the next level by going vegan. It is her strong 
commitment to cruelty-free consumption that informs Lucy’s self-identification as an 
ethical consumer. At the same time, she admits that over recent years she has become 
less rigid in her pursuit of ethical foodways, with concerns over health increasingly 
impinging upon her dietary principles. For Lucy, ethical consumption means “just that I 
thought through it carefully and it fits with my conscience”, the principle of not doing 
harm being the key moral benchmark against which she evaluates her consumption 




Vignette 2: Jason 
Jason is one of the participants whom I invited to take part in my research 
having learned about his engagement in ethical consumption, specifically his pursuit of 
organic farming and strong preference for organic foods. In total, I met Jason on five 
separate occasions which included two informal meetings during which we discussed 
the food culture of his home country, his farming pursuits, his dietary preferences and 
tastes; two shopping trips to Morrison’s – Jason’s usual destination for grocery 
shopping; and a formal interview which took around one hour to complete.  
 Jason is 31 years old and currently pursuing a doctoral research project on a 
sustainability-related subject. Being an overseas student in England, he lives in a rented 
accommodation and is responsible for his own food provisioning and cooking. Jason 
refused to define himself in terms of class as it seemed an alien concept to him, 
although his level of education and material circumstances would suggest belonging to 
the middle class. He grew up in a traditional household with his mother being 
responsible for preparing family meals, which Jason described as always fresh, 
nutritious, and healthy. Surrounded by small-scale holdings, Jason’s family had easy 
access to locally grown, organic, seasonal produce, although questions of food ethics 
have never been explicitly raised in the house. Despite not being a self-recruited 
participant, Jason self-identifies as an ethical consumer who, in his view, “is someone 
who takes into account a range of different issues such as, for example, responsibility”. 
His project of ethical consumption is centred on commitment to organic, seasonal, and 
local produce, preservation of endangered species, and selective fair-trade purchases, 
but, consistent with Jason’s view of ethical consumerism as “not the action of just 
eating” but “the whole life attitude”, extends beyond provision and consumption of 
food and involves waste management practices, such as recycling. Jason considers 
availability of products with desired qualities and convenience to be major impediments 
on the way toward more responsible consumption. 
 
Vignette 3: David 
I knew David from my network of academic acquaintances and invited him to 
take part in my study. A committed vegetarian with strong environmental values and a 
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long-held interest in sustainability, he seemed - and proved - a perfect participant. I met 
David on multiple occasions, but our formal interaction consisted of three shopping 
trips to various locations, including Waitrose and Sainsbury’s as well as independent 
international food stores, and two separate two-and-a-half hour interviews.  
 David is 33 years old and currently pursuing a doctoral degree in the field of 
sustainability. He expressed difficulty in defining his social position – his background is 
working class, but his educational and occupation trajectory as well as cultural capital 
suggest middle-class belonging. He has recently moved in with his girlfriend – a life-
long vegetarian and environmentalist. They usually do grocery shopping together, but 
food preparation is almost exclusively David’s responsibility – a passionate and 
competent cook, he finds cooking a highly enjoyable and rewarding activity. David is a 
vegetarian, an avid supporter of organic and local agriculture, and is interested in fair-
trade. He is highly knowledgeable about the specifics of global food production and 
consumption and their environmental and societal repercussions; his food practices are 
well informed and well thought through. At the core of his moral food project are 
concerns over the environment, climate change, and social justice. David’s commitment 
to a meat-free diet has purely environmentalist underpinnings which distinguishes him 
from other vegetarian and vegan subjects of my study for whom killing animals is 
morally wrong. For David, being an ethical food consumer means “making a deliberate, 
conscious decision to do what you think is good and always in opposition to what you 
think is bad”. At various points in life, David’s ethical pursuits were constrained by 
time, money, and availability of preferred options which he perceives as major barriers 
to consumer engagement in ethical consumption. 
 
Vignette 4: Darren 
Darren is a self-selected participant who got interested in my research after 
seeing a promotional poster at the local community centre. I met him multiple times, 
including several informal meetings, a visit to his allotment site, two shopping trips to 
international grocery stores, and a formal interview which lasted around two hours. 
 Darren is a 36 years old vegan and animal rights activist. He earns his living 
through various pursuits, such as distribution of herbal teas. Darren defines himself as 
lower class due to his family background, material circumstances, and occupational 
status. At the same time, he is university educated to an undergraduate degree, well-read 
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in philosophy and sociology, and has extensive knowledge about issues of food 
production. Previously married, he is now divorced, lives on his own and does all 
shopping and cooking himself. Darren grew up in a single parent household and was 
raised on a mix of traditional African-Caribbean cooking and ready meals. Meat was an 
essential part of his family’s diet and it was not until quite later in life that Darren 
developed concerns over animal welfare and life. His moral food project evolved 
progressively from pescetarianism, to vegetarianism, and, finally, to veganism.  
Currently, his food choices are determined by a commitment to cruelty-free 
consumption which does not permit any products of animal origin. He is aware of and 
supports organic and fair-trade, but can rarely afford to buy any of these premium-
priced products. His ethical pursuits extend beyond personal consumption - he is a 
founder of a charitable organization promoting vegan lifestyle, manages an allotment 
collective to grow food for the homeless, regularly organizes vegan cooking events to 
feed the hungry, and gives public speeches to promote cruelty-free living. For Darren, 
ethical consumption means “not causing suffering”, and he perceives himself as an 
ethical consumer because he is “not taking part in animal abuse, suffering”. He thinks 
that habit - “mental slavery” in his words - is a major obstacle to be overcome on the 
way toward more ethical foodways. 
 
Vignette 5: Mary 
Mary learned about my research through a newsletter of one of the co-housing 
groups that had kindly agreed to advertise my project among their members. With Mary, 
we have been on three shopping trips mainly to independent grocery stores and health 
food shops, but also conventional supermarkets such as Sainsbury’s. We met separately 
for a formal interview which lasted around two hours.     
 Mary is 64 years old. She has an MSc in environmental technology and has held 
various positions at universities, including distance teaching and research in 
environmental sustainability. She is currently retired, but remains a keen volunteer for 
environmentally oriented organizations, such as the Wildlife Trust. She lives alone and 
takes care of her food provisioning and preparation. She defines herself as middle class, 
although recognizes the fuzziness of the concept. Mary grew up on a farm, in close 
proximity to nature and wildlife, and became involved in food growing and animal 
rearing activities at an early age. Her family’s diet consisted of freshly cooked, 
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wholesome meals in the spirit of traditional British cooking. Mary’s moral food project 
is inspired by concerns over environmental wellbeing, biodiversity, and issues of social 
justice, hence she actively seeks out organic, locally grown, and fairly traded produce. 
Mary has never been vegan or vegetarian, but over the last years she has made a 
conscious effort to reduce her meat intake – this refinement of her ethical food practice 
is informed by growing awareness of the negative environmental and ethical impacts of 
intensive meat production, especially those related to climate change and animal welfare. 
She can therefore be described as a “vegetarian-oriented” (Janda and Trocchia, 2001) 
person – the one who displays a tendency to prefer vegetarian solutions over meat-based 
meals. For Mary, ethical consumption means “being aware of the impact on other 
people and other living organisms on the planet of the decisions you make and the 
things you consume, and try to create the least impact – negative impact - as you can in 
the process – socially, environmentally, ecologically”. She self-defines as an ethical 
food consumer because most of her food purchases, although admittedly not all of them, 
“are with an awareness and some consideration of this effect on people and the planet”. 
She cites lack of clear information and money as major barriers to switching to more 
responsibly modes of consumption.  
 
Vignette 6: Maggi 
Maggi is another self-recruited participant. As Mary, she learned about my study 
from a newsletter of a co-housing community of which she is a friend. I had a chance to 
develop a very close rapport with Maggi through extensive face-to-face as well as email 
communication, including three separate visits to various co-housing sites, four 
shopping trips, and a two-hour long interview.    
 Maggi is 62 years old and currently retired. She is university educated, has had a 
long career as a social worker, and perceives herself to be middle class. Both her 
children have by now moved out of the family home leaving Maggi responsible for 
managing her own foodways. She grew up in a family which followed traditional 
British cooking and regarded meat as an essential component of a “proper” meal. Since 
Maggi was a child, she has felt deep compassion for animals which started to 
materialise into a commitment to cruelty-free consumption once she began an 
independent life as a university student. Maggi transitioned to vegetarianism in her 
twenties, but found it difficult to sustain her moral food project at certain points in life, 
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such as during pregnancy and breastfeeding or while living with meat-eating partners. 
For the lasts several years, however, Maggi has been a strict vegan and currently finds 
no obstacles to her pursuit of ethical consumption. She shops as much in health food 
stores as at conventional supermarkets, where her main destinations are fresh produce 
aisles and sections with alternative foodstuffs, such as organic and dairy-free. Her ideal 
food choice is vegan, organic, local, and fair-trade, but prohibitive costs make certain 
compromises inevitable. Maggi admits to feeling proud for the way she consumes, but 
also conscious of and guilty about less ethical choices that she can’t always avoid, such 
as imported products or plastic packaging. One of the major challenges Maggi faces as 
an ethical food consumer is social occasions and family gatherings where meat-based 
dishes usually form the centre of the meal. Price is also a key factor influencing 
Maggi’s ability to fulfil her moral food project in a comprehensive and consistent 
manner. For Maggi, ethical consumption means “not exploiting people, not exploiting 
animals, that’s healthy, that’s sustainable, and it’s in terms of simple living”. She 
considers herself an ethical food consumer because, as she says, “I care about what I 
eat”. Expressions such as “I ought to”, “I should” appeared frequently in Maggi’s 
narrative suggesting a strong sense of moral obligation and responsibility for her 
choices and actions. 
 
Vignette 7: Joe         
   
Joe learned about my research from his fellow Green Party member and 
expressed interest in taking part in the project. Apart from two pre-planned shopping 
trips and a two-and-a-half hour formal interview, we also met casually on several 
occasions and established a good rapport. Joe shared with me his personal journal on 
food and shopping where he catalogued his efforts to make better consumption 
decisions. This has offered me a unique insight into Joe’s most private deliberations 
about his consumption practices and life in general, enabling me to create a reliable 
account of his evolution as an ethical food consumer.    
 Joe is 29 years old and works in a call centre at a bank. He is university educated, 
well-read, and has an interest in philosophy, politics, and social issues. He is an active 
Green Party member, a committed environmentalist, and a convinced animal rights 
activist. He does not have a very clear class identity, but associates himself more with 
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lower middle class. He lives with an omnivorous friend with whom they share the 
kitchen and the fridge, but each of them follows his own food practices. Joe was born 
and raised as a vegan / vegetarian and has never knowingly eaten meat except after 
losing a bet to a friend. During his life, he transitioned back and forth between veganism 
and vegetarianism depending on the circumstances and opportunities that he faced at 
different points in time. He constantly makes a conscious effort to sustain a strictly 
vegan diet, but finds himself compromising due to social influences, lack of affordable 
choices, and temptation. Joe’s commitment to a meat-free diet is informed as much by 
moral considerations as environmental concerns. His food practices are a part of the 
larger project of ethical living which includes conscious effort to reduce his personal 
carbon footprint, support local economies, promote human rights and fair trade, and 
defend animal welfare. In his view, habit and lack of motivation and support are major 
barriers to changing one’s foodways. He defines ethical consumption as “the 
purchasing and utilisation of food stuffs where your primary consideration is not taste 
or nutritional value, but wider moral principles”. He feels very strongly about his 
identity of an ethical consumer, which he believes is “definitely” who he is since ethical 
implications of his food choices is, as he says, “what I think about first”. 
 
Vignette 8: Solveig 
Solveig is one of the subjects whom I invited to take part in my study upon 
learning about her ethical food commitments, i.e. her vegan lifestyle. I observed 
Solveig’s shopping on three separate occasions which included two trips to 
conventional supermarkets and a visit to a charity shop. Our formal interview lasted for 
over two hours.         
 Solveig is a 29-year-old doctoral student who does not express affiliation to any 
class membership. Originally from Germany, she moved to England several years ago 
where she now lives with her husband. Together, they are responsible for maintaining a 
vegan household - although Solveig’s husband is a meat-eater himself, he is very 
supportive of his partner’s ethical commitments and does not mind cooking and eating 
vegan food at home. Solveig grew up in a household where the tradition of baking 
fresh sourdough bread every morning was still practiced and cooking meals from 
scratch was an essential part of the family’s daily routine. Coming from a conventional 
German background, Solving was brought up on a meat-based diet surrounded by 
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people for whom the idea of vegetarianism was an alien concept. Yet, having grown up 
with pets, she developed emotional attachment to and sympathy for animals at a very 
young age. When Solveig was nine years old, she saw a documentary exposing the 
practices of industrial meat production and, profoundly moved by it, decided to abandon 
meat eating. She has been an on-and-off vegetarian until several years ago when, under 
the influence if several factors, she decided to go vegan. Currently, Solveig’s foodways 
are guided by the moral principle of not doing harm which in practice translates into 
avoiding products of animal origin, including dairy, eggs, and leather. However, she 
does not draw a conclusive line in terms of what is acceptable to eat and is willing to 
make compromises when her personal interests, e.g. health, or consideration for other 
people’s feelings demand so. Solveig would like to support local agriculture and 
independent producers, but is limited in her opportunities to do so – time resources and 
convenience are the key factors constraining Solveig’s ethical ambitions. She is an 
opponent of the throw-away society – she buys most of her clothes from second-hand 
charity shops, condemns food waste and supports freeganism, which she used to 
practice on a regular basis back in her native Germany. For Solveig, ethical 
consumption means “do no harm or do as little harm as possible” and her self-
perception as an ethical consumer is informed by a continuous effort to live in 
consistence with this principle.  
 
Vignette 9: Lila 
I came to know Lila through one of my research participants, Maggi, with whom 
we paid several visits to a developing co-housing site managed by Lila and her husband. 
A committed vegan of 20 years, an environmentalist, a defender of animal rights, and a 
fair trade supporter, Lila perfectly fit my research focus. She is the only participant with 
whom I did not go shopping, reason being that food provisioning in Lila’s household is 
organised in a different way. Although Lila patronises two independent ethical grocery 
shops, she does not have an established shopping routine and relies predominantly on 
alternative ways of sourcing food. Together with her husband, Lila is involved in a 
buying group that sources organic and fair-trade products from trusted suppliers at 
wholesale prices. The family also subscribes to a vegetable box scheme which provides 
by-weekly deliveries of seasonal organic vegetables and fruits. Lila is strongly opposed 
to the global food business, hence her exceptionally rare visits to mainstream 
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supermarkets and chain stores. Since conventional grocery shopping does not constitute 
a significant part of Lila’s consumption routine and because visits to physical shops are 
infrequent and almost always spontaneous, I had to find another opportunity to get an 
insight into Lila’s food purchasing behaviour. Such opportunity was provided by Lila 
and her husband who kindly invited me to join them in the discussion of their next order 
with the buying group. As Lila scrolled through the pages of an online catalogue, she 
and her husband exchange views on different products revealing the complex 
interweaving of family needs and requirements, personal preferences and tastes, and 
ethical considerations and concerns. At the end of this process, a list of products was 
compiled and agreed upon which I also got a copy of. Thus, not only did I have a 
chance to directly observe Lila make her food purchase decisions, but I also got a first-
hand insight into the negotiations and reasoning behind them. In addition to this 
observation, I also met Lila on several other occasions, including a co-housing 
community event and a formal interview.      
 Lila is 34 years old. She is university educated, works as an editor, and has 
recently started a PhD on a sustainability-related topic. She defines herself as middle 
class, although she only became familiar with the concept upon moving to England. 
Together with her husband, they raise two kids. Although her husband and his son from 
the first marriage are both meat eaters, the household is kept almost entirely vegan, 
reflecting Lila’s life-long avoidance of animal products. Her moral food project extends 
beyond commitment to cruelty-free consumption and accommodates concerns over the 
environment, animal rights, and social justice. Lila’s food choices are almost 
exclusively organic and fair-trade; wherever possible, she prefers to buy local, seasonal, 
and unpackaged produce. For Lila, ethical consumption means “mindful consumption”, 
and while she perceives herself as a mindful consumer, she is at the same time 
conscious of the inevitable compromises and inconsistencies in her ethical practices. 
She perceives habit and lack of reliable information to be major inhibitors to individual 
transition to ethical foodways. 
  The above vignettes provide the backdrop against which the analysis and 
discussion of my research findings can begin to unfold, paving the way towards 







Moral Concerns, Emotional Commentaries, and Reflexive 
Conversations: Toward an Ethical Consumer Identity  
 
 
The best way to study ethical consumer identity is to observe how it forms gradually; 
considering identity as a construction, a process never completed, and always evolving offers 
an opportunity to learn about ethical consumers as consumers in transition  
(Cherrier, 2007, p. 332) 
 
This chapter represents our first stop on the tour of the private and social lives of 
self-perceived ethical consumers. In it, I will describe and analyse how, it is through 
which inner processes and under which external influences, individuals achieve the 
distinct identity of an ethical consumer. Accomplishing this goal is a multi-step process 
requiring an in-depth investigation of each of the series of phases through which 
individuals go as they evolve as persons with particular moral concerns and develop 
into consumers with specific ethical food commitments. Having set off on this research 
journey, I will first explore the origins of the participants’ concerns over the moral 
aspects of consumption by analysing their subjective experiences of the objective reality 
around them and investigating the role of those experiences in triggering the affective 
and cognitive processes through which subjects came to define their ultimate concerns. I 
will demonstrate the key role of emotions in alerting people to particular moral concerns 
and propelling them into corresponding consumption practices, whilst also highlighting 
the place of cognition and reason in the development of individuals’ sense of food 
ethics. I will rely on the concept of reflexive conversation to explain how human 
emotionality comes into play with reason and, building upon the empirical evidence 
from my research, argue for the key role of reflexivity in enabling agents to elaborate 
their subjective experiences of external reality and thereby determine what objective 
things and circumstances represent their ultimate concerns and how they can live them 
out. In constructing this account, I will emphasise the central role of both agential 
subjectivity as well as structural objectivity in forging out ethical consumer identities 
during subjects’ reflexive conversations with themselves. Finally, I will argue that by 
embracing concerns over food ethics and engaging in subjectively devised moral food 
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projects, individuals decide not only “how to act, but who to be” (Giddens, 1991, p. 81), 
that is they define their unique moral characters and achieve the identity of an ethical 
consumer. I will draw on the participants’ self-narratives to exemplify the relationships 
between subjects’ moral food practices and identities thereby highlighting ethical 
consumption as a site where continuous formation and re-formation of individual 
identities occurs. Thus, the overarching aim of this chapter is to reveal, describe, and 
analyse the generative mechanism that accounts for the evolution of agential concerns 
over food ethics and paves subjects’ way toward the practices of ethical consumption 
through which their identities are reflected and defined. I chose Lucy’s case to take 
centre stage in this part of the data analysis due to the richness of content and 
representativeness of the themes with which this chapter is concerned. To this 
centrepiece insights gleaned from the remaining eight participant accounts will be added 
as essential building blocks of the argument carefully chosen so that to offer the most 
telling illustrations of the points developed and claims made. They may take us to the 
moment when the subjects got acquainted with the idea of ethical consumption for the 
first time, or when they realized that animal welfare, environmental wellbeing, or social 
justice were among their most valued things in life, or when they decided to address 
their ultimate concerns through specific consumption practices. All of these glimpses of 
the participants’ stories will serve to explain how, by actively and reflexively embracing 
consumption ethics as their ultimate concern and devising particular food projects 
through which to address them, individuals develop the identity of an ethical consumer.
 Out of the different aspects and elements that constitute individuals’ experiences 
of becoming and being an ethical consumer, embracing food ethics as their ultimate 
concern comes first and foremost. The question about the origins of subjective concerns 
over the moral aspects of consumption turns the spotlight on the participants’ earliest 
memories of their relationships with food and the familial and wider social contexts in 
which they developed. In fact, when tracing the origins of people’s values and beliefs, 
family settings seem to be an obvious first calling point. Indeed, for some of the 
subjects familial contexts played a critical role in inspiring pro-ethical attitudes. Thus, 
David identifies the roots of his environmentalism in the politicised atmosphere that 
prevailed in the family house and his parents’ outspoken views on a range of political 
and social issues: 
I was raised that way, that was just what I was thought to be normal, so when I 
got to about 17-18, it is a natural thing, it gets included really, if you are worried about 
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politics, if you are worried about social justice, you are automatically worried about the 
environment, it just seemed a natural choice…     
  
In unison with David, Mary refers to her family as a source of “political, 
environmental awareness background stuff” and, specifically, her father whose political 
views set the moral tone for the future: “he was very left-wing, so we were very involved 
with community stuff and support for the miners and political stuff, so right from the 
start I had a certain value system, if you like”. Joe’s formation as an advocate for 
animal rights and a committed vegan had also been predefined by his parents’ moral 
practices and beliefs: “I was raised on a strict vegan diet, my parents were vegan, my 
younger siblings were all vegan (…) that was just the norm for me to be on a vegan 
diet”. Yet, for our key character, Lucy, familial foodways seem to have played little role 
in the development of her sense of consumption ethics. Overall, she was brought up in 
the conventional food culture where meat was considered an important part of the diet 
and the idea of vegetarianism was very far from widespread. Thus, neither Lucy’s 
family, nor her early social environment can be cited as a source of her concerns over 
non-human life. In an attempt to identify their origins, Lucy evokes her childhood 
experiences with animals as a strong influence - retrospectively, she feels that she has 
always been “soft on animals”. This long-standing affection for animals appears to be 
common among ethical consumers: in her study of practicing vegans, McDonald (2000) 
comments on the participants’ self-description as “animal people”. This sentiment is 
echoed by my research subjects many of whom have been brought up with pets or in 
close proximity to wildlife. Mary, for instance, has vivid memories of being close with 
nature and animals: “I spent my childhood climbing trees and being in the countryside 
with animals” and the emotional rewards and bonding arising from those experiences: 
“I’ve always been fascinated by, happy with, absorbed by wildlife and animals and 
plants”. Likewise, Darren recollects his childhood feelings of passion for animals: “I 
was fascinated with animals”.  Maggi remembers being very passionate about all living 
things and particularly sensitive to their suffering: “I felt sort of compassion to animals 
and closer to nature I think, you know, if I found injured bird or animals”. This 
emotional pain - a commentary upon Maggi’s concern over animal life and welfare 
developed at a very young age – extended to food consumption: “I can always 
remember as a child looking at the Sunday joint and feeling sad that it was like eating 
animals”. For some participants, however, the feelings of sympathetic pity for animals 
 
109 
were what McDonald (2000) refers to as “compartmentalised” compassion, i.e. where a 
person fails to make a connection between pets and other animals and, consequently, the 
food that they eat. Solveig admits to exactly this kind of obliviousness when describing 
her relationships with pets: “I did not really see them as the same kind of creature as 
pork on your plate (…) I just did not see the fact that it’s just cultural difference 
between eating pork and not eating a dog”. Lucy’s affective attitude towards 
companion animals, however, was of a different kind. She remembers that the house 
was always full of pets but, unlike most children who would be thrilled to have 35 
rabbits in the family’s winter garage, Lucy experienced very different feelings: “I felt 
trapped and I kind of identified with all these animals that were in cages, and I thought 
it’s wrong”. Archer’s account of emotions as commentaries upon human concerns 
offers a useful theoretical lens through which to construe Lucy’s distinct affective 
response. As Archer explains, emotions are relational, i.e. they arise in relation to 
something, "and that something is our own concerns which make a situation a matter of 
non-difference to a person" (2000, p. 195). Thus, Lucy’s intense emotional reaction - a 
bout of sadness and empathy with caged animals – can be decoded as the earliest of the 
streams of emotional commentaries that the evolving concern over animal life will yet 
supply during the course of her life. As a 5-year-old child, Lucy lacked the reflexive 
capacity to interpret her emotions as a signal of a particular moral concern; yet, the 
affective import of the situation was strong enough to provoke an attempt to address it. 
She remembers turning into a little animal liberator: letting her friend’s hamster out of 
the cage on one occasion, opening her sister’s birdcage to set the budgies free on 
another – actions that caused a lot of distress to the pet owners but seemed totally just 
and justified to herself.         
 The crucial links between human emotions, concerns, and actions manifest 
themselves equally clearly in the accounts of other participants. Thus, it was intense 
emotional reaction to news about environmental disasters that alerted Mary to her 
incipient concerns over nature, made her realise their affective appeal, and provoked an 
urge to act upon them: “[It] made me think what else should I do, and I wanted to do 
something about environmental issues, it became more my passion”. Joe offers another 
telling illustration of the ways in which human emotions and concerns link up to incite 
agential action. For him, a job in the banking industry became a source of profound 
personal dissatisfaction: “I became very unhappy with the direction my life was going 
in”. The growing feeling of disaffection experienced by Joe was an emotional 
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commentary upon his deep-seated concern over the right way to live: “I knew in my gut 
it was – or felt in my gut - that it was wrong working for the bank”. This affective 
reaction to an increasingly unrewarding lifestyle propelled Joe into specific actions: he 
quit his job at a bank, joined the Green Party, and resumed the vegan diet – all as part of 
a comprehensive effort to address his concerns over ethical living: “that was the prompt 
to go back to that trying to be a bit more ethical…”. These examples reveal the direct 
relationship between human emotions, concerns, and actions defended in the literature. 
Thus, Sayer (2011, p. 37), echoing Oakley (1992), contends that “emotions involve 
desire and concern to produce or prevent change; they incline us to act in some way, 
though we may override such inclinations”. Archer (2007, p. 231) illuminates the 
relationship in a similar way: 
It is not possible to have a genuine concern and to do nothing about it. (…) When 
normal people express concern at all – as opposed to sympathy or empathy, both of which are 
compatible with remaining a bystander – it is usually accompanied by an attempt to do 
something about it.         
  
The ethical consumers of my research echo the argument with remarkable 
precision: “I care about these things and I can’t care about them, and think about them, 
and know about them without enacting that”, asserts Mary; “People who say they do 
care and do nothing - they don’t really care, that’s not caring. It’s got to be linked to 
action if it’s a genuine thing”, agrees with her Joe, as does Lila: 
If you have some ideas that you really believe in, it only means something if you 
manifest these ideas in your life, in your lifestyle, and if you just have them as your 
precious ideas and you go out to the world and you do something completely different, 
it means your life don’t really represent your ideas and you are not being honest. 
  
The force of Archer’s argument becomes increasingly evident as we continue to 
follow Lucy on her ethical food journey. Her moral concerns became more articulate 
when she, under the influence of provocative literature and protest music, developed an 
acute interest in politics, religion, and the meaning of life. This was also the time when 
her socio-cultural environment expanded immensely as she moved from a Church of 
England school to a bigger school attended by children from diverse religious and 
cultural backgrounds. Exposure to alternative outlooks led Lucy to challenge the 
traditional worldview she was brought up with and, especially, the Christian idea of 
man’s dominion over animals which contrasted sharply with deep respect for animal life 
and commitment to non-violence advocated in Hinduism. At the age of 12, she was 
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introduced to the idea of vegetarianism through a radio interview with Chrissie Hynde – 
a rock star and a committed animal rights activist. Shortly thereafter, Lucy declared 
herself a vegetarian. This decision was underpinned by emotionality – strong aversion 
to animal cruelty – as well as reflexive work of comparing and contrasting different 
worldviews, questioning the accepted, and exploring alternative ways of thinking and 
acting. It is the emotions, however, that have been central to the intensification of 
Lucy’s moral concerns and the evolution of her ethical food commitments. She 
identifies the roots of her affective and physical revulsion at the mere idea of eating 
meat in a specific experience - a school trip to a model animal farm. Just as when she 
was a little child, Lucy was profoundly shaken by the vision of captivated animals - she 
remembers being particularly “freaked out” upon seeing a sow separated from her litter 
by iron bars. Here is how Lucy describes her feelings in response to this experience:  “I 
was so shocked, it gave me nightmares. It was absolutely appalling”. This intense 
affective reaction reaffirmed the emotional import of Lucy’s concerns over animal life 
and reinforced her commitment to a cruelty-free diet: “I knew then I’d made the right 
decision”. The next emotional wave of comparable magnitude washed over Lucy three 
decades later and instigated her transition to veganism. It occurred during Lucy’s visit 
to Switzerland, where she was deeply upset by a vision of little calves locked away on a 
highland dairy farm. She recollects:  
This was in a French speaking area of Switzerland, up in the highlands where 
they have a lot of cheese and milk and little dairy cattle – all very beautiful, bells 
around the neck, you know, it’s idyllic, Alpine scenery - really, really beautiful. But, 
unfortunately, everyday we’d walk past these calves who’d been separated from their 
mom, every day, and they were crying, they were just protesting against that fate, and it 
upset my so much, I still feel tears when I think about it.     
  
Profoundly moved by this picture, Lucy felt the same bout of sadness and urge 
to liberate the captivated animals as she did when she was a 5-year-old child: “And I 
was thinking looking at them, “if I could get in there, unlock it, I would”. This 
experience and the intense emotionality aroused by it played a critical role in Lucy’s 
unequivocal decision to go vegan: “And I just couldn’t eat the milk or the cheese, I 
couldn’t do it. And I haven’t been able to since”. This specific episode and its high 
emotional relevance explain why, despite that Lucy had been long aware that her 
ultimate concerns would be most adequately addressed by a vegan diet, she only 
recently made this commitment. Admittedly, several factors have been key to Lucy’s 
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ability to refine her moral food project, and the increased availability of suitable food 
options and relevant information played a non-trivial role in rendering veganism a 
feasible undertaking. However, the critical factor which was missing from Lucy’s 
previous attempts at veganism and which eventually gave her a necessary impetus to 
take her ethical practice onto a whole new level was the profound emotional 
involvement with the object of concern. The following excerpt from the interview 
conveys this point: 
- I’ve tried being vegan a few times before this time. This time it’s worked 
because of those calves that were looking at me sympathetically. So now it’s worked, 
now I just could not drink milk, I could not do it. 
- But what was different before? 
- I suppose I hadn’t got that emotional revulsion. I have to have that 
gut reaction and just think - no.      
   
This idea of “gut reaction” (which, I contend, is the emotional commentary upon 
Lucy’s ultimate concern) is like a thread running through the entire interview, tying 
together Lucy’s reflections on what matters to her and why. Thus, when discussing 
organic, local, and fair trade, she once again refers to emotions - or rather absence 
thereof - as a major reason for excluding these products from the list of her ultimate 
concerns and consumption priorities. Although Lucy is aware of and sympathises with 
the moral cause behind the products, she does not feel emotionally involved with them:  
I can see it’s important, you know, I am not denying it’s important, but, you 
know, I don’t feel a rush of horror from eating something that’s from Kenya in the same 
way as I would over eating sheep’s eyeballs.      
  
The absence of negative emotional response - “a rush of horror” in Lucy’s 
words - to non-fair trade or imported foods suggests that Lucy has not embraced 
environmental or social issues implicated in the production and consumption of food as 
her ultimate concerns. Admittedly, certain practical constraints would also have to be 
negotiated had she done so - particularly, her limited food budget. However, before 
material costs of such moral food project could even be assessed, relevant concerns 
must have been discerned, recorded, and logged into Lucy’s moral register which in the 
absence of emotional involvement simply did not occur. The explanatory potential of 
this argument extends to Lucy’s relationships with her body and, specifically, her 
neglectful attitude to health:      
 
113 
I think there has to be a really strong emotional reason for me not to do 
something. It’s like healthy food – yes, I know what’s healthy and what isn’t, but I did 
not stop smoking because it was unhealthy, I stopped smoking because I could not 
afford to. I could not feel sort of surge of revulsion from a cigarette, you know. There 
has to be a real kind of moral horror attached to it.      
  
Thus, due to low emotional appeal concerns over health failed to supply the 
necessary stimulus for Lucy to give up the harmful habit. Instead, the affective import 
of material concerns, which could be neither neglected nor dismissed, forced Lucy to 
reconsider her lifestyle in order to overcome financial difficulties. Similarly, David 
cited the lack of emotional involvement as a key reason for why he had never 
considered going vegan: “I just don’t feel bad enough about it, I just don’t feel bad 
about milk and cheese, I really don’t”. In tune with him, Mary justifies her consumption 
of meat by the absence of affective response to animal killing: “I think for a lot of 
vegetarians - the ones I came across - it was an emotional response about not killing 
animals, and I am okay about killing animals, actually”. It is because concerns over 
animal life do not have the potential to solicit negative emotional reactions from David 
or Mary that they have both settled for vegetarianism as a sufficiently satisfying moral 
commitment.          
 So far, Archer’s account of the relationships between human emotions, concerns, 
and practices provided an effective conceptual guide to understanding the development 
of the participants’ ethical food commitments. What requires further explanation, 
however, is how concerns over food ethics develop and become a defining part of 
individuals’ morality in the first place. Going back to Lucy’s case, what needs to be 
explored is how and why concerns over animal life came to acquire such intense 
emotional import so as to become an integral element of Lucy’s personal moral matrix 
and the ultimate guide to her eating practices.  She herself does not seem mistaken in 
locating the roots of her ethical concerns in specific life experiences – tending to caged 
pets, visiting animal and dairy farms. Yet, it calls for further explanation how exactly 
these experiences fed into Lucy’s morality and in which ways they contributed to her 
deep-rooted emotional aversion - “the moral horror” - to meat and dairy. This important 
issue becomes clearer in light of Coff’s (2006) theory which resonates with my research 
findings and offers a compelling theoretical blueprint of the participants’ experiences. 
For Lucy, the visions of caged pets, a pig behind the iron bars, calves in chains and 
“ankle deep in their own muck” offered a first-hand experience of the animals' pitiful 
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life conditions and a glimpse into the disagreeable practices of meat and milk 
production. Animals’ misery, to which Lucy had become an eyewitness, got inscribed 
into her own biography – “I felt trapped and I kind of identified with all these animals 
that were in cages”. Moreover, it became attached to food products – the meat and the 
dairy - which Lucy will never be able to put on her dining plate again. This account 
offers a potential explanation of how Lucy became so acutely sensitised to the issues of 
animal welfare and so deeply averse to meat and dairy products. Yet, a crucial aspect 
seems to be missing from it. In his account of how “glimpsed experiences” of food 
production awaken individuals to the implications of their consumption practices, Coff 
(2006) seems to construe such exposures purely as a source of knowledge and 
information which, when accessed and interpreted by the subjects, incite them to ethical 
actions. However, he overlooks the all-important affective aspect of subjects’ 
experiences, which not only supply factual knowledge, but also stimulate deep 
emotional responses. In fact, McDonald (2000, p. 10) too underscores the emotional 
dimension of ethics-inducing encounters: “emotions seem to have been one of the major 
defining characteristics of the more memorable catalytic experiences”. The reason for 
this, I contend, is because the narrative into which the production history transforms 
consists not only of the information about manufacturing conditions and processes, but 
also of the feelings that people bring in. Food products, in their turn, become not merely 
“silent documents”, but also emotional anchors: not only do they remind individuals of 
what they’ve learned through their experiences, but they also acquire the capacity to 
revive the emotions that arose in response. Consider the following quote again: 
Everyday we’d walk past these calves who’d been separated from their mom, 
every day, and they were crying, they were just protesting against that fate, and it upset 
my so much, I still feel tears when I think about it. And I just couldn’t eat the milk or the 
cheese, I couldn’t do it.        
  
It illustrates that, firstly, Lucy’s recollections of the event are deeply infused 
with emotions, and, secondly, that this affective reaction is the ultimate reason why she 
could never contemplate eating dairy again. The encounter with the calves was, as she 
notes, central to her irrevocable transition to a dairy-free diet. Yet, the significance of 
this experience was not in its informative content - Lucy had been long aware of the 
specifics of dairy production and its toll on animal lives - but in its affective dimension. 
It is not the information she learned, but the emotions she felt (i.e. not the experience 
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itself, but the emotional commentary upon it) that provided the driving force for a 
radical change in Lucy’s foodways. Her memories are not just factual accounts of the 
experience, but depositories of emotions whose intensity has not faded over the years. 
The “gut reaction” and the “rush of horror” which Lucy consistently cites as the main 
reasons behind her inability to eat animal products are a resounding echo of her initial 
affective response to the upsetting experiences. This response echoes back every time 
she faces the idea of eating dairy or meat, which for Lucy became the embodiments of 
animal suffering: “If someone was offering me a bacon sandwich, I’d immediately think 
of that”. The inextricable relationships between human experiences, emotions, and 
concerns are also evident in Lucy’s rather tepid attitude towards environmental issues 
and, more specifically, organic foods: “I suppose if I was a gardener, I’d be more 
bothered, you know, if I was growing my own food (…) It does not get me emotionally in 
the same way as, you know, animals”. Thus, in the absence of first-hand experiences of 
nature and food growing, Lucy failed to develop emotional connection with the cause 
for organic foods - a necessary impetus for acting on the concern. In contrast, Mary has 
been involved in farming from an early age: helping to tend plants and animals first on 
her aunt’s holding and later as a volunteer on a nearby farm – the experiences through 
which she developed a deep interest in agriculture and was sensitized to concerns over 
environmental sustainability, ecological balance, and biodiversity. Her strong 
preference for free-range meat is informed by a first-hand insight into the practices of 
intensive livestock production which instigated her awareness of and sympathy with the 
feelings of animals: “I’ve been to an abattoir, I know what abattoirs are like, I know 
that for animals it is an intense period of fear and I am not entirely happy about that”. 
This evidence aligns with research literature suggesting that direct experiences of nature 
and engagement in nature-related activities play a significant role in the formation of 
individual environmental values. Hards (2011) identifies personal involvement in the 
“eco-regulatory practices”, such as tending animals or a garden, as a major factor in the 
development of nature-respecting values. Not only does my research confirm this 
relationship, but my interpretation of the subjects’ experiences through the concept of 
emotions as commentaries upon human concerns allows us to actually understand its 
generative principles.         
 At the same time, my findings suggest that different experiences may provoke 
emotional involvement on the part of the individual, and direct exposure to or 
involvement in relevant practices is not the only way to create affective links between 
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consumers and the objects of concern. For Darren, for example, emotional engagement 
occurred through a very specific experience – an incident with meat pasty which got 
stuck in his teeth causing serious pain and discomfort. Continuous pain that Darren 
experienced during the next several days sensitised him to the suffering of others: “so 
then you link that to the wider world, to others, you think about people – what about 
their pain, other people’s pain and other animals’ pain, and these things link, 
connect…”. By projecting his physical pain onto other sentient beings Darren was able 
to feel their suffering as his own or, in Coff’s terms, gained a “glimpsed experience” of 
their throes. Through an understanding and sharing of animals’ struggles and aches 
came profound sympathy for them and an urgent desire “to eliminate the suffering of 
those who are in the most pain”. This internal emphatic response fed into Darren’s on-
going deliberations about food ethics and gave the final impulse to turning 
vegetarianism into his ultimate moral commitment: “along with the pain, and the 
concern for the animals, and contradictions with other forms of meat-eating in other 
cultures, you know, all that came together”. The emotional involvement achieved 
through a physical experience made Darren see himself and the objects of his concern, 
i.e. non-human animals, tied together in one single story wherein he was implicated in 
and responsible for animal suffering through his particular consumption choices and 
acts. Further, Lila’s approach to justifying their commitment to veganism to her 4-year-
old daughter is a telling demonstration of Coff’s theory put in practice. Let us consider 
how she explained the family’s food restrictions to the little girl: 
I used to explain like, you know, this milk was taken from a cow and there is 
actually a calf waiting for this milk, and it is not having it because you want to have it – 
does it look fair to you?  
 
Without realising it, Lila followed Coff’s prescription for how to incite an 
individual’s sense of food ethics: she turned the history of milk production into a story, 
a narrative that could be cognitively assessed and emotionally absorbed by a little child. 
It provided her daughter with an indirect – because from a second-hand account - 
insight into how milk is produced and what the implications of those practices are. By 
making the little girl realise that anyone who chooses to drink milk is taking it away 
from a calf, Lila engaged her emotionality – “that’s really sad”, was her daughter’s 
affective response - and inspired her sense of responsibility for the animals’ happiness.
 Against the backdrop of this evidence, I want to elaborate on Coff’s account of 
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the ways in which individuals engage with ethics-inducing experiences. I suggest that 
there is a two-way relationship: not only do consumers internalise “glimpsed” 
experiences and make them part of their own biographies, but they also develop a view 
of themselves as participants in the narratives produced by the situations of concern. 
Through a deep emotional connection with the matters of concern, individuals acquire 
the sense of responsibility for them. Thus, not only did stories of animal cruelty got 
inscribed into Lucy’s own life record, but she also felt herself implicated in them and 
hence faced with the choice – to either partake in the exploitation of animals by 
consuming dairy or avoid contributing to animal suffering by giving it up. It is this 
profound emotional bonding that generates the sense of responsibility for one’s 
consumption decisions, prompts individuals to develop ethical considerations and bring 
them to bear upon their food practices. Identity theorists cast light on this intricate inner 
process: thus, Steedman (1986) contends that identification with others is central to the 
process of identity production - we forge our identities, she argues, by putting ourselves 
into other people’s stories, interpreting, reinterpreting, and making them a part of our 
own biography. More specifically, identification with the pain and suffering of others - 
the “empathetic understanding” (Lawler, 2008, p. 24) - is argued to be particularly 
consequential for individuals’ formation as ethical subjects. Lawler (2008) elucidates 
the relationship: “in this case, instead of empathy, there is an appropriation of the pain 
of others” (p. 14) and proceeds to make the crucial point: “we behave ethically because 
we can imagine ourselves in others’ stories” (p. 24). The power of this theoretical 
argument manifests itself in the practical reality, e.g. the well-documented 
ineffectiveness of information-based approaches to changing patterns of consumer 
behaviour (Barnett et al., 2005) and the increased popularity of advertisements that 
feature close-up images of real producers and growers and share their personal stories in 
order to emotionally involve consumers - achieve the “gut reaction”, as Lucy would put 
it – and sensitise them to concerns over food ethics. In light of this account, claims 
about the potential of labels, images, and texts imbued with moral messages and 
symbolic meanings to induce consumers’ reflexivity and incite their sense of food ethics 
take on a new significance. The apparent parallels between the concepts of the “ethics 
of care” capable of engaging the problems of distant parts of the world (Smith, 1998), 
political ecological imaginary with its “expansive “spatial dynamics of concern” 
(Goodman, 2004, p. 906), and long-range, or distance, ethics (Coff, 2006) make it more 
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understandable how exactly semiotic devices help to enact the  “globalising reflexivity” 
which brings distant places and people “into the world of concern (and pocketbooks) of 
Northern consumers” (Goodman, 2004, p. 893). Like glimpsed experiences, discursive 
and visual narratives that “veritably shout to consumers about the socio-natural relations 
under which they [the products] were produced” (Bryant and Goodman, 2004, p. 348) 
engage consumers in the ethics of distance by bridging the gap between consumption 
and production ends of the food supply chain. By disclosing problematic social and 
environmental relations underpinning food production they reveal “the world of 
meaning” behind products, the “world beyond the commodity fetish” (Goodman, 
Dupuis and Goodman, 2012, p. 43) and in doing so revive consumers’ sense of personal 
responsibility for the implications of their shopping and eating practices.  
Superficially, one may be tempted to follow the many commentators (Wheeler, 
2012; Barnett et al., 2010; Jacobsen and Dulsrud, 2007) who have discerned in this 
scenario a passive, “constructed” and “governed” consumer whose ethical choices are 
merely a part of the system of “transnational moral economy” (Goodman, 2004) into 
which she had been drawn by deliberately designed and strategically disseminated 
discourses of which she is neither a master, nor even a co-producer, but only a slave. On 
reflection, however, there is an important caveat: when arguing for the potential of 
morally charged texts, images, and visions to foster a sense of food ethics, it is critical 
not to assume a kind of self-energizing and self-extracting symbolic power which sucks 
consumers into the “global moral economy” irrespective of whether, how, and with 
what outcomes individuals interact with and make sense of the supplied materials. To 
the contrary, those can only become a potent source of symbolic meanings in the 
presence of a consumer willing and being able to engage with and appropriate them. As 
Adams and Raisborough (2010, p. 258) note,  
 
Studies of ethical consumption campaigning may well point to the ‘generation of 
narrative frames in which mundane activities like shopping can be re-inscribed as forms of 
public-minded, citizenly engagement’ (Clarke et al. 2007b: 242) but analyses of people’s own 
accounts of their consumption practices suggests that such re-inscription is not wholly 
manageable or predictable (Newholm, 2005).  
This is because ethical discourses and naratives do not simply produce “a green 
consumer as a subject” (Moisander and Pesonen, 2002, p. 330) out of a cultural dope or 
impose the ethically minded consumer role model on unsuspecting individuals, but, 
instead, “energize consumers to be morally reflexive” (Goodman, 2004, p. 896), i.e. 
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engage them into reflexive conversations about their life practices and courses of action, 
“about ourselves, any aspect of our environment and, above all, about the relationship 
between them” (Archer, 2007, p. 63). Depending on the outcome of these internal 
deliberations, glimpsed experiences may not only incite, but also alleviate consumers’ 
concerns over the moral implications of their eating practices. For Solveig, for example, 
a direct insight into small-scale meat production obtained during a week-long visit to an 
animal farm resulted in the appeasement of concerns over animal suffering: 
Because it was so small-scale, and because it was so personal, and because you 
could actually see that the people cared about the animals while they were alive, I was 
completely fine with it.         
  
This indicates that subjective emotional responses play the key role in 
determining the impact of individuals’ experiences on their sense of food ethics and, 
subsequently, consumption practices. Thus, for Lucy visits to an animal farm and a 
Swiss pasture were infused with intense negative emotions in response to animal 
suffering, hence her decision to withdraw from consumption of meat and dairy. In 
contrast, Solveig’s insight into production practices on a small-scale animal farm has 
assuaged her ethical concerns to the extent that she felt comfortable eating meat 
products again. With respect to these examples, the difference between the participants’ 
experiences could be justly pointed out – indeed, whilst Lucy came face to face with 
animal suffering, Solveig encountered respectfully treated and well-tended livestock. 
However, I contend that it is not the objective circumstances, but the agents’ subjective 
emotional perception and interpretation thereof that should be held responsible for the 
differing outcomes: we know from life experience that not every person would be 
equally disturbed by the vision of calves on an Alpine pasture and, similarly, not every 
vegetarian would so readily warm towards meat, no matter how humanely produced.
 In making this claim, I assert the indispensability of emotions in triggering 
agential concerns over the morality of consumption and in inducing commitment to 
ethical diets. At the same time, it is important not to overlook the role of information 
and reason in individuals’ subscription to and engagement with the practices of ethical 
consumption. As my research demonstrates, cognitive factors, such as factual and 
conceptual knowledge obtained through education, media, or social interactions, have 
the potential to contribute to the evolution of subjects’ moral concerns and food projects. 
Thus, Lucy’s commitment to cruelty-free foodways was not only driven by her 
 
120 
profound emotional involvement with the objects and circumstances of concern, but it 
was also underpinned and informed by the factual knowledge about them. The bout of 
compassion which Lucy felt at seeing a sow behind the iron bars was grounded in her 
understanding of pigs as intelligent animals capable of suffering. Similarly, through 
learning about food nutrients and, specifically, animal protein, Lucy realised the 
inefficiency of industrial meat production and, based on this knowledge, came to 
morally condemn it: “all these people in the world are starving and we are feeding cows 
instead of people, you know, that did not make any sense to me”. Likewise, Maggi’s 
moral concerns expanded and intensified as her awareness of the animal welfare issues 
was rising in parallel with the growth in the amount of publicly available information 
about factory farming: 
(...) that’s become more talked about, and that kind of knowledge and 
information is around more over the years. It’s become more important for me (...), I 
suppose, with the realisation about animal welfare and that milk and eggs as well were 
cruel, the whole production process was.      
  
In a similar vein, Joe’s commitment to a plant-based diet, initially little more 
than a customary practice, gained new meaning through his learning about the larger 
socio-environmental impacts of global consumption: “I was like – oh, isn’t capitalism 
terrible, and it’s destroying the planet and the environment, and such a big thing I can 
do to combat this would be to go vegan again”.  Following the expansion of his 
horizons through education, knowledge, and social interactions Joe came to review the 
underpinnings of his food practices and, eventually, embraced them as a much more 
conscious, intentional, and reflexive ethical commitment: 
I think the real difference was being at a college studying sociology, and I did 
philosophy and ethics as well, and then living with my aunt who was kind of very into it 
and that was a big part of her identity, and that very much changed my reasons behind 
it.           
  
Likewise, David first started to reflexively and practically probe ethical 
consumption upon getting introduced to a hippie culture, while for Darren religious and 
philosophical teachings and later on scientific knowledge have become important 
triggers of his sense of food ethics. At school, interactions with children from diverse 
religious and cultural backgrounds who followed particular food customs prompted 
Darren to question and ponder over different dietary rules and prescriptions: “that 
informs your ethics, you are trying to make sense out of these different patterns and 
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contradictions”. For Mary, the news about the Torrey Canyon oil spill and media 
coverage of the rising environmental movements such as Greenpeace and Friends of the 
Earth were, as she notes, one of the biggest influences on the formation of her value 
system: “I became a lot more aware of the environmental issues”. This growing 
awareness was, to use Mary’s own phrase, “part of the gestalt” – the cognitive, 
emotional, and normative sources that were driving Mary’s progression towards moral 
concerns over social and environmental implications of the global food system. Mary’s 
current commitment to fair-trade and the emotional satisfaction derived from it also 
have a cognitive underpinning:  
Because I do know, having read, you know, having studied about these issues a 
lot more, I am aware of just how much the livelihood of people in developing countries 
is dependent on growing cash crops and how much fair trade enables them to live better, 
and it just feels fairer.         
   
What this evidence clearly points to is that the development of individuals’ 
sense of food ethics and dietary commitments occurs through interaction between 
emotionality and cognition. In a psychological study on moralisation of eating practices, 
Rozin, Markwith and Stoess (1997) too distinguish between affective (e.g. experiences 
of animal slaughter) and cognitive (exposure to information about animal welfare issues) 
factors that may encourage ethical consumer practices. In the field of sociology, this 
argument is underpinned by McDonald’s study on vegans underscoring the co-
constituting nature of the cognitive and affective aspects of catalytic experiences that 
enabled the subjects “to immediately comprehend, as well as feel, the consequences of 
the new knowledge of animal abuse” (2000, p. 9, my italics). However, McDonald’s 
interpretation of her research findings does not go as far as to explain the mechanism 
that brings human emotions into play with reason in the process of individuals’ 
subscription to food ethics. Elaborating on Archer’s (2000), I contend that this 
mechanism is reflexive conversation during which agents deliberate and elaborate upon 
their subjective experiences of objective reality and in doing so come to discern and 
embrace particular objects, circumstances, and events as their ultimate moral concerns. 
It is because reflexive conversations are, amongst other things, about our concerns, and 
the objects of our concerns are separate from our affective responses to them (i.e. 
emotions emerge in relation to something that has its own ontological worth 
independent from our affectivity) that our internal self-dialogues are always infused 
with both emotions and reason. In Archer’s words, since our concerns involve “both an 
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external ‘object’ and a subjective commitment, the outcome itself will be a blend of 
logos and pathos” (2000, p. 231). In tune with Archer, Sayer (2011, p. 39) contends that 
“keeping feelings separate from thoughts, echoing the body-mind dualism, is absurd; 
both are responses to the world and our concerns”. Indeed, as we have seen, it is both 
Lucy’s subjective emotional response to factory farming and her knowledge of its 
objective features that fed into the reflexive conversation through which she came to 
embrace veganism as her ultimate moral commitment. Likewise, a combination of logos 
and pathos has been fuelling Darren’s continuous reflexive deliberations about the 
morally right way to consume.  Instigated by intense emotional response to animal 
suffering (provoked by the above-mentioned accident with the meat pasty), his reflexive 
conversation was further informed by scientific knowledge: “there is enough evidence 
to suggest that we are supposed to be like herbivores (…) medical evidence shows that 
as well”; philosophical teachings: “I read a book (…) it had a lot of facts and 
arguments in for vegetarianism (…) so that was quite enlightening”; and insights 
gleaned from religious texts: “I’d look at things at the Bible, religions, what you can eat 
what you can’t eat”. For David, appealing to logos and pathos in the process of soul-
searching was a way to work out his purpose in life and embrace environmentalism as 
his ultimate moral commitment. On the one hand, logos played a critical role in David’s 
conclusion underpinned by a particular ontology of the world: 
 
I decided that there is this kind of hierarchy which is similar to the way that 
ecological economists think about the Earth as a system. So you have the Universe, and 
you have the Earth, and inside the Earth you have life, and inside life you have society. 
If you are going to choose which one to start with, you know, you go as high up the 
chain as you can, and I decided then just because of that simple logic that the thing I am 
going to care about is the environment. 
 
At the same time, defining his ultimate concerns would not have been possible 
without pathos for, undoubtedly, David did not just arbitrarily “decide” what to care 
about in life – to the contrary, concerns over environment had been previously logged 
into David’s moral register due to their emotional import and appeal. In Joe’s case, 
rational underpinnings for commitment to veganism were supplied by the parents:  
 
The argument that I was always given for being vegetarian or vegan when I was 
young was an animal welfare one, so it was just - we don’t eat animals, we don’t eat 




Yet, as Joe admits, the reason why he has so readily internalised concerns over 
animal life and allowed them to define his consumption practices is because of their 
emotional appeal, manifest in his unequivocal passion for animals:  
 
I remember always being very much into animals, and liking animals, and 
collecting a file of facts about different animals, and it would tell you where they lived 
and how endangered they were and stuff like that and what they did and really enjoying 
that. And so I think I bought into animal rights completely...   
   
The above analysis of the subjects’ self-accounts reveals that people’s concerns 
“are not just free-floating “values” or expressions projected onto the world but feelings 
about various events and circumstances that aren’t merely subjective” (Sayer, 2011, p. 
1). It supports the idea of reflexive conversation as a site where human emotionality and 
cognition unite to enable individuals to define their ultimate values and concerns and 
work out the best ways to manifest them in practice. It is noteworthy that the ethical 
consumers of my research acknowledge the key role of reflexivity in enabling 
individuals to work out the relationships between their inner self and the outer world. 
Their comments on the mental and emotional journey towards ethical consumption 
highlight this especially well: “I think that comes from examining life much much more 
(…) it’s always a good thing to take a look at where you are, build a clear picture of 
where you are and where you want to be and then move towards that”, says Joe; “you 
are having to look what is the wrong thing to do, what is the right thing to do, in order 
to do the right thing you need to replace, find another way of living right”, echoes him 
Darren. He describes his progression towards ethical consumption as a process of 
finding his true self in the things that he values most: “it was like the search for the 
truth I guess, in learning who you are, discovering who you are and what is important 
to you”. Likewise, the focus on reflexive self-awareness is shared by Lucy: “I think it is 
important to think about what you are doing, you know, not act unreflectively” and 
Solveig: “what really gets me is when people are unconscious of what they are doing”. 
Solveig’s internal deliberations through which she worked out her relationship to the 
outer world and came to embrace veganism as a way to fulfil her moral duties as a 
human is a glaring example of reflexive conversation: 
(…) as a human being am I really that separate from a chimpanzee? And if I am 
not, how am I… I am only separated by degrees from, say, a pig or a cow and how… if I 
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don’t have to eat these products to survive, how can I justify putting other sentient 
creatures though treatment like this?       
  
What these quotations evidently show is that “values are things people can 
reason about” (Sayer, 2011, p. 18). This crucial finding enables me to join Sayer (2011, 
p. 18) in a crusade against the misconception that judgements of value and objectivity 
do not mix. My analysis of the participants’ reflexive deliberations about their ethical 
concerns has clearly shown that “emotions and subjectivity influence how we reason 
and what we accept as fact” as well as allowed to “acknowledge the opposite – the role 
of reason within emotion and value” (Sayer, 2011, p. 18).   
 Overall, the above account allows to firmly secure the concept of reflexivity in 
my theoretical framework purporting to explain the internal processes through which 
subjects define their moral concerns and arrive at ethical food commitments. It remains 
to vindicate the claim that through this reflexive work of discerning our ultimate 
concerns we define not only what to care about, but also the kind of persons we are 
(Archer, 2007). In the remainder of the chapter, I will corroborate this argument by 
revealing the direct links between moral concerns of ethical consumers and their distinct 
identities. By analysing the participants’ self-narratives, I will demonstrate that ethical 
food practices are manifestations of individuals’ ultimate values and beliefs which 
determine not only how they act, but also who they are or aspire to be.   
 Let us start by analysing the relationship between Lucy’s commitment to a meat-
free diet and her unique moral character revealed in the following quote about factory 
farming: “And it is just not right, I can’t do that to animals, it’s just cruel”. This phrase 
conveys two main ideas: that Lucy considers factory farming cruel, and that she doesn’t 
want to partake in it. The key point of Lucy’s remark is a sharp juxtaposition that she 
makes between herself and the notion of cruelty. The reason she refuses to contribute to 
the enslavement of animals is not just because she thinks it is cruel, but because she 
does not consider herself the kind of person to do a cruel thing. Her statement, therefore, 
misses a logical ending which Lucy implies but fails to vocalise.  Taken to its logical 
completion, the quote would read: “And it is just not right, I can’t do that to animals, 
it’s just cruel, and I am not a cruel person”. This single phrase is the vocalised 
quintessence of what Lucy’s commitment to veganism represents - a manifestation of 
her ultimate values, principles, and concerns, in which her unique identity is reflected 
and expressed, through specific ethical food practices. The links between ethical 
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consumption and individual identity are most explicitly revealed in the following quote 
from Joe in which he reflects upon the relationship between his dietary commitment and 
his inner self:  
The main reason I am vegetarian is just because… (…) it is such an ingrained 
part of my identity, I was born on that diet, I’ve always put that forward and it’s just – 
oh, it’s like the fact that I am male, you know, it’s just, that’s my identity now, I feel 
that’s so solid and unchanging.       
  
…and describes the true, deeper meaning of ethical food practices which involve 
a lot more than merely changing what one does and are ultimately about changing who 
one is:  
Being vegetarian or being vegan is ultimately just a dietary thing, you know, so, 
if you switch from eating foods from all colours to just eating blue foods or not eating 
any foods that have blue, that does not change you, it’s the things that drive you to be 
vegetarian or vegan - that’s where the change comes from. 
 
 In the same vein, Lila regards her commitment to veganism as “a way to 
communicate your ideas and ideology and identity”; for Mary, being an ethical 
consumer “is kind of part of who I am really”; while Solveig perceives her vegetarian 
practices as “a social statement”. Further, David explicitly referred to the symbolic 
value and identity-defining potential of ethical consumption when talking about the 
evolution of his pro-environmental practices and the relationship between his particular 
choices and self-image: “fair trade - organic thing became automatically attached to 
political notions of environmentalism and social justice, just automatic, like “oh, wow, 
they are selling stuff for us!”. The idea of ethical food commitments as a key defining 
feature of one’s distinct identity is equally prominent in the subjects’ perceptions of 
other people. “It’s about who they are”, says Maggi, explaining why she rejects the 
possibility of developing an affinity with a meat-eating person: “if they think it’s alright 
to eat meat then that’s part of their value system that would clash, you know…”. 
Likewise, Joe regards vegetarianism as an essential feature of not only his own 
personality, but also that of his potential life partner: “I’ve not had a long term 
relationships with someone who hasn’t switched to being at least vegetarian”. 
 In the above discussion, I have brought the voices of the ethical consumers of 
my research to testify to the inextricable relationship between agential commitments to 
ethical consumption and their identities. A uniform agreement appears to have been 
reached that our moral concerns are, indeed, “both extensions and expressions of 
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ourselves” (Archer, 2000, p. 79) and that in defining what to care about in life one 
inevitably defines what kind of person she is. In this reflexive process of construction of 
our desired identities, an attentive observer will discern a continuous interplay between 
agential subjectivities and structural objectivities. On the one hand, the intricate process 
of defining our ultimate concerns and, through them, our unique personalities is 
propelled by human capacity for reflexivity, as I have previously argued and shown. On 
the other hand, however, the strong emphasis on reflexivity as an essential ability of 
agents to reflect upon their lives, define their ultimate commitments, and choose their 
moral pathways should not detract from the potent role of objective reality in shaping 
not only what people do, but also the kind of persons they become. Archer (2000, p. 249) 
highlights the limits of control that we, as human beings, have over shaping our life 
courses and ourselves: “we do not ever make our personal identities under the 
circumstances of our choosing, since our embededdness in nature, practice and society 
is part of what being human means” – the point just as finely expressed by one of my 
research participants, David:“there is a lot of structural elements that get on the way of 
you achieving what it is right to be”. 
Once again, I am calling my research subjects to testify for the truth of the 
argument. Consider, for example, how Darren celebrates his agential power to define 
and follow his preferred practices: “it was freedom, you know, it was choice, food 
choice, it was ethical food choice, food empowerment and more education, more 
enlightenment”, whilst also recognising various external forces shaping and moulding 
his pathways: “your personal family circumstances, depending on how strong their 
values are, it is always gonna influence your behaviour (…) you have got all these 
social influences going on…”. Equally revealing is David’s interpretation of his ethical 
choices as wilful acts of construction of his desired identity: “it was a lot of just ticking 
the box - oh yes, I am someone who eats organic, I am someone who buys fair trade, I 
care, you know, I care about these things, because that is who I am”. As Darren, he 
highlights the key role of his agential subjectivity in determining his concerns and 
setting his life priorities: “I decided, I chose to place the environment at the top of my 
constructed idea of what is important, my hierarchy of what is important”, and as 
Darren, he too is aware that his subjective vision of “what it is right to be” has been 
planted and nurtured in him throughout the course of his life by a variety of different 
influences – the family he was raised in, the education he obtained, the people he met 
and the relationships he developed, the experiences he had and the objective reality he 
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faced: “all of my experiences had resulted in this my identity”. In a remarkably similar 
way, Lucy too acknowledges both that her distinct identity is an outcome of her actively 
and reflexively taken decisions as well as that it bears indelible imprints of various 
forces of external reality: “I am a product of my own environment, of my own 
background, and my own experiences”.  
Yet, that my participants might be aware of the roots of their ultimate concerns 
and are able to rationalize their moral food projects does not make their commitments 
any less authentic, emotionally appealing, or value-laden. They still represent integral 
elements of the subjects’ unique identities, extensions and reflections of their inner 
selves, as finely expressed by David: “So just because I know that these things are 
constructed does not mean I can’t enjoy them, allow them to give me purpose, allow 
them to, allow my identity to develop within them”. It is remarkable how this quote is 
almost an exact echo of Archer’s (2000, p. 241) own argument:   
          
It does not matter in the least that these concerns do indeed originate outside ourselves 
in our ineluctable relationship with the natural, practical and social orders, for in dedication we 
have taken responsibility for them and made them our own. 
 
This is precisely where human reflexivity plays its key part, i.e. in propelling a 
continuous dialogue between agential subjectivities and structural objectivity and 
mediating people’s relationships with the outer world. While not granting agents full 
command over the properties of the structure, it enables them to evaluate, reflect, and 
elaborate upon their subjective experiences of objective reality, identify matters of 
concern in the events and circumstances that are external to and independent from them, 
but, to paraphrase Archer, in dedication take responsibility for them and make them 
their own. As one of my interviewees, Lila, also noted, it is only through such inner 
reflexive journey that concerns about the external world can become indelible defining 
features of our true inner selves: “you have to just walk the road and make it your own, 
otherwise it is just so superficial”       
 In this chapter, I aimed to illuminate the subjects’ journey towards ethical 
consumer identities by exploring the origins of their moral concerns and revealing the 
generative principles of their ethical food commitments. By unravelling Lucy’s life 
story and drawing on other participants’ narratives, I have provided an account of how 
different features of objective reality, of which individuals became aware and to which 
they got emotionally sensitised through subjective experiences, became the objects of 
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their concerns and how, through continuous cycles of reflexivity-propelled internal 
conversations in which agents deliberated upon their relationships with the world, they 
came to embrace these concerns as ultimate moral guides and determinants of their 
consumption practices. I have argued that through this reflexive process of discerning 
what matters to them and why, not only did individuals decide upon their ultimate 
values and beliefs, but they also came to define what kind of persons they are and, in 
living out their moral ideals through subjectively devised shopping and eating practices, 
achieved the identity of an ethical consumer. Finally, by casting light on the participants’ 
musings over the matters of concern and ways to address them, I have demonstrated the 
key role of human reflexivity in mediating the incessant dialogue between agential 
subjectivity and structural objectivity and enabling individuals to develop distinct 
identities in defining the relationships between their inner self and the outer world. Last 
but not least, I have highlighted an important caveat about the limits of individual 
agency to define who we are or will become, thereby distancing myself from the 
assertion that people can freely choose their identities outside of the social, cultural, and 
practical constraints – the view that deeply permeates the neo-liberal discourse on 
identity politics and that I deem essential to guard my account from. 
In constructing this account I have made multiple references to McDonald’s 
(2000) study on practicing vegans. Indeed, there are a lot of similarities between her 
exploration of the process of becoming a vegan and my research on the formation of 
ethical consumer identities, both in terms of the pursued questions as well as achieved 
conclusions. However, while McDonald describes the empirical, i.e. her subjects’ 
catalytic experiences, and the actual, i.e. the subsequent changes in their worldviews 
and consumption practices, my analysis of the participants’ self-accounts informed by 
the realist ontology, Archer’s conceptualisation of reflexivity, and Coff’s idea of 
“glimpsed experiences” penetrates to the level of the real and explains the generative 
principles of human concerns over food ethics and their evolution into the practices of 
ethical consumption. I have brought the abstract, i.e. my proposed theoretical 
framework, into the relationship with the concrete, namely the subjects’ particular 
experiences, acts, and circumstances, thereby managing to disentangle the key elements, 
stages, and causal powers co-constituting the process of becoming an ethical food 
consumer. I have shown that this process begins with the properties of external reality – 
its objective facts, features, and states which are prior to and independent from agents 
but have the potential to become the objects of their concerns, e.g. animal abuse, 
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environmental degradation, labour exploitation, etc. For this to occur, those objective 
conditions need to come into play with the essential properties of the agents, namely 
their affective and cognitive capacities. The opportunity for subjective emotional 
perception and cognitive interpretation of the objects and circumstances of potential 
concern is provided by catalytic factors, such as direct exposure to or personal 
involvement in food production practices as well as other experiences through which 
individuals learn about and, most importantly, become emotionally involved with the 
matters of concern. For those concerns to result in ethical food commitments, agents 
need to elaborate their emotionality beyond initial commentaries in order to arrive at 
their ultimate moral priorities. The essential human property of reflexivity is absolutely 
key to the process of emotional elaboration – it kicks in at the moment when agents 
appeal to their deliberative capacities in order to review and evaluate their concerns in 
terms of their emotional appeal, moral worth, and sustainability, that is the potential to 
become a life-long commitment. This reflexive work takes places during internal 
conversations in which, through a unification of human feeling and thought, the 
formation of subjects’ moral pathways and identities occurs. It is this account, 
supported by empirical evidence from my research, that I offer as a potential 
explanation of the mechanisms that give rise to subjective concerns over food ethics, 
produce ethical consumer practices out of the interplay between the objective properties 
of the world and agential capacities for affectivity and cognition, and forge out ethical 
consumer identities during reflexive conversations in which these essential human 
properties unite to enable people to define who to be and how to act. 
Crucially, this account, grounded in a realist ontology of the world and guided 
by the key concepts of ultimate concerns (understood as internal commitments to 
external objects) and reflexive conversation (consisting of subjective deliberations about 
objective circumstances) enabled me to progress toward achieving my key research aim, 
i.e. to showcase ethical consumption as a site of continuous interplay between agential 
subjectivity and structural objectivity – a performance that we will be spectating 
throughout the entirety of the thesis as the participants’ ethical food stories unfold. Next, 
this incessant interaction between agency and structure will reveal itself in the daily 
lives and experiences of self-defined ethical consumers to which the next chapter is 
about to take us. In it, I will explore how, having achieved the identity of an ethical 
consumer, subjects actively and reflexively sustain desired self-images through on-
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going accommodation of their ethical food practices in the changing contexts of 



































Competing Concerns, Objective Constraints, and Moral Dilemmas: 
Toward a Coherent and Stable Ethical Consumer Identity 
 
 
The relation that holds between us and our contexts is always one of forces in tension, 
in which we push and pull, and are pushed and pulled (Sayer, 2011, p. 104) 
 
In the previous chapter, I began to follow nine distinct individuals as they set out 
on their journeys toward an ethical consumer identity. We have heard them voice their 
most intimate feelings and thoughts through which they figured out their subjective 
relationship to the world as one of the concern over the morality of consumption. We 
have seen how, by reflexively evaluating and elaborating their affective and cognitive 
experiences, they came to embrace particular moral concerns and devised specific food 
practices as a way to address them. We have thus witnessed how, by making ethical 
consumption their ultimate life commitment and a medium through which to express 
their unique moral selves, they attained the distinct identity of an ethical consumer. At 
this point, our focus shifts from the process of becoming an ethical consumer to the 
intricacies and complexities of actually being one. The questions this chapter is meant 
to illuminate concern the ways in which, once embraced, the ethical consumer identity 
is preserved and sustained; the subjective and objective enablements and constraints that 
individuals have to negotiate as they pursue their chosen moral pathways; and, finally, 
the essential human properties and capacities that enable agents to do so.   
 I will begin by demonstrating the embeddedness of ethical consumer practices in 
objective reality and their situatedness against people’s subjective concerns and, 
building upon this evidence, construe ethical food consumption as a moral commitment 
that requires active and continual maintenance by reflexive and intentional agents. I will 
investigate the ways in which individuals under the pressure of objective conditions and 
subjective circumstances continually adjust their relationships with the natural, practical, 
and social orders of the world in order to achieve a satisfying balance between their 
competing concerns and ensure the stability of their ethical food projects. My analysis 
of the participants self-accounts’ will reveal what it means for the subjects to not merely 
practice ethical consumption, but to deeply identify with it. I will argue that for the 
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individuals who perceive their dietary commitments as an integral constituent and the 
defining feature of their personal and social identities, ensuring the stability and 
consistency of their moral food projects is essential to maintaining a coherent and 
continuous sense of self. I will defend this point by exemplifying the destabilising 
effects that dietary compromises produce on the personal identities of self-perceived 
ethical consumers as well as revealing the variety of ideational strategies to which 
subjects resort in order to mitigate them. In fulfilling the above goals, I will open up 
new frontiers of the relationship between ethical consumption and individual identities, 
as well as reiterate and strengthen the fundamental argument about the crucial role of 
both objective reality and agential ability to reflexively respond to it in shaping ethical 
consumer practices.         
 The embeddedness of ethical consumption in external reality becomes manifest 
as soon as a subject makes his or her first attempt at fulfilling a particular dietary 
commitment. The properties of the natural, practical, and social contexts in which 
individuals are placed play a key role in determining agential ability to pursue their 
moral food projects as well as their concomitant costs. A review of my participants’ 
initial endeavours to engage in desired eating practices is particularly helpful for 
bringing out the force of this argument. So, Lucy’s first several bids at going vegan 
proved unsuccessful due to the unsupportive conditions: “This is back in the 1990 and 
(…) then it was really difficult and most of the stuff was really unpleasant”. Upon 
moving to Eastern Europe, the practical difficulty of sustaining a vegan diet was 
aggravated by socio-cultural context: the idea of avoiding animal products was unheard 
of and justifying a request for a meatless meal in a restaurant or canteen was almost as 
challenging as finding it on the menu. Thus, unavailability of vegan choices made 
Lucy’s new ethical project unrealistic, food being an absolute necessity of life. In 
contrast, Joe’s transition to veganism was greatly facilitated by a change in his living 
situation, i.e. moving in with his aunt – a committed vegan, nutritionist, and competent 
cook: “it was easy to do living with my aunt, very very straightforward”. Similarly, 
Lila’s switch to a plant-based diet and the challenge of avoiding animal products in a 
meat-eating household were simplified by the practical implications of the cultural rules 
around food preparation followed by her family: 
Because it is a Jewish family and they keep kosher, so it means they don’t mix 
milky stuff and meat stuff (…) it made it really easy for me to become vegan because of 
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this reason, because it was really easy to avoid milk.    
  
Likewise, a combination of practical and social factors has been conditioning the 
development of David’s consumption practices. Accessibility of products with desired 
qualities has always been critical to his ability to engage in ethical eating. Back in 
Scotland, lack of shops selling environmentally friendly produce was a major restraint 
to David’s ethical food pursuits: “We had to go to Glasgow to get different things, but 
you can’t go and get your weekly shopping in an hour bus drive away...”. Interestingly, 
this practical constraint was rooted in the socio-cultural context prevailing in his 
hometown of Cumbernauld: “it does not have a very much diversity of people there, so 
even if you opened a shop selling different things, there were not many customers for 
it…”.  David’s opportunities to exercise ethical choices have expanded once Waitrose 
became part of his local shopping scene:  
So many times over the years I have been buying things, something I really liked 
and I felt bad about it and I thought to myself, I wish I could get the fair trade version of 
it, I wish there were an organic one of these, and then going to Waitrose and there was!
  
At the same time, his explorations of ethical consumption could not have 
happened without an important social enablement - moving away from an old group of 
friends, whom David described as “tough, dangerous, bad people”, and starting a 
relationship with an environmentally oriented girl, who allowed him to set off on his 
desired moral path:   
All the things that I wanted to change about myself, I wanted to try, I was only 
able to try that because of her, because she allowed that, she would not make fun of it, 
because she was interested in this as well.      
  
  Solveig offers another revealing example of the embeddedness of ethical food 
practices in the social reality. Socio-cultural factors have been critical to Solveig’s 
ability to initiate her moral food project and carry it through the different stages in life. 
She came to the idea of veganism at the time when sustaining a plant-based diet was 
becoming increasingly easier due to such structural enablements as growing 
environmental awareness among the mass public and widening presence of green 
products and goods, including meat-free foodstuffs. Later, the prevalence of liberal 
outlooks in the university environment, easy access to vegetarian foods due to proximity 
of the Indian-Pakistani community during her study abroad year in Sheffield, the Green 
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Party’s rise to power and a subsequent increase in public awareness and availability of 
environmentally friendly products in her native Germany all played a non-trivial role in 
ensuring the stability of Solveig’s ethical food practices. Upon moving to the UK, she 
found herself in a social context where high levels of environmental awareness and a 
historically conditioned tradition of accommodating people of diverse cultural 
backgrounds and eating customs have ensured that Solveig’s commitment to veganism 
was respected and well catered for both in professional and public settings:  “because it 
is a very diverse crowd of people anyway, I have never had any problems, she testifies. 
Most recently, sustaining a vegan diet has become more straightforward due to the rise 
of the Internet, social media platforms and online communities, on which Solveig relies 
for information: “God bless the Internet - I would have died without having access to 
vegan recipes”, news: “when Oreos turned vegan I found that on one of these groups” 
as well as knowledge sharing and support: “sometimes just giving people tips - there is 
Leeds vegan group, for example”. At the same time, objective conditions place 
significant constraints on Solveig’s ability to fully realise her project of ethical 
consumption. Absence of fresh food markets close to home makes shopping at 
conventional supermarkets a more frequent activity than she would have desired; UK 
food stores’ security measures preclude an opportunity for dumpster diving which she 
used to practice in Germany; while the realities of the global food industry prevent 
Solveig from putting her money where her mouth is:     
  I would like to consume more products from smaller independent companies, but 
it is really tricky because you have three or four really big companies that produce soya 
products and it is very hard to avoid that. 
Jason’s anti-capitalist position and Lila’s desire for alternative shopping face the 
same objective constraints: “that is the system, I have to follow it, I make most of my 
shopping at supermarkets”, says Jason; “some things you just can’t buy in the local 
shops”, echoes him Lila. Her desire for local consumption is further constrained by the 
climatic conditions in which her moral food project unfolds. “It would be easier to go 
for local if you lived in a normal climate, England is such a nightmare”, she comments, 
offering a telling example of the embeddedness of ethical consumption in the natural 
order of reality.          
 This discussion demonstrates the role of objective conditions and subjective 
circumstances in determining individuals’ ability to successfully implement their moral 
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food initiatives. It is because of the embeddedness of dietary commitments in the 
natural, practical, and social contexts of reality and their inevitable positioning against 
subjects’ various concerns that ethical consumption, as any agential project, is a 
precarious and fragile enterprise. On the one hand, external reality, which consists of the 
systems that are not closed and fixed but open and mutable (Bhaskar, 2013), produces 
continuous effects on agential courses of action. On the other hand, the life cycle itself 
is a source of multiple changes and, as people make important transitions in their lives, 
such as leaving parental home, getting married or divorced, making career progress or 
retiring, becoming a parent and so on, the nature of their social interactions and practical 
circumstances change and so do their priorities, opportunities, and possibilities to 
pursue particular pathways (Archer, 2007). At the same time, what the respondents’ 
experiences reveal and what is important to highlight is the need “to resist the common 
tendency to regard causes as always enemies and never friends, as constraining our 
freedom rather than enabling it; they may feed, empower and stimulate us” (Midgley, 
2003, p. 11 cited in Sayer, 2011, p. 104). Since multiple systemic and personal factors 
affect the way people shop and eat at various stages in life and may constrain as well as 
enable their dietary undertakings, ethical consumer projects need to be continuously 
monitored, reflexively reassessed, and actively sustained by intentional and self-aware 
subjects.           
 Lucy’s story allows to capture and understand the lived experiences of an ethical 
consumer who continuously negotiates her relationships with the natural, practical, and 
social orders of the world in order to maintain a satisfying balance between her 
competing concerns and ensure the stability of her moral food commitments. Although 
initially nothing seemed to impede Lucy’s new eating practices - her mother was 
tolerant of her convictions, while school meals were easily replaced by packed lunches - 
she soon had to face the unintended consequences of the dietary restrictions she was 
stringently observing. For Lucy, being a 14-year-old vegetarian in a meat-eating 
household meant subsisting largely on vegetables, which she complimented with sweets 
and other foodstuffs, usually of low nutritional value, from the kitchen cupboard. After 
several months on the “bread and jam diet”, Lucy fell ill. She was diagnosed with 
anaemia and strongly advised to switch to a more nutritious food regime. Abandoning 
vegetarianism was ruled out, and as an alternative solution her mother bought Lucy a 
vegetarian recipe book and let her cook her own meals - a concession on the part of a 
devoted housewife who didn’t like other people in the kitchen, as Lucy notes in 
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hindsight. Let us now analyse the significance of this episode for Lucy’s development 
as an ethical food consumer. The situation represents the first clash between her moral 
commitment to vegetarianism and concerns over health - the “animal-welfare versus 
self-welfare tension”, as defined by Janda and Trocchia (2001, p. 1208) in a study of 
vegetarians. This tension could be neither eliminated, since health concerns are 
“embodied in our physical constitution” (Archer, 2000, p. 198), nor ignored, as the 
increasing intensity of its emotional import called for an action to eliminate or 
ameliorate the harmful relationship between Lucy’s body and her dietary practice. Thus, 
Lucy was faced with the need to appease her ineluctable physical concerns by either 
abandoning vegetarianism - which would mean departing from her identity-defining 
moral commitment - or mitigating its damaging effects. As we have seen, by taking 
advantage of the social and practical enablements, Lucy was able to achieve a satisfying 
and morally acceptable solution to the progressively intensifying conflict between her 
different concerns. Mastering cooking skills and learning vegetarian recipes in 
particular was a performative achievement that enabled Lucy to attend to her physical 
needs without forsaking her dietary practice. Her mother’s support has also been key to 
facilitating the shift to a healthier diet. Thus, by fine-tuning her relationships with the 
natural, social, and practical contexts of reality Lucy managed to achieve a liveable 
balance between her competing concerns and preserve her commitment to ethical eating.
 Other participants too continuously face the need to negotiate subjective and 
objective impediments to their moral food projects. Prohibitive cost of ethical goods has 
been commonly singled out as one of the key factors restraining the subjects’ ability to 
engage in ethical consumption. However, while concerns over limited food budgets 
undoubtedly place constraints on the contents of individuals’ shopping baskets, the 
ethical consumers of my research demonstrate the capacity to overcome financial 
barriers and fulfil their moral food projects in the ways that do not command a premium 
price. For example, Solveig is keen on freeganism and considers dumpster diving a 
good way to cut grocery bills while simultaneously addressing the problem of food 
waste; Joe is actively exploring opportunities for downshifting and continually 
experiments with different vegan meals in search of the most cost-effective weekly 
menu; Darren organised an allotment collective to grow organic food for personal 
consumption as well as for charity; while Lila joined a buying group to purchase fair 
trade and organic foodstuffs in bulk at a much more affordable price. Those who for 
various reasons, such as convenience or lack of alternative options, rely on 
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supermarkets, came up with peculiar shopping strategies in order to accommodate both 
their moral and financial concerns. So, Maggi ensures a continuous supply of ethical 
goods by seeking out special offers and deals – once a bargain is found, she places a 
bulk order which usually lasts her until the next promotion is offered in-store. David 
remains a regular patron of the upscale Waitrose, where the reduced price section is his 
constant source of otherwise unaffordable goods. “Waitrose is not expensive, you can 
have expensive things if you want them, or – not”, he says, underscoring the power of 
consumer agency and its potential for creative approach to consumption practices. 
Subjects manifest similar resourcefulness when it comes to negotiating occasions where 
food choices consistent with their ethical beliefs are lacking. While such practical and 
social constraints may become a significant challenge to agential dietary commitments, 
the ethical consumers of my research successfully negotiate such barriers - for example, 
by bringing their own food, as does Lucy: “usually if I go out on a social occasion I 
take something with me that I can eat”, Solveig: “I would bring vegan burgers or 
sausages so that I would have something to put on the barbecue”, and Lila: “I kind of 
coped, I brought my own packed dinner with me”. As an undergraduate student, Joe had 
to actively defend his ability to sustain his commitment to veganism against the lack of 
meat-free options in the university catered halls: “I remember having to fight for that 
for a bit, for that special treatment”.        
 These examples showcase how through creativity and skilful use of resources 
individuals manage to push the boundaries of what is accessible or available to them in 
the given contexts and devise alternative ways to fulfil their moral food projects. They 
provide empirical evidence to counterbalance the argument that “the consumer role is 
plastic and open for business interests, civic society organizations, and governmental 
agencies to mold” (Jacobsen and Dulsrud, 2007, p. 473), for in the manner in which 
participants negotiate their relationships with objective reality and balance out their 
subjective concerns one cannot be mistaken to detect the exercise of human agency and 
a manifestation of individuals’ capacity for reflexive, active, and creative response to 
constraints and limitations facing their ethical food projects. Furthermore, the above 
analysis prompts me to engage in the debate on the connections between ethical 
consumption and economic capital. Particularly, it enables me to challenge the 
perspective essentialising ethical consumption as an exclusive province of the rich 
which has permeated media and public discourse on responsible shopping: a radical 
activist magazine New Internationalist, for example, condemned ethical consumerism as 
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merely “yet another way in which the poor are being disenfranchised” (Worth, 2006, no 
pagination), while a well-known environmental journalist George Monbiot (2007, no 
pagination) echoed the critique in his Guardian column attacking ethical pursuits as  
“just another way of showing how rich you are”. The accusations seem to be based on 
the fact that products with ethical credentials such as organic and fair-trade tend to come 
with significant price premiums leading critics to argue that the vast shoes of a 
responsible consumer can only be filled by high-income earners. Indeed, a comparative 
assessment of 75 products at the top six UK grocery stores revealed that on average 
ethical goods are 45% more expensive that conventional products, and that nearly half 
of UK consumers are unable or unwilling to pay the price (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
2008). Other commentators, however, reject the view of ethical consumption as an elite 
practice and just “a further brand of middle-class distinction” (Littler, 2011, p. 35). As 
Littler (2011) justly notes, being rich does not necessarily lead to ethical concerns or 
commitments. At the same time, many less well-off consumers subscribe to and practice 
responsible lifestyles – historically, associations between working class people and 
ethical consumerism are exemplified in such events as, for instance, American 
housewives’ boycotts of supermarkets with exploitative labour practices or the 
development of the co-operative movement in the UK, while contemporary statistical 
evidence suggests that ethically minded consumers are increasingly found among the 
poorer nations with China, Brazil, Mexico, and India actually outweighing UK, USA or 
Germany by the number of people prepared to pay ethical premiums (Havas Media, 
2007 cited in Carrigan and De Pelsmacker, 2009, p. 681). Moreover, while it is true that 
organic and fair trade goods often carry hefty price tags, plenty of ethical choices come 
at no added cost providing for a convenient marriage of consumers’ environmental and 
financial concerns (Flatters and Willmott, 2009). My research findings corroborate the 
argument enabling me to challenge the view of ethical consumption as merely a wealthy 
shopper’s pursuit. Thus, out of nine individuals who took part in my study – all 
convinced ideological supporters and active practitioners of various forms of ethical 
consumption – only one interviewee reported no concerns about the cost of her food 
shopping (being retired and having no significant financial obligations, Mary can afford 
a rather generous food budget and faces very little financial constraints when it comes 
to grocery shopping), whereas others were rather restricted in their financial abilities 
and had to carefully watch their food spending. Unsurprisingly, for the subjects of my 
study shopping for premium priced products such as organic or fair-trade was neither 
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the only nor even the primary way to manifest themselves as ethical consumers. Instead, 
they fulfilled their moral food projects through various means demonstrating that certain 
ethical choices and practices can be embraced at little or no extra cost, such as choosing 
low-carbon options or products with minimised packaging; others can actually bring 
significant savings by helping to cut down the grocery bills, e.g. going meat-free, using 
leftovers; while otherwise unaffordable choices can be reached through consumer 
creativity and wise shopping techniques. In light of this evidence, I contend that the 
argument about prohibitive costs of ethical consumption overlooks the vast array of 
consumer practices, choices, and acts that fall under the term. The short-sightedness of 
the view of responsible shopping as an exclusive privilege of the moneyed classes 
becomes apparent once one breaks away from the extremely limited idea of ethical 
consumption as confined to leisurely shopping for conspicuously labelled fair trade and 
organic products in high-end grocery stores, and once one begins to understand food 
consumption not merely as shopping for, but as provisioning of goods and takes it 
outside the physical boundaries of quirky health shops, specialised supermarket sections, 
or farmer’s markets to account for the variety of ways in which individuals may feed 
themselves as well as the variety of ways in which they can do it more ethically. While 
it is self-evidently true that some can more easily engage with ethical consumption than 
others due to fewer financial or social restraints, the socio-demographic profile of my 
research participants suggests that the possession of cultural capital plays a far greater 
role in the individual adoption of ethical food practices than access to economic 
resources – a finding which mirrors the results of the Eurobarometer (2011) survey 
proving educational levels to be a better predictor of the willingness to pay ethical 
premiums than income.        
 The above analysis of the ways in which my participants negotiate the inevitable 
constraints, financial or otherwise, facing their dietary commitments highlights the 
central role of reflexivity in enabling individuals to not merely design projects of ethical 
consumption, but to accommodate them to the fluid contexts of objective reality and  
the ever-changing backdrop of their subjective concerns. At the same time, sustaining a 
satisfying balance between competing concerns does not always prove possible and, as 
the respondents’ accounts showcase, dietary compromises and slips constitute an 
inevitable part of ethical consumer experiences. Thus, despite being repeatedly subdued, 
concerns over physical wellbeing eventually took their toll on Lucy’s moral food 
project. Although back in England where the idea of vegetarianism had already entered 
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the mainstream and meat-free options had become widely available both in shops and 
restaurants Lucy’s ethical foodways faced neither practical nor social constraints, her 
health continued to deteriorate due to extensive over-reliance on convenience meals. As 
health problems intensified, so did their emotional import, which could no longer be 
neglected or repressed. Eventually, Lucy paid a visit to a doctor, whose major 
recommendation was to enrich her diet with fish. Reluctant to backtrack on her 
principles of ethical consumption, Lucy did not take the advice until practical, natural, 
and social influences all came together to encourage a compromise. This turning point 
occurred during Lucy’s trip to Portugal where limited choice of vegetarian foods 
represented a practical constraint to her project of ethical eating. On the second week of 
a diet consisting largely of eggs, Lucy got covered in spots. The physical manifestation 
of the pressing need to attend to her bodily needs generated an emotional response – a 
growing feeling of worry – which, coupled with words of encouragement from her 
pescatarian boyfriend, prompted Lucy to reconsider her ways. Here is how she describes 
this decisive moment: 
So you know, I got really spotty, and we were in a restaurant - it was a nice 
outdoor restaurant - and they were doing grilled sardines, you know, that traditional. 
And he was sat there, and he was eating these sardines, and he said, “they are 
absolutely delicious, you should eat this” (…) So I said, “ok, I’ll try one” and I ate a 
sardine. Since then I try and eat fish once a week, just for the health. 
                     
Thus, combined pressure from the practical, natural, and social orders of reality 
forced Lucy to adjust her moral project to accommodate her bodily needs. Despite being 
rather dismissive of her health during her younger years, Lucy eventually had to 
acknowledge and accept the ineluctability of physical concerns and work out a new 
lifestyle within which they would be adequately heeded. Other participants also 
demonstrate preparedness to review their subjective hierarchy of priorities and 
compromise on ethical food commitments in order to address concerns that arise in the 
natural realm, i.e. those that involve their physical wellbeing and state. Like Lucy, 
Solveig too recognises the inevitability of her bodily needs and is ready to suspend the 
vegan diet for the sake of her health, as she did when milk chocolate was the only 
available solution to her quickly dropping blood sugar levels: 
If it is something basic like that, something you need or something you don’t 
have an alternative for, then I have to say that my own life in this situation is for me 
more important than my convictions. 
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Further, obligations and responsibilities entailed by various social roles as well 
as dominant norms around certain societal situations often take prevalence over the 
requirements of ethical consumption. Thus, Maggi subdued her vegetarian pledge to 
concerns over nutrition, whose emotional import overrode the significance of her ethical 
food commitments once she got pregnant and became a mother. “I had a bigger focus 
on my baby”, she explains, attesting to positional changes in her subjective hierarchy of 
priorities induced by the new familial context, her role within it and its concomitant 
responsibilities. Mary too embraced motherhood as a bigger commitment than ethical 
consumption. As Maggi, she prioritised her parental duties over her ethical pursuits: 
“we had an allotment when she [her daughter] was little, but got thrown off it because I 
couldn’t get to it”, and reviewed her moral convictions, such as those over having a cat, 
through the prism of her new ultimate concern over the needs and desires of her child: 
 
I was aware of environmental issues of feeding cats food which was fish and 
meat and stuff that actually was not really environmentally very… should you be using 
the resources to feed cats? (...) it was because my daughter really really wanted her that 
I caved in. 
 
Likewise, Lila is willing to prioritise an opportunity to treat her child over her 
ethical principles: “sometimes, you know, I just think – my daughter is going to enjoy 
these treats, so I am going to buy it regardless of the packaging and trans-fats and what 
have you…”         
 Respect for societal norms also appears to be among the values which subjects 
are ready to promote over their dietary commitments. Particularly, concerns over being 
a gracious guest or a hospitable host have the power to dominate one’s consumption 
behaviour. Thus, questioning the origins and characteristics of food prepared and served 
by a host was uniformly defined by the participants as inacceptable and rude: “to go 
somewhere else, to stay at someone else’s house - you are not going to say, “oh, is this 
avocado organic? I am not going to eat it then”, that is so ridiculous”, says David; 
“you don’t have the right to do that, it is a matter of politeness”, agrees Jason. Similarly, 
even the most committed ethical consumers put their dietary principles aside when 
serving food to their guests, as does David: “my guests will get whatever they want, 
whatever they need and there will be no questions as to whether it is bad for the 
environment or not, cause they are my guests”. How ethically motivated individuals 
negotiate their relationships with the social order and balance their dietary commitments 
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against inescapable concerns over social standing and worth, as well as how this affects 
their identities is an important theme that I will take up and explore in depth in the next 
chapter. What the selected examples above were meant to highlight is individuals’ 
inherent sociality and its place within the inescapable “trio of human concerns” (Archer, 
2007) which directly affect consumers’ ability to pursue their desired food practices.  
Finally, agential ethical food commitments often fall prey to financial concerns 
and practical difficulties. Echoing Adams and Raisborough’s (2010, p. 263) respondent 
who described ethical shopping as a constant “balancing act between my social 
conscience and the size of my purse”, my participants too emphasised the limits that 
family food budgets place on their ability to make ethical choices: “I could not afford to 
be fussy about whether something was organic or anything like that”, recollects Lucy 
her life as a student with no secure income; “I’d end up spending £30 a week on apples 
alone” – justifies Maggi her limited consumption of organic products; “we had very 
little money as well, so I could not invest in buying those expensive products”, looks 
back Lila on her early days in the UK; “I could not find any vegan burgers which were 
not pre-fried tofu, which was just so expensive” – explains Joe the wilful slip in his 
vegan diet; “if I didn’t have enough money then I wouldn’t be able to and that is that, 
I’d have to prioritise much more carefully”, acknowledges Mary the ineluctability of 
financial concerns. Although Mary has a comparatively generous food budget and 
enjoys the freedom to consume a range of premium priced products like organic or fair 
trade, she too faced the need to suspend her ethical practices due to more urgent 
demands of life, such as going to Newbury to look after her old-aged aunt. Lack of time 
and easy access to ethical food outlets meant that Mary had to rely on the convenience 
of supermarket shopping, contrary to her commitment to farmer’s markets and 
independent health food shops. She interprets this as a temporary, yet unavoidable, 
concession in the face of more pressing concerns:  “I can’t worry about it because I’ve 
got so many other pressures on me, it is just how it is. When I come back, I’ll start 
again”. Such temporal abandonment of ethical commitments due to exigencies of life is 
not an uncommon experience for ethical consumers. For instance, Joe faced the 
challenge of adjusting his vegan practice to a new living context in Leeds: “I was a bit 
unfamiliar with everything, I just found it hard to carry that on”. Likewise, Lila’s 
ethical shopping routine was thrown into confusion as she was trying to settle in 
England: “I did not know where to get anything basically, I did not know where you 
shop more healthy food or organic food, I had no idea”. The need to fulfil the 
 
143 
responsibilities of a young mother while adapting to a new living situation proved too 
difficult to combine with the principles of ethical consumption:  
I really made a point of not buying any packed fruit and vegetables, but if you go 
to a supermarket - it is so much easier just to grab a bag of carrots rather than pick 
them individually, and it sounds really lazy but actually, you know, when you have this 
big trolley and the girl is whining, you just kind of grab and just go, so… 
 
“You have to fit in so many tasks”, justifies Lila this wilful negation of her 
moral principles, echoing Archer’s point about the ineluctable need to achieve and 
sustain a satisfying balance between our competing desires and needs.   
 The participants’ confessions exemplify the ways in which “the moral 
complexities of everyday life restrict the adoption of an active consumerist role” 
(Jacobsen and Dulsrud, p. 2007, p. 469). They underscore the contingency of ethical 
food projects on agential relationships with the three different orders of the world and 
reveal that no matter how sincere and strong, individuals’ dietary commitments are 
liable to compromises and trade-offs commanded by the need to achieve a liveable 
balance between their competing concerns. The ethical consumers of my research 
demonstrate and acknowledge preparedness to adjust, suspend, or abandon their moral 
food projects in the face of ineluctable natural concerns, practical constraints, and their 
responsibilities as functioning members of society, as succinctly expressed by Darren: 
“you have to balance enjoyment, your lifestyle, and your culture”. In a study of ethical 
dispositions and actions of ordinary consumers, Adams and Raisborough’s (2010) too 
highlight the unevenness of individuals’ practices of ethical consumption. Following 
them, I too resist the temptation to take the inconsistency of the participants’ moral food 
commitments as a sign of fragmented identities and isolate what is best seen as 
“component parts of a coherent, liable to flux, but mostly uneven, biographical narrative” 
(Adams and Raisborough, 2010, p. 271). At the same time, my argument about a direct 
relationship between consumers’ identities and their ethical food practices suggests that 
dietary compromises affect not only how ethical consumers act, but also how they feel 
and, more specifically, how they feel about themselves as a particular kind of person. In 
light of the key goal of my thesis – to interpret moral food practices in relation to 
individual identities – an in-depth exploration of these effects becomes a research 
imperative. On this way, Lila’s interpretation of the inevitable dietary compromises 
imposed by the pressing subjective concerns and changing objective conditions is the 
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best starting point: “I felt that I did not have the network and the know-how of being 
really me”, she confessed. This idea of losing “the know-how of being really me” unites 
Lila’s account with the experiences of Mary, Joe, and other morally concerned and 
committed consumers who faced and accepted the need to subdue their inner moral self 
as their food projects became impractical or too costly to maintain. It reiterates the links 
between ethical food consumption and individual identities by alluding to the 
destructive effects that dietary concessions produce on ethical consumers’ self-image. 
The most revealing example is found in Lila’s eloquent description of the internal state 
of discontinuity with herself induced by a temporary collapse of her ethical practices:  
Not only I felt guilty, I also felt I was completely remote from myself... I felt like, 
who is this person who goes to the supermarket and buys all this packed food? I really 
felt like it wasn’t me.           
Another testimony is offered by Lucy, whose self-view as a person genuinely 
concerned about animal life was profoundly shaken upon her learning about veganism 
and recognising the misfit between her foodways and her ultimate concerns: “I was 
about 20 when I met vegans and realised that I was a total hypocrite, and there was me 
eating all this stuff that I should not be eating”.  Lucy’s description of the destabilising 
identity effects of the value-practice gap revealed in her moral food project resonates 
with Joe, whose sense of true self is equally closely tied to his ethical commitments: “if 
I switched from being an ethical consumer of food, I’d feel really hypocritical about 
that and quite miserable”. Participants’ descriptions of the ways in which their sense of 
personal continuity and integrity changes depending on whether they are able to sustain 
their ethical food practices or forced to compromise on their commitments fit well into 
my theoretical framework. They demonstrate the direct relationship between people’s 
ultimate concerns and identities and substantiate the argument that, since we invest 
ourselves in our moral commitments, their consistency and stability is crucial for 
our sense of self-worth. As Archer (2000) reminds us, agents cannot be indifferent to 
how well their ultimate concerns are realised for they are expressions and extensions of 
their distinct personalities. Frankfurt (1988, p. 83) conveys the same point:  
A person who cares about something is, as it were, invested in it. He identifies himself 
with what he cares about in the sense that he makes himself vulnerable to losses and susceptible 
to benefits depending upon whether what he cares about is diminished or enhanced.  
This argument holds explanatory power to account not only for the practices that 
morally concerned individuals engage in, but also for the commitments that they abstain 
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from making. My analysis of the participants’ development as ethical food consumers 
brings out the force of Sayer’s insightful point that “our vulnerability is as important as 
our capacities; indeed the two sides are closely related, for vulnerability can prompt us 
to act or fail to act, and both can be risky” (2011, p. 5). Consider, for example, the 
reasoning behind Lucy’s long-lasting reluctance to go vegan: “I admired it, I thought it 
was admirable, I just… You know, I did not want to set myself up and fail”. Thus, 
despite high emotional appeal, she negated the project of veganism at the time when its 
long-term sustainability was uncertain. Lucy’s unwillingness to set herself an ethical 
standard which she was not able to live up to can be neatly construed as part of the 
struggle for a continuous self. It is not a practical failure but one of a more personal 
kind that Lucy strove to avoid by refraining from unrealistic commitments, whose 
fiasco would not only unsettle her moral project, but by doing so would also diminish 
her sense of self-worth. Frankfurt (1988, p. 83) finely expresses the argument: 
With respect to those we love and with respect to our ideals, we are liable to be bound 
by necessities which have less to do with our adherence to the principles of morality than with 
integrity and consistency of a more personal kind. These necessities constrain us from betraying 
the things we care about most, and with which, accordingly, we are most closely identified. In a 
sense which a strictly ethical analysis cannot make clear, what they keep us from violating are 
not our duties and obligations but ourselves.      
  
That it is not specific dietary rules and principles but the sense of being true to 
themselves that ethical consumers most dearly observe is confirmed by my participants: 
“It is more about my own sense of living in a bit more integrity”, acknowledges Mary; 
“I want to be true to my values, I don’t want to eat fish”, asserts Maggi; “I would not 
lose sleep if I ate something and it’s got egg in it and I did not realize and then I found 
out, then I would not really lose sleep about it”, admits Daren, revealing that his ethical 
commitments are ultimately about “not lying to yourself, be honest to yourself”. My 
interpretation of the participants’ confessions feeds into the argument advanced by 
Greenebaum (2012, p. 131) in her study of self-defined ethical vegans in which she 
construes her subjects’ “quest for purity” of dietary commitments as “a pursuit of an 
authentic identity”. My research offers ample empirical evidence to support this 
theoretical construct. For example, David’s self-perception as a person of strong 
environmental values has been the main driving force behind his decision to give up 
meat. “There was this cumulative effect over my entire adult life of this idea that I am 
kind of supposed to be vegetarian, but I am rebelling against myself”, admits David to 
the gradual recognition of the disturbing misfit between his omnivorous lifestyle and his 
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true self, defined by concerns over the environment. A desire to achieve a coherent self-
concept by bridging the increasingly unsettling gap between values and practices 
became the major impetus for David’s commitment to vegetarianism. His moral food 
project was informed by and still rests on the view that “if you think you can be an 
environmentalist and still eat meat, then you are wrong”, which alludes to the idea of 
ethical consumption as a way of achieving an authentic identity. Other participants have 
remarkably similar perceptions of the connection between their consumption practices 
and their self-view: “it seemed contradictory to do anything else, I just could not justify 
not being vegan”, conveys Joe his perception of veganism as the only right moral path 
towards his subjectively defined true self; “there was probably a sort of – I should not 
be eating fish because I am, in my head, I am vegetarian”, evokes Maggi her transition 
to a meat-free diet driven by a yearning for inner harmony with her vegetarian self-
image; “I knew it was inconsistent to be eating fish, so I became a vegetarian and 
shortly after that vegan”, describes Darren the progressive refinement of his ethical 
food project propelled by the sense of discrepancy with his self-view as a person 
committed to cruelty-free lifestyle; “my self-concept is of someone who is fairly 
environmentally and ethically aware and tries to be consistent with that”, joins them 
Mary in interpreting her consumption practices as “a pursuit of an authentic identity” 
(Greenebaum, 2012, p. 131). These examples suggest that subjects’ continuous 
reflexive efforts to align their values, beliefs, and eating behaviours are driven by the 
desire to live in congruence with their perceived authentic selves, offering support to the 
claim that “self-inquiry ultimately enables an authentic self through active and 
deliberate choices of a specific, ethical consumption lifestyle” (Cherrier, 2007, p. 322). 
The urge for the feeling of authenticity, arguably universal among humans and 
evidently shared by the ethical consumers of my research, is explained by Vannini 
(2006, p. 237): 
The basic precept of authenticity is that when individuals feel congruent with their 
values, goals, emotions, and meanings, they experience a positive emotion (authenticity). In 
contrast, people experience inauthenticity as an unpleasant emotion when they perceive 
incongruence with their values, goals, emotions, and self-meanings.   
   
Once again, my participants attest to the truth of the argument: “I think I am 
more coherent with myself when I am more ethical, I am more in harmony with myself”, 
says Lila; “I feel safe, I feel comfortable in my own skin about it”, echoes her Mary. 
This evidence offers support to the view that “much environmental advocacy represents 
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a certain way of thinking and acting that can be characterized as a style of life or as a 
desire to be a certain kind of person” (Moisander and Pesonen, 2002, p. 330; see also 
Shaw and Shiu’s, 2003; Newholm, 2005).      
 In the above discussion, I have offered ample empirical evidence to illustrate the 
relationship between agential performances of ethical consumption and their identities – 
a crucial association which explains the importance that self-perceived ethical 
consumers attach to the stability and consistency of their dietary commitments. It 
enabled me to substantiate the claim that subjects’ perseverance in sustaining their 
moral food projects is driven first and foremost by concerns over a stable and coherent 
identity. To fully harness the explanatory potential of this argument, I will now employ 
it to analyse and render meaningful the participants’ continuous endeavours to negotiate 
the shortcomings of their ethical food practices and the particular ways - or strategies - 
through which they do so. Let us start by considering how Lucy, for whom 
inconsequent dietary practices once presented a good enough reason to proclaim herself  
“a total hypocrite”, currently manages to preserve the sense of personal integrity despite 
having to compromise on her commitment to a plant-based diet. Although Lucy 
perceives and defines herself as an ethical food consumer, she claims neither the 
identity of a vegetarian: “I don’t call myself vegetarian because I occasionally eat fish”, 
nor that of a vegan: “I am not a vegan because I eat fish and I eat eggs”. What Lucy 
subconsciously achieves by refusing to be labelled as vegan or vegetarian is prevention 
of a destabilising inconsistency between the diet she follows and her assumed identity. 
Joe adopts the same strategy: “right now I don’t tell myself that you’re a proper strict 
vegan at the minute”. Like Lucy, he justifies his eating behavior by disclaiming the 
identity that would compel him into a vegan diet; moreover, he is well aware of the 
ideational process at work: “not having kind of internalized or externalised identity as a 
vegan is what stops me from resisting that temptation”. Through an analysis of the 
participants’ confessions I have been able to detect this strategy of identity disavowal as 
one of the tactics that subjects employ to avert the negative feeling of incongruity with 
their assumed and projected identities.      
 Further, Mills’ (1940) concept of the “vocabularies of motive” - social 
discourses that individuals know and expect to be accepted as morally valid excuses for 
potentially reprehensible behaviour - provides another useful theoretical prism through 
which to comprehend how ethical consumers legitimise their dietary compromises. In 
referring to it, I am following in the footsteps of Grauel (2014) who deploys Mills’ 
 
148 
ideas to construct an account of the ways in which mainstream consumers resolve 
inconsistencies between their food practices and socially circulated ideas of responsible 
consumption. In his study, Grauel describes subjects’ attempts to justify the lack of 
ethical considerations in their eating behaviour by invoking personal taste, family needs, 
and practical constraints which he interprets as appeals to the vocabularies of motives 
from which his participants derived socially legitimate excuses for their transgression of 
certain moral ideals. Following Grauel, I utilize the idea of the vocabularies of motives 
as a conceptual tool to analyse the ways in which the ethical consumers of my research 
explained away the disturbing contradictions between their dietary commitments and 
some of their actual food practices. To this end, I would like to go back to the 
participants’ accounts of their voluntary and forced dietary compromises and consider 
their explanations. To ease the task for the readers, I reiterate the most revealing 
excerpts: “my own life in this situation is for me more important” (Solveig); “I’ve got 
so many other pressures on me” (Mary); “I had a bigger focus on my baby” (Maggi); 
“I could not afford to be fussy about whether something was organic or anything like 
that” (Lucy). The central message conveyed by these quotes is that the participants are 
ready to subdue their ethical concerns when faced with the matters of higher priority, i.e. 
those that they consider to be more important to them at a given point in life, such as 
motherhood, or those that they have no means of escaping, such as health problems, or 
those that they have no choice but to submit to, such as lack of money or unavailability 
of desirable choices. Such accounts can be construed as “justificatory conversations” 
(Mills, 1940) in which people engage in order to explain away their conduct and guard 
it against societal disapproval, and references to the vocabularies of motive can be 
clearly found within them. Like Grauel’s ordinary consumers, my interviewees 
problematized the possibility of attaining their ideal vision of food ethics given the 
realities of life, as David succinctly expressed: “structural elements get on the way – the 
shops just don’t sell it, I don’t have the time…”. It is the need to account for the gaps 
between their actual eating practices and proclaimed ethical ideals that made the 
subjects resort to the vocabularies of motive and invoke socially approved values in 
order to justify the perceived shortcomings of their dietary behaviours. So, Lila referred 
to the notions of good mothering and fairness to explain why she had conceded to her 
daughter’s desire for non-vegan ice-cream: “it was just constantly – no, you are not 
allowed that, you are not allowed this, it was kind of – that is just so unfair”; Solveig 
appealed to the social conventions around being a respectful guest as the reason for 
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sharing a non-vegan meal: “not accepting it would have been rude beyond belief”; while 
Maggi justified the occasional forsaking of her vegan principles by invoking respect for 
food and the value of thrift: “it really seems morally wrong to throw food away”. 
Apparently, my participants recognised that their eating practices were being questioned, 
and that there were normative implications of both their conduct and the excuses given 
for it. Urged to present a just cause for the transgression of their own subjective 
standards of ethical consumption, the interviewees invoked motives that they considered 
normatively relevant to the situation and that they knew and expected to be commonly 
accepted as morally legitimate. Moreover, the subjects were eager to underscore their 
aspirations and intentions to consume in more ethical ways while commenting on the 
lack of opportunities to do so: “ideally I would want fair trade, organic, and local stuff”, 
asserted Maggi her desire to support a wide range of ethical causes, unfulfilled due to 
financial constraints; “if I had an infinite amount of time I would grow more food, I 
would develop more recipes, I would have time to research all of my foods to find out 
where everything comes from”, stated David his ethical intentions, constrained by a 
constant lack of time. This evidence corroborates Grauel’s (2014) argument that not 
only actual behaviour, but preferences and intentions alone can be used in justificatory 
conversations as a way to assert one’s virtues.     
 Further, my analysis of the subjects’ accounts revealed the tendency among 
ethical consumers to justify their dietary compromises by referring to the practices and 
acts of ethical consumption in which they routinely engage and which, the participants 
argued, massively outweigh the negative impact of their occasional “wrongdoings”. 
This strategy, which I call “compensatory reasoning”, evidently guides David’s moral 
self-defence: “I do so much, and I put so much thought into it, and I base my life 
around these principles for such a long time that I don’t feel that bad when I do 
something wrong”. Likewise, it manifests itself in Joe’s approach to justifying his 
foodways: “I am working towards a greater good ultimately, it does not matter if I eat 
the odd sandwich, you know, in the greater scheme of things”, and Lila’s excuse for 
indulging in a non-vegan treat: “after 15 years of being vegan – no, I thought, it 
wouldn’t harm, it won’t do any harm, I’ll just try because I feel like it”. 
 Finally, developing subjective conceptions of ethical consumption is yet another 
way in which the ethical consumers of my research attempted to bridge the gaps 
between their ethical values and dietary practices. Consider, for example, how Lucy 
explains the apparent moral disaccord between her consumption of fish and eggs and 
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her ultimate concerns over animal welfare: “the reason why I eat eggs – I’ve got friends 
who keep chickens and I know that the chickens are perfectly happy - I’ve seen those 
chickens, it’s not doing them any harm laying those eggs” and “I won’t eat farmed fish, 
I won’t eat anything that’s been produced in an unnatural way, but if it’s deep sea fish, 
I think - well, at least it had a normal life”. Thus, by subjectively devising the rules and 
principles to define and guide her ethical food commitments, Lucy manages to achieve 
harmony between her self-perception as an ethical food consumer and her particular 
eating practices. As long as consuming free-range eggs and sustainably sourced fish is 
not perceived by Lucy as a transgression of her ultimate commitment to cruelty-free 
consumption, it can be neatly accommodated within her personal moral matrix and 
entails no detrimental effects for her sense of integrity and self-worth. Solveig resorts to 
the same strategy when trying to justify the ethical compromises she willingly makes, 
such as accepting non-vegan foods offered by the people she cares about:  
I think in a way it is the whole Hippocratic thing, you know, – first do not do 
harm. I know that if I had gone to my grandmother’s place and refused the cheesecake 
that she bought especially because I was coming to visit (…) I think it would have been 
more harmful…         
  
  In the above example Solveig chooses to sacrifice her food ethics because, in her 
view, upholding them would entail more harm by profoundly offending the people 
whose effort went into providing the food: “the priority in this case was really not to 
hurt people’s feelings and not to offend people”. Although Solveig’s actions explicitly 
violate her commitment to veganism, they manifest respect for its underlying moral 
principle and are thus in alignment with her individual belief system. By presenting the 
principle of not doing harm as her ultimate moral benchmark, Solveig effectively 
eliminates the inconsistency between her dietary concessions and her self-image as an 
ethical food consumer and thereby manages to secure the sense of being true to her 
moral self. The deeply subjective nature of Solveig’s and Lucy’s reasoning reveals itself 
in their differing application of exactly the same moral principle that underlies their 
vision of ethical living and, more specifically, their idiosyncratic judgements of what 
constitutes harm and who the potential victims are. “Harm for me would be animal 
welfare” – says Lucy, justifying her unbending persistence in sustaining a cruelty-free 
diet even at the risk of hurting her mother’s feelings. By contrast, Solveig’s moral 
vision in this case extends beyond animals to include human beings which is why for 
her the best way to minimise harm might - and often does - involve compromising on 
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her vegan commitments. Lucy’s and Solveig’s divergent approaches to upholding the 
same moral principle and resolving the same moral dilemma, their differing “hierarchy 
of vulnerability and responsibility”, to use Solveig’s phrase, underscore the all-
important role of agential subjectivity in shaping the ways in which individuals address 
their ethical concerns. As Archer (2000, p. 298) explains, 
  Part of being concerned about our concerns is also internally to interrogate ourselves 
about whether we are doing them justice. This is not simply a matter of persons asking 
themselves, “if I am dedicated to x, them am I dedicated enough?” There is also a judicious 
question, partly an instrumental one, of how “I” should act so as best to promote my concerns to 
the best possible effect. This can be answered very differently, for the same kind of concern, by 
different people, precisely because they are unique persons. 
Darren’s approach to ethical consumption is yet another telling illustration of 
this argument. His moral food practices are also informed by the subjective idea of what 
being an ethical consumer entails, which for him is “eliminating the suffering, taking it 
out of your life, removing it”. Although Darren acknowledges that commitment to 
cruelty-free consumption requires addressing both human and animal suffering and is 
highly aware of such issues as child labour, abuse of workers’ rights, and exploitation of 
immigrants, his moral food project is centred on veganism and displays very limited 
practical involvement with fair trade, anti-corporate, or organic agenda. “You want to 
eliminate the suffering of those who are in the most pain, in the worst position”, 
explains Darren his specific focus on non-human animals thus adding another layer of 
personal judgements to his subjective idea about what it means to be an ethical 
consumer (eliminating the suffering); who is most vulnerable to suffering (animals), and 
how one could help to eliminate their pain (by going vegan). Likewise, David used to 
justify the habit of eating meat, which runs counter to the environmental values he 
strongly upholds, through subjectively constructed and endorsed ideas: “I just told 
myself that by buying local, organic, free-range meat - that is minimizing the impact, 
therefore I can continue as normal as long as I am paying the premium”. Interestingly, 
David is remarkably well aware of the ideational work he performed, its underlying 
goal and achieved effects: “I managed to wilfully convince myself that it was not a 
problem (...) because you can twist your morality quite easily like that”. Mary admits to 
the same conceptual trick of “twisting” the idea of what constitutes an ethical choice to 
make her eating habits feel and appear consistent with her environmental concerns: 
“I’ve convinced myself that free range lamb, for instance, wasn’t part of the problem”. 
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Mary’s life-long consumption of meat was rendered acceptable by her “intentional 
ignorance”, to use Solveig’s phrase, of the negative impact of animal farming to which 
she admits in hindsight: “I just missed it or did not want to see it, who knows”. These 
examples showcase how by developing their own subjective conceptions of ethical 
consumption individuals can justify the choices they make and practices they engage in 
– as well as those they avoid – and claim their desired moral identities without losing 
the sense of authentic self. These findings align with the conclusions drawn by Cherry 
(2006) in her study of self-defined vegans where she highlights how by constructing 
personal definitions of veganism individuals could claim and defend vegan identities 
without complying with strict dietary requirements. One of her participants, for example, 
acknowledged the inconsistency of his eating practice, which included milk, with the 
principles of a “true vegan” (Cherry, 2006, p. 161), yet defended his self-identification 
as a vegan person by declaring deep belief in preventing animal cruelty. Just as my 
interviewees, Cherry’s participant sought to explain away the apparent contradiction 
between the mainstream practice of veganism and his idiosyncratic enactment of it by 
grounding it in his personal ethical principles and beliefs.     
 The significance of this evidence extends beyond merely revealing the 
diversities and divergences in ethical consumer practices. The undeniably subjective 
nature of individuals’ understandings, interpretations, and enactments of ethical 
consumption undermines one of the key arguments of the proponents of practice-based 
perspective on the sources and determinants of consumer behaviour persisting in the 
view that “how we understand and actually use these things will be guided by the 
organisation of the practice rather than any personal decision about consuming” 
(Wheeler, 2012, p. 89). The idea that every practice tends to be enacted on socially 
recognized and approved terms fails to account for the variations in the performances of 
ethical consumption among the participants of my research. While social practice 
approach recognizes individuals as “active and creative, constantly reinterpreting social 
structures and norms within the changing contexts of their lives” (Hards, 2011, p. 25), 
to explain the differing interpretations and enactments of consumption practices by 
referring solely to the contextual nature of subjects’ actions is to acknowledge only one 
side of the story. As Cherrier (2007, p. 322) argues, 
The act of choosing among this wide constellation of possibilities calls for active 
participation in defining and selecting ethical products, ethical organizations, and, ultimately, 
ethical consumption patterns.  
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Thus, apart from objective structural conditions which, undoubtedly, shape the 
ways in which consumers act, these ways are also defined by individuals’ subjectivities 
and, more specifically, the specific concerns that their engagement in particular 
consumption modes is meant to address. In other words, people exercise creativity in 
relation to their performance of practices not only in response to changing structural 
conditions, but also in order to more comprehensively and effectively accommodate 
their subjective concerns, desires, and needs. The ethical consumers of my research 
provide demonstrable evidence that “many lifestyles and types of consumption can be 
ethically valid, depending on the values, concerns, knowledge, historical background, or 
social context” (Cherrier, 2007, p. 322). It is this pluralism of values, considerations, 
conditions, and concerns that leads to diverse ethical consumer behaviours which may 
either conform or run contrary to societal expectations and norms: 
By becoming active participants in the working of their ethical consumption lifestyles, 
consumers critically analyze their personal ethical concerns and self-concepts, which initiates 
customized perceptions and personalized practices of the ‘‘good life’’ and the common good 
(Cherrier, 2007, p. 322).  
This is precisely what the above examples from the participants’ food stories 
demonstrate – the discrepant and even contrasting performances of socially established 
consumption practices by reflexive, interpretative, and purposeful agents. The 
respondents’ deliberate departures from conventional enactment of vegetarianism and 
veganism occur not under pressure from social forces, but due to the actively and 
reflexively taken positions in relation to their subjective commitments and concerns. 
The subversion of societal expectations surrounding the practices is possible because 
human beings have the power to succumb to or evade social affectivity, i.e. feelings of 
emotional distress in response to societal judgments, by either embracing or staying 
dispassionate to particular social norms – an argument advanced by both Archer (2000) 
and Goffman (1959), contending that for public evaluations to have any affective 
impact on us, we first need to recognize relevant social norms and incorporate them into 
our personal belief system. Likewise, social conceptions of any given practice will 
circumscribe agential performances thereof only if the subject comes to acknowledge 
and prioritise its underlying values. As we have seen, commonly shared understandings 
of veganism guide Solveig’s foodways only to the extent that they do not transgress her 
ultimate concerns which demonstrates that “particular discourses limit and enable our 
thinking in specific ways, but they do not imprison our thinking altogether” (Sayer, 
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2011, p. 36).          
 In making this argument, I do not mean to wholly reject the assertion that 
“personal values are drawn from the ideas circulating within the environment, and are 
shaped by social context” (Hards, 2011, p. 31). The argument about “the situated nature 
of values and practices as enabled and constrained by the various landscapes in which 
individuals are embedded” (Hards, 2011, p. 39) is the one that my own research 
corroborates. However, it does not stretch as far as to warrant the claim that any agential 
practice is predefined by an unbending “set of ideas, including values (…) that enables 
and limits the thoughts and actions of those performing it” (Hards, 2011, p. 26) and that 
social discourses are the sole prime determinants of how and to what ends individuals 
engage in particular activities. To me, this view seems flawed in a serious way for it 
overlooks the fact that ethical consumers are “pluralistic, heterogeneous, and 
multiskilled ethical persons” (Cherrier, 2007, p. 322), and homogenises the varied 
understandings, meanings, reflections, and dispositions involved in individual projects 
of ethical consumption. To see values as an inherent constituent of practices implies that 
whoever engages in any given practice is always acting upon and expressing the values 
that are commonly associated with it. Yet, as Harrison, Newholm and Shaw (2005, p. 2) 
note, “ethical purchases may ... have political, religious, spiritual, environmental, social 
or other motives for choosing one product over another”. Indeed, different people may 
engage in the same practice for different reasons and with different purposes without 
being always concerned about or even aware of the values and norms that surround it. 
Jason, for instance, admits that he is motivated to buy organic products mostly because 
of their assumed health benefits and better quality, rather than as part of the pledge to 
avoid negative environmental impact, thus supporting the argument that “the wider 
social values of others mediate our own experiences, but they don’t fully determine 
them” (Sayer, 2011, p. 27, emphasis in original). Further, in claiming that when 
engaging in practices “people carry or express ideas that are circulating in their social 
environment”, Hards (2011, p. 26) seems to overlook an important nuance, i.e. that 
through performance of particular practices people may transmit ideas and values 
without necessarily expressing compliance with or commitment to them. To come back 
to the previously mentioned example, Jason’s purchase of organic foods may be 
conveying environmental values that are commonly associated with organic 
consumption to the people around him, and yet his shopping practice does not express 
environmental concerns in the sense of manifesting what is important to him, for it is 
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motivated by personal interest and therefore devoid of the value content. The notion of 
“governed” or “constructed” ethical consumers discussed in the literature review further 
substantiates the argument  - as many commentators (Wheeler, 2012; Barnett et al., 
2010; Jacobsen and Dulsrud, 2007; Trentmann, 2006) note, ethical consumption may 
simply be forced upon people by the organisation of the systems of collective provision, 
in which case it has little to do with an active choice based on conscious reasoning of an 
individual consumer. I refer to this perspective not in order to endorse the dismissal of 
consumers as agents of conscious choice or ethical purchases as an expression of 
individual commitment and beliefs, but to vindicate the distinction between engaging in 
a practice and expressing a genuine concern. Although buying an ethically labelled cup 
of coffee at a fair trade railway station is consistent with what society would broadly 
define as ethical shopping and, moreover, although such consumption act may well 
bring about intended benefits, it cannot be construed as a manifestation of moral agency 
or expression of beliefs on the part of the consuming agent, who simply had no choice 
but to choose fair trade. A truly meaningful act or practice of ethical consumption 
demands conscious subscription to the relevant moral cause, deliberate decision, and 
intentional action on the part of an active and reflexive individual.   
 Thus, while there is no objection to the claim that society is a significant source 
of personal values and beliefs and that the dominant social order has the power to affect 
or, in the words of Archer, “exercise causal efficacy” over individuals and their courses 
of action, the distinction between personal and social values is the one that can and 
should be made and maintained: “our values are not merely ventriloquized by social 
discourses, so that what we think is important or valuable is simply what is regarded as 
such in the wider society” (Sayer, 2011, p. 27). As Sayer (2011, p. 7) explains, 
The social structures and norms in which we live shape how we behave towards one 
another, and provide provisions from which we interact, strongly influencing what we can do 
and the kind of people we become, but they do not fully determine our actions. Social structures 
and rules themselves can institutionalise moral norms about entitlements, responsibilities, and 
appropriate behaviour; as such they can still be the object of ethical evaluation, whether in 
everyday life or academic commentaries; are they fair, empowering, democratic, oppressive, 
conducive to respectful treatment of others, friendliness or selfishness?  
 
In tune with this argument, my analysis of the participants’ self-accounts reveals 
that personal and social values are separate from – albeit in a continuous dialogue and 
interaction with – each other, as are our personal and social identities. Individuals have 
the power to transform the social into the personal by rejecting some norms and 
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subscribing to others – those that they embrace as guides to a morally satisfying, from 
their subjective perspective, way of life. Agential performances of any given social 
practice cannot be universally homogenous precisely because they are informed not 
merely by socially developed and shared ideas, but also by what individuals themselves 
deem important and wish to achieve.       
 The vocabularies of motives, along with the strategies of identity disavowal, 
subjective moral framing, and compensatory reasoning, represent conceptual techniques 
through which the ethical consumers of my research negotiate the discontinuities and 
inconsistencies in their eating practices and thereby vindicate their moral selves. 
Following Greenebaum, I use the umbrella term of “accommodation strategies” to refer 
to these various mechanisms through which the subjects “negotiated the consumption of 
products that contrasted with their own philosophies, ethics and politics” (2012, p. 132). 
Such accommodation strategies themselves can be construed as part of the broader 
psychological notion of coping strategies - “constantly changing cognitive and 
behavioral efforts to manage tensions that are outcome of specific external and/or 
internal demands”, as used by Janda and Trocchia  (2001, p. 1216) in their study of 
vegetarians. At the same time, there are crucial differences between the techniques that I 
have described and exemplified. When resorting to the vocabularies of motives, identity 
disavowal, or compensatory reasoning, people acknowledge the contradiction between 
their beliefs and behaviours which they seek to justify by appealing to society’s 
normative discourses, renouncing compromised identities, or shifting the focus to their 
better acts and deeds. Consider, for example, how Maggi admits to the inconsistency 
between her values and practices: “I should follow my values more and I should buy 
organic”, and how she immediately justifies it by invoking the prohibitive costs of 
organic goods: “but then it is like, this is a ridiculous price, it is so expensive, so I 
don’t”. In case of subjective ethical framing, however, individuals modify the definition 
of the situation or practice so that to eliminate the very contradiction itself and achieve a 
conceptual alignment between their actions and personal value systems and thus defend 
the integrity of their moral selves. In this scenario, people’s subjective moral standards 
and beliefs regarding ethical consumption rather than socially dominant ideas around it 
serve as the basis for the justification of conduct, as Lucy’s approach to her food project 
reveals: “Just that I thought through it carefully and it fits with my conscience”.  
 It is for this reason that, while I find that Mills’ concept of the vocabularies of 
motives offers a valuable theoretical prism for understanding the ways in which subjects 
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negotiate their ethical food compromises, I find problematic his assumption that social 
discourses define and govern individual performance of practices. Building upon the 
evidence from my research and elaborating upon the previously made argument about 
the direct relationship between ethical practices and consumers’ self-image, I contend 
that the fear of social judgments is not the sole and arguably not even the primary 
motive behind subjects’ efforts to defend their moral selves. As Campbell (2006, p. 222) 
insightfully notes, “individuals have as much need to convince themselves as any 
observers who may query their conduct”. This point is illustrated by Joe, with whom we 
had an extensive discussion about his food temptations and continuous efforts to live up 
to the image of a strict vegan. In response to my question as to what prevents him from 
having an occasional treat in the privacy of his home where no one could know it, he 
says:  “oh, but I would know, and that would bug me. (…) I would not want to be that 
type of person, I would not want to be hypocritical in that way”. This feeds directly into 
my earlier argument that subjects’ relentless efforts to succeed in the fulfilment of their 
ethical projects are driven by a pursuit of an authentic identity – the internal state of 
consistency with their subjective idea of how it is right to be and act as particular 
persons they are. It is this critical finding that allows me to dispute Mills’ view that 
social recognition is the sole end and purpose of agential attempts to solicit moral 
legitimacy to their behavior. It enables me to vindicate subjective moral judgments as 
major determinants of human practices and corroborate the view that “morality is not 
determined by social structures, being grounded in good reasons and the human 
capability of ethical self-reflection” (Grauel, 2014, p. 5). While the links between 
ethical dispositions that people come to develop and moral discourses circulating within 
their socio-cultural environments cannot be negated, I contest Mills’ argument about the 
dominant role of societal structures in individuals’ moral reasoning. The extensive 
empirical evidence I have provided in this chapter allows me to balance his 
emphatically social perspective on human motives by stressing their other essential 
dimension – the personal – and showcase how both subjective morality and social 
normativity can inform individuals’ defense of their inner moral commitments. Thus, 
negotiation of discontinuities and inconsistencies in agential moral food projects 
represents one domain of ethical consumption where the interplay between agential 
subjectivity and structural objectivity is clearly manifest.     
 So far, I have evidenced the participants’ endeavours to ensure the stability and 
consistency of their practices of ethical eating by actively and creatively negotiating 
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their subjective states and objective circumstances. I have argued that the relentless 
fight for the successful implementation of moral food projects is driven by human 
longing for a sense of continuous identity, personal integrity, and self-worth. What begs 
further explanation, however, is what enables agents to ceaselessly monitor their 
commitments in relation to their evolving concerns, shifting priorities, and changing 
circumstances; what empowers them to actively negotiate the costs of advancing their 
moral projects; and what fuels their capacity to creatively respond to the conflicts and 
dilemmas that arise between their ultimate commitments and meandering course of life. 
The answer to these all-important questions is found in the participants’ accounts of the 
inner work – the logical and emotional reasoning - behind the development of their 
ethical food practices.  Consider, for example, how back in time Lucy ruled out 
veganism as a possible course of action: “then it was really difficult and most of the 
stuff was really unpleasant, you know, and I just thought – no, it’s just too hard line”. 
As the quote reveals, her decision to put the project of veganism aside was based on the 
conclusion about its practical difficulty at which she arrived having assessed the 
potential commitment in light of all relevant circumstances. This seems to be a direct 
reference to the idea of reflexive conversation, whose purpose is to review our current 
and prospective commitments and evaluate their worth and accompanying costs against 
our subjective conditions and objective contexts (Archer, 2007). Other participants too 
engaged in such inner work. For instance, Lila rejected commitment to local 
consumption having evaluated its toll on the family diet in their current living 
conditions: “in England it just means that in some season you just eat kale all the time, 
and I am not willing to go there”. Solveig arrived at the decision to go vegan through an 
internal self-dialogue in which she reflexively reviewed and assessed her involuntary 
experience of vegan eating during student protests. Appreciation of the ease of 
sustaining a vegan diet contributed towards Solveig’s decision to turn veganism into her 
ultimate moral commitment: 
We ended up doing only vegan food and I felt that I didn’t really miss anything 
(…) because I did not miss anything - I started thinking about whether or not I need to 
eat cheese and eggs and stuff.       
   
Maggi too engaged in reflexive deliberations when devising her ethical food 
project. Not only did she have to evaluate prospective consumption practices in terms of 
their moral appeal and emotional import: “I really don’t want to buy things that aren’t 
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organic”, but she also had to assess the concomitant costs of such a commitment: “I’d 
be spending a ridiculous amount of money”, consider it in light of competing concerns, 
and decide upon her ultimate priorities: “it’s that conflict with how much money I am 
prepared to spend on food”. Darren went through the same reflexive process of 
balancing his desires and needs against his moral concerns: “you have to ask yourself 
how important it is, those foods - those eggs and that milk - how essential it is for health, 
can we live without it?”. Such reflexive deliberations form an integral part of the inner 
life of a morally concerned consumer for, as Archer (2000, p. 242) explains, the 
concerns we embrace as ultimate and come to identify with serve as a lens through 
which we evaluate all our subsequent relationships with reality: "our commitments 
represent a new sounding board for the emotions". Once set out on a particular moral 
course, “we are no longer capable of the simplicity of purely first-order response: 
reactions to relevant events are emotionally transmuted by our ultimate concerns” 
(Archer, 2000, p. 242). The ethical consumers of my research offer persuasive 
illustrations of this argument. Lucy has repeatedly ignored the emotional import of 
increasingly pressing concerns over health in order to preserve her commitment to a 
vegetarian diet. Lila went through a similar experience of actively subduing her 
immediate bodily demands to her ultimate moral concerns:  
I was really starving, it was late at night and we couldn’t find anywhere to eat 
and the only open option was basically McDonalds (…) and I said - no way, I am not 
buying anything from this place (…) I better be hungry…    
  
The ways in which Lucy and Lila consciously and actively overrode the 
emotional import of their immediate needs in order to promote their moral 
commitments are examples of agential ability to elaborate their emotionality beyond 
primitive responses and re-evaluate problematic situations in light of their ultimate 
concerns. They testify to the key role of reflexivity in individuals’ development as 
ethical consumers for, as Archer argues, it is our reflexive capacities that fuel “our 
ability to reflect upon our emotionality itself, to transform it and consequently to reorder 
priorities within our emotional sets” (Archer, 2000, p. 222).   
 Setting priorities and devising a hierarchy of concerns is not, however, a one-off 
challenge – it is a fragile equilibrium that needs to be continually reviewed in light of 
our constantly changing subjective conditions and objective circumstances. Accordingly, 
our reflexive conversation becomes “a ceaseless discussion about the satisfaction of our 
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ultimate concerns and a monitoring of the self and its commitments in relation to the 
commentaries received” (Archer, 2000, p. 195). During such inner dialogues, 
What the subject is doing is conducting an endless assessment of whether what it once 
devoted itself to as its ultimate concern(s) is still worthy of this devotion, and whether the price 
which was once paid for subordinating and accommodating other concerns is still one with 
which the subject can live (Archer, 2000, p. 297).     
  
That subjects repeatedly engage in such reflexive work is clearly evident in the 
fact that their moral food projects incessantly change. Thus, Lucy becomes increasingly 
more flexible about her ethical food practices which suggests that an “endless 
assessment” and, subsequently, re-ordering of her subjective priorities is indeed taking 
place. In light of Archer’s point, her recent decision to start eating fish makes perfect 
sense: 
I am not as stubborn as I used to be, I used to be really really really stubborn 
and, you know, I made myself ill many times by sticking strictly to a veggie diet. I am 
not as pig-headed as that any more. (…) I am older, I don’t want to be ill, life is short, 
you know.          
  
Lucy’s admitted preparedness to compromise on her moral principles to the 
extent that she wouldn’t previously consider indicates that she continuously reviews and 
re-designs her hierarchy of priorities as other concerns become more pressing and their 
intensified emotional import calls for a restacking of the old balance. It is through such 
evaluative process that Lucy has finally come to tilt the balance of concerns in favour of 
her physical health, having realised that the price which she used to pay for repeatedly 
promoting her ethical food commitments over her bodily needs is no longer the one 
with which she feels she can live. Likewise, Maggi called off her project of organic 
consumption having realised that it comes at too high a cost: “I thought I’d try buying 
organic apples and I did for a few months, but they are twice as expensive”. On the 
other hand, a repeated review of subjective concerns enabled Maggi to advance her 
moral undertaking – once her grown-up children left home and their nutrition ceased to 
be Maggi’s responsibility, she could fully commit to a vegan diet thereby promoting 
ethical consumption to the very top of her subjective hierarchy of concerns. Let us hear 
her explain this shift in priorities: 
As I get older that becomes more of a focus for me about what’s important to me, 
about who I am (...) I think because your focus changes, I think because when you are 
caught up with work and are focused on children and making sure that they are kind of 
healthy and that is the main concern, and rushing around and trying to do everything... 
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and I suppose now that, you know, it’s just me now at home - cause I am not working – 
and it’s like I’ve got more freedom and space to kind of - not to explore - but to focus on 
the things that are important for me.  
 
That Maggi’s balance of priorities is continuously changing and that at different 
stages in life her ethical food project occupied different positions in her subjective 
hierarchy of responsibilities depending on which concerns commanded supremacy over 
her actions suggests that a reflexive “monitoring of the self and its commitments” 
(Archer, 2000, p. 195) has been and is still taking place, its most recent achievement 
being Maggi’s increased focus on living out her true self and paying heed to her most 
important concerns.        
 Overall, the above examples demonstrate that a reflexive audit of concerns 
against changing subjective conditions and objective contexts and concomitant 
adjustment of moral commitments is an essential part of ethical consumers’ experiences. 
This evidence is key for defending the view of ethical consumption as a continuous 
reflexive process that this thesis develops and that has been problematized in the 
literature. Thompson and Coskuner-Balli (2007, p. 150), for example, maintain that a 
bulk of ethical consumer choices, far from being an outcome of reflexive deliberations, 
result from consumers’ use of heuristics such as opting for ethical brands and labels 
which provide mental shortcuts to better purchase decisions. The “ideological allure of 
simple choices”, authors argue, steers consumers away from reflexive approach to 
navigating the complexity of ethical consumption and make them rely on the 
simplifying search strategies to achieve the feelings of “confidence in outcomes, direct 
participatory involvement, and personal engagement” (Thompson and Coskuner-Balli, 
2007, p. 150). Adams and Raisborough’s (2010, p. 265) assessment of the moral 
discourse around fair trade echoes the argument: “the common cultural equation of 
Fairtrade with ‘doing good’ might suspend the requirement for reflexive effort 
otherwise involved in negotiating through the complex demands noted above”. Drawing 
on the evidence supplied by the ethical consumers of my research, I want to respond to 
this scepticism and reinstate the continuous nature of reflexive work involved in 
consumption practices of morally concerned individuals. The indispensability of human 
reflexivity for successful implementation of ethical food projects arises out of the open 
and mutable nature of external reality in which human practices are embedded and 
which demands the practitioners to exhibit “the powers of ongoing reflexive monitoring 
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of both self and society” (Archer, 2000, p. 295). The ethical consumers of my research 
demonstrate the ability to meet these demands. Mary offers a telling illustration of the 
ways in which constantly changing properties of objective reality induce consumer 
reflexivity: 
I have noticed that (...) there is much more of world food cooking going (...) and 
I started to think - well, my diet shifted that way and I am eating a lot more (...) 
imported foods and not as much basic English food (…) and I am thinking - this is going 
to be affecting world food trade, and people in developing countries, and food growth 
patterns, and climate change, and all sorts of things, I am thinking – I might have a look 
at that in my own diet, think about that a bit. 
 
Mary’s deliberations showcase her deeply reflexive approach to the fulfilment of 
ethical food commitments. They illustrate the potential of consumer reflexivity to 
extend beyond the immediate temporal and spatial contexts of individuals’ existence 
and incorporate distant places and people into the sphere of reflexive awareness of an 
ethically concerned subject, epitomising Coff’s idea of long-range ethics and 
exemplifying the rise of the “global imaginary”, i.e. the sense of belonging to a global 
community (Steger, 2008), or ‘political ecological imaginary”, to use Goodman’s (2004) 
more specific term. Further, not only does Mary stay alert to the ways in which 
changing economic and socio-cultural landscapes affect her diet, but she also engages in 
a repeated re-assessment of the ethical consequences of her consumption choices and 
continuous review of the consistency between her concerns and her actual food 
practices. This shows compellingly that “the internal conversation is never suspended, it 
rarely sleeps, and what it is doing throughout the endless contingent circumstances it 
encounters is continuously monitoring its concerns” (Archer, 2000, p. 297). In ethical 
consumption, this task is complicated by the lack of clear, consistent, reliable, and 
easily accessible information needed to support consumers in navigating the ethical 
shopping landscape. Cherrier (2007, p. 321) highlights the overwhelming abundance of 
“conflicting and nonlinear ethical opinions about what to purchase (or not purchase)” 
which fragments the ethical consumption landscape and complicates the task of “doing 
the right thing”. Her argument resonates with the participants of my research who 
directly face the predicament: “information in order to make that decision is not widely 
available and quite often it is so complex, and so arbitrary and so changing”, 
complains David; “there is so much conflicting advice and information out there, let 
alone the whole marketing industry and stuff which is misleading or confusing or 
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contradictory”; Mary echoes him, “sometimes you just don’t know and then you realize 
that this company you trusted is not really trustworthy”; Lila joins them. However, 
although at times disoriented by the complexity of ethical goods market, the ethical 
consumers of my research, contrary to what Cherrier (2007, p. 323) goes on to suggest, 
are not paralysed by the “moral fatigue”, nor do they lack tenacity to follow through on 
their commitments by reflexively revising their food practices. Consider, for example, 
how Lila continuously reviews her consumption habits as new products and information 
about them becomes available:  
For about a decade I refused to have processed food in my house and then I 
read something about super-ethical company that is the most ethical company in 
Europe (…) and I looked at the ingredients and it looked fine, and I thought - you know 
what, my kids are going to be delighted with this processed soya sausages… 
 
This evidence offers support to Adams and Raisborough’s (2010, p. 271) 
conclusion that  
(…) ‘unevenness’ and ‘doubt’ are not always unwelcome accompaniments to 
commitment that threaten to potentially hijack or soften it. Instead, we get the view here that 
unevenness is a necessary constituent to the ways that commitment materializes through 
dynamic epistemologies (knowledge of supermarket practices for example) that differently 
assert the realities of global business and also, of any moderating ‘good’ action.  
Likewise, my analysis of the participants’ experiences indicates that in an 
environment where knowledge about products’ attributes and impacts emerges, 
develops, and changes every day, ethical consumers are not only required to consciously 
seek out, actively learn, and reflexively evaluate information to make appropriate 
consumption choices, but have the capacity and demonstrate the ability to do so. 
 The reflexive capacity of human beings to progressively evaluate their 
performance in relation to their ultimate commitments is absolutely vital for ethical 
consumption because, as a moral project, it is not liable to normative routinisation: 
“since the aim is to determine upon the course of the right action, then “good” is always 
the enemy of “best” (Archer, 2007, p. 301). My participants’ sentiments align with this 
point, as Maggi’s remark demonstrates: “I think it is probably an on-going kind of 
struggle (…) struggle of what’s best, you know”. The task is further complicated by the 
indeterminacy of consumption ethics the roots of which Cherrier locates in the 
postmodern moral climate, characterised by contingency and non-foundationalism: “in a 
constantly changing and unpredictable world, postmodern ethics, rather than being fixed 
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and predetermined, become plural and nonlinear (2007, p. 321). Indeed, ethical 
consumer choices carry a variety of moral meanings, values, and stances on a wide 
range of issues, such as animal welfare, human rights, environmental sustainability, etc. 
For example, endorsement of fair-trade may convey a strong sense of justice and 
equality, preference for organic goods points to environmental awareness, while 
commitment to a meat-free diet is a sign of compassion and respect for non-human life. 
Consequently, ethical consumers often find themselves faced with “a complex 
overlaying of competing ethical demands” (Adams and Raisborough, 2010, p. 264), as 
Joe’s confession reveals: “I am riddled with areas of conflicts and what is the right 
thing to do”. The statement rings true for other participants too: Maggi is torn between 
her commitment to ethical shopping and a desire to avoid materialistic lifestyle and live 
an existence that is not dependent on money: “maybe I need to examine my own motives 
as well and be prepared to spend more money”; Joe is trying to solve the dilemma as to 
how it is best to use his consumer spending power: “am I letting down the local 
business or am I exploiting foreign farmers through using the local business? – oh, it’s 
very hard to have all the right answers”; as is Lila: “you have to kind of balance – 
support a chain and get your fair trade bananas or do you want to just support your 
local shops and get those other bananas which may not be fair?”. In line with the 
conclusions drawn by Adams and Raisborough (2010) in a study of ethical dispositions 
of mainstream shoppers, these comments highlight the complexity of consumers’ 
motivations and their understanding of their own ethical practices as “far from idealized, 
but hedged by the hard ‘realities’ of global capitalism” (p. 266). They also offer support 
to the assertion that value-oriented reflexivity is a continuous and iterative process. 
They reveal that living an ethical food project informed by moral concerns that are often 
in competition or even at war with each other is a difficult moral conundrum, and that 
every shopping trip therefore creates the need for a reflexive review of individuals’ 
priorities. These findings also resonate with Adams and Raisborough’s (2010) 
participants who expressed concerns about the need to “question your every action” (p. 
264) while highlighting the importance of being “ethically effective by thinking of the 
bigger picture at all times” (p. 262, my emphasis). Such “pervasive reflexivity”, as 
Adams and Raisborough define it, permeates the practices of my research participants: 
“if you really want to become an ethical consumer you look at all aspects of your 
consumption”, claims Joe; “ethical consumerism is not the action of just eating, it is the 
whole life attitude”, supports the point Jason.  
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It is precisely because as a moral project ethical consumption does not “lend 
itself to the termination of one’s mental review of moral considerations” (Archer, 2007, 
p. 301) that it requires a continuous exercise of human capacity for reflexive 
deliberations – an argument that is in tune with the participants’ perceptions of their 
quest for a perfect way to consume as a life-long, perhaps impossible, challenge: 
“maybe I never will get round to finding out the most environmentally friendly way of 
doing everything”, accepts David; “you have to accept that you can’t be ethical on all 
fronts”, echoes him Lila. Moreover, ethical food projects need to be continuously 
revised not only against changing objective conditions and information contexts, but 
also in light of the subjects’ continually evolving knowledge and understanding of the 
self. As Gabriel and Lang (2006, p. 86) remind us, identities are not fixed but constantly 
changing entities: 
Identity, then, can be seen as a story which a person writes and rewrites about him- or 
herself, never reaching the end until he/she dies (…). In this sense, it is both reflexive and 
incomplete. Identity and identity-seeking are (…) essentially the same thing.  
 
Because moral food commitments are extensions and expressions of individuals’ 
identities and because “the narrative of self-identity has to be shaped, altered and 
reflexively sustained in relation to rapidly changing circumstances of social life, on a 
local and global scale” (Giddens, 1991, p. 215), ethical consumption is bound to be a 
reflexive, constantly developing, and continuously changing agential enterprise. As 
Lawler argues, “the achievement of identity is creative work and if we are plagued by a 
sense of not quite getting it right, that is because it is a project that can never once and 
for all be got right” (2008, p. 145). This sentiment is close to the hearts of the 
participants of my research - that ethical commitments are subject to review and open to 
change is acknowledged by Mary: “I don’t think I will ever go fully vegetarian but I 
might well change my mind cause I have changed before”; explained by Lila: “because 
the situation changes as well and I learn more things all the time”, and finely summed 
up by David: “the idea of what you think is right to be - it is constantly moving, 
constantly changing layer upon layer upon layer”. These responses echo the findings of 
other cognate studies, such as Adams and Raisborough’s nuanced analysis of fair trade 
consumption highlighting how consumers’ ethical activity is “increasingly complicated 
over the years and requires a constant review and reappraisal of (…) attitudes and 
values” (2010, p. 262). This makes reflexivity indispensable to the project of ethical 
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consumption, for it is the reflexive capacities that enable individuals’ to not only devise, 
but also revise their ethical food commitments in light of their constantly developing 
understanding of themselves, the subjective circumstances in which they happen to be at 
different points in life, and the objective conditions in which their projects unfold. 
 Thus, as long as a perfectly ethical way to consume remains a moving target and 
as far as being an ideal ethical consumer is a work in progress and never an 
accomplished mission, the need for reflexivity in agential moral food pursuits cannot be 
dispensed with. It is for this reason that social practice theories, which approach 
consumer practices as predominantly “a routinized type of behaviour” (Reckwitz, 2002, 
p. 249), cannot provide an adequate framework for exploring ethical consumption as a 
highly reflexive consumer engagement. It is not that ethical consumer choices are 
completely immune to routinisation, but that such routines, even if allowed to form, are 
constantly challenged and disturbed by ongoing changes in subjective conditions and 
objective circumstances to which the inherently reflexive mind of an ethically 
concerned consumer always stays alert. What is also important to stress is that 
automatisation to which individuals’ moral food practices may succumb (until, of 
course, something prompts a re-opening of reflexive deliberations about their feasibility, 
suitability, and worth) does not work to disrupt the links between ethical consumer 
practices and identities defended in this thesis. Standardisation of decision-making 
process does not render ethical food choices meaningless or void of the affective charge, 
subjective values, and identity investments for, as Sayer (2011, p. 26-27) contends,  
General evaluative stances towards familiar things may become habitual, but they are 
habits of thinking to which we become committed or emotionally attached. They inform not 
only how we evaluate others but how we evaluate ourselves, and they influence how we act, 
albeit often imperfectly. They therefore become part of our character. 
 Archer (2000, p. 303) echoes the point: 
(…) we all develop routines for meeting what we have adopted as our routine concerns. 
Yet in this very routinisation lies our distinctive personification of our roles; recognisable to self 
and to others and expressive of our continuing commitment.    
  
Yet, what also needs to be acknowledged is that while my account of consumer 
reflexivity suggests deliberate agential engagement with the relationships between their 
identities, concerns, and practices on the one hand and the objective world on the other, 
and while the subjects of my research demonstrate ample capacity for such engagement, 
I do not intend to portray ethical consumers as all-knowing social actors who always 
 
167 
and everywhere make conscious, well-planned, and evaluated decisions about food. My 
participants admit to the limits of their mindfulness with regard to consumption: “I 
forget that I am supposed to like this and not that”, comments David on the mental 
strain of constant monitoring of his choices against his self-concept; “it is just neglect”, 
points out Lila what can be best described as “the inertia of ordinary consumption” 
(Jacobsen and Dulsrud’s, 2007, p. 469) which prevents her from finding a new 
vegetable box scheme to join; “if I was really really committed, I’d spend a lot more 
time thinking it through and shopping carefully”, confesses Lucy to the lack of 
reflexive effort in her approach to consumption. These examples demonstrate that a 
proportion of ethical consumer practices inevitably stays “outside the area of reflective 
action” (Jacobsen and Dulsrud, 2007, p. 477) and that mindful consumption is not “a 
full time preoccupation” (Jacobsen and Dulsrud, 2007, p. 477) even for the most deeply 
concerned and committed individuals. In light of this, the notion of “particular and 
partial reflexivity”, which Adams and Raisborough (2008) propose as a better 
theoretical construct on which to hang ethical consumption, seems appealing. Thus, just 
as in the preceding chapter my pronounced emphasis on a key role of agential 
subjectivity in shaping ethical consumer practices was accompanied by an 
acknowledgment of the inevitable embeddedness of individual agency in objective 
reality, so should the celebration of human reflexivity also leave room for habitual 
practices, spontaneous choices, inconsistent preferences, mindless and at times 
unpredictable decisions in consumer behaviour.      
 In this chapter I have argued that achieving the identity of an ethical consumer 
by embracing particular moral concerns and developing appropriate dietary projects is 
not a conclusive achievement, but the one that needs to be continuously reaffirmed, 
monitored, and sustained. I have corroborated this argument by demonstrating the 
embeddedness of ethical consumption in the natural, practical, and social realms of the 
world as well as its positioning vis-à-vis individuals’ subjective concerns that emerge, 
evolve, intensify, and fade as they go through different stages and experiences in life. 
Having demonstrated the contingency of ethical food practices on the constantly 
shifting objective contexts and subjective circumstances, I proceeded to show how 
ethical consumers continuously negotiate their relationships with the three orders of 
reality in order to successfully fulfil their dietary commitments. By drawing on the 
participants’ experiences, I have provided revealing illustrations of how ethical 
consumers maintain their moral food projects by continually prioritising consumption 
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ethics over their other concerns, as well as how they backtrack on ethical food 
commitments when confronted with the pressing realities of life.  
 Having shown that agential practices of ethical consumption are charged with 
moral dilemmas and riddled with compromises arising out of the inescapable tensions 
between individuals’ competing concerns, I went on to analyse their import in relation 
to subjects’ identities. By delving into my participants’ confessions, I have uncovered 
the profound effects that discontinuities and inconsistencies in individuals’ moral food 
practices produce on their sense of integrity, personal continuity, and self-worth. This 
empirical evidence, interpreted through the lens of Archer’s argument that people 
sustain desired identities by actively and repeatedly promoting their ultimate concerns 
and advancing their moral commitments, allowed me to construe the respondents’ 
relentless struggles for the stability and consistency of their dietary projects as a pursuit 
of an authentic self. In light of this evidence of a direct association between subjects’ 
self-view and the success of their ethical food practices, I went on to investigate the 
ways in which ethical consumers negotiate the contradictions between their assumed 
moral identities and their actual food practices. An analysis of the participants’ 
explanations behind the inevitable shortcomings of their food projects enabled me to 
identify and describe a set of strategies through which the ethical consumers of my 
research mitigated the identity implications of their occasional and long-established 
dietary compromises. To construct this account, I relied on Mills’ concept of the 
vocabularies of motive, yet have been able to show that appeals to social normativity 
represent but one of a range of accommodation strategies that subjects deploy to feel 
and appear continuously consistent in the fulfilment of their moral food commitments, 
and that there are forces and drives that do not belong in the social realm, but are 
innately a part of human nature which can foster moral self-defense.  
 Finally, I have argued for the key role of human reflexivity in enabling 
individuals to sustain their ethical food commitments and through them – their desired 
moral identities. By analysing the participants’ subjective relationships with the natural, 
practical, and social orders of the world I have demonstrated how reflexivity enables 
agents to progressively monitor their moral food projects against ever-changing 
subjective circumstances and objective conditions, reassess their ultimate concerns and 
ways to address them in light of the constantly expanding knowledge of the outer world 
and their inner selves, and actively negotiate the enablements and constraints emerging 
on their moral pathways. By evincing the subjects’ ability to successfully maintain their 
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ultimate commitments and propel their moral food projects through evolving personal 
life and shifting objective contexts, I have demonstrated that the causal powers of 
external reality do not operate unmediated and unconstrained, and that agential 
responses to the given conditions and circumstances play a key role in the development 
of individuals’ ethical projects and moral selves. I have thus not only underscored the 
embeddedness of humans and their practices in the external world, but also 
demonstrated “how involuntary placement in the three different orders [of reality] 
intertwines with the voluntary human response” (Archer, 2000, p. 249). In showing that 
“ethical consumption practices are neither a response to rigid and authoritarian rules 
imposed on persons nor a pure product of voluntary and rational consumers” (Cherrier, 
2007, p. 331), I have contributed towards my key research goal, i.e. to evidence the key 
role of both structural objectivity (the enabling and constraining properties of objective 
reality) as well as agential subjectivity (human capacity for reflexivity, creativity, and 























Identity is a relation which embraces both our ability to recognize ourselves 
and the possibility of being recognized by others (Melucci, 1996, p. 30). 
 
In the previous chapter, I have construed ethical consumption as an identity-
defining moral commitment that requires active and continuous maintenance by 
reflexive and intentional agents and whose stability is contingent on subjects’ 
interactions with the natural, practical, and social orders of the world. My account of the 
participants’ on-going struggles for the solidity and consistency of their dietary 
practices highlighted the importance that self-perceived ethical consumers attach to the 
successful implementation of their moral initiatives, enabling me to advance the 
argument that the ability to carry ethical food projects through is as key to individuals’ 
identities as ethical consumers as making the commitment itself. I have provided 
multiple examples from the participants’ accounts to demonstrate how ethical 
consumers continuously negotiate their relationships with the natural, practical, and 
social realms in order to defend their ability to sustain their moral food commitments 
against changing objective and subjective conditions. Out of these three orders of reality 
in which individuals are placed and which provide contextual backgrounds for their 
ethical food projects, the social order is of particular relevance for this thesis given the 
sociological nature of the study and its concern with consumer identities. As the 
preceding chapter has begun to show, ethical consumption as an agential project 
involves not only individuals’ relationships with the practical and natural orders 
(through food provisioning and consumption), but also places particular requirements 
and demands on their social lives. While up until now my analysis has been concerned 
with the process of achieving and sustaining the identity of an ethical consumer and the 
generative forces behind it, it is now time to shed light on individuals’ experiences of 
taking this identity into the social world and living it out in public.  The key aim of this 
chapter is to reveal and explain the underlying mechanism that accounts for the 
emergence of the social identity of an ethical consumer, that is as a public persona of a 
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subject with particular moral concerns and consumption commitments. To this end, I 
will bring into focus the lives of ethical consumers as social beings and examine the 
interplay between individuals’ moral food projects and responsibilities, desires, and 
needs arising from their inevitable position as functioning members of society and 
carriers of particular social roles. I will ground the discussion in two participant cases - 
those of Lucy and Solveig – and, by analysing how and with what results these two self-
perceived ethical consumers negotiate their competing moral and social concerns, 
determine the place of the ethical consumer identity among the different facets of their 
social selves. By comparing and contrasting Lucy’s and Solveig’s experiences, I will 
show that the character of an ethical consumer can be either allowed to represent the 
subject’s social identity - how she act towards other people and how other people 
perceive her - or subdued to some other social image – that which lies closer to her 
ultimate concerns. I will use this evidence to advance the argument that individuals’ 
ultimate concerns determine what societal roles they take up or discard, foreground or 
restrain at different points in life (Archer, 2007), thus revealing crucial links between 
people’s personal and social identities. I will achieve the above goals by intertwining 
Archer’s theoretical account of the process of co-emergence and co-development of 
personal and social identities with my analysis of Lucy’s and Solveig’s experiences of 
trying to live out their ethical selves in the specific social environments which provided 
meaningful backgrounds for the fulfilment of their ethical food projects. The purpose of 
this, consistent with the approach taken throughout the thesis, is to bring the abstract 
into the relationship with the concrete (Sayer, 2010) and in so doing uncover and 
explicate the mechanisms behind the emergence and development of ethical consumer 
identities. By explaining how people’s personal identities “spill over onto how we are 
towards other people and things and how other people find us” (Archer, 2000, p. 298), 
Archer’s theory, applied to the concrete experiences of two distinct individuals, will 
enable me to yield an understanding of how as well as under which necessary and 
sufficient conditions the identity of an ethical consumer rises from the deepest layers of 
one’s inner self to become his leading social part.     
 Before we can get immersed into Lucy’s and Solveig’s stories and by examining 
their comportment as morally committed individuals and as bearers of various social 
roles determine the place that the identity of an ethical consumer has been assigned in 
their social lives, it is essential to clarify the conceptual distinction between personal 
and social identities. Following Archer (2007), I construe social identity as individuals’ 
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unique personification of their chosen roles in society. From this perspective, personal 
identity, which arises out of human relationships with the natural, practical, and social 
orders of reality, encompasses social identity, which pertains exclusively to the 
discursive realm. Moreover, personal identity represents the source of “human qualities 
of reflexivity and creativity” (Archer, 2000, p. 288) essential for shaping agential 
performances of social roles in an idiosyncratic way: “what we need is personal identity 
in order for any individual to be able to personify a role, rather than simply animating it” 
(Archer, 2000, p. 288). The performance is distinctive precisely because it is produced 
by the unique character that the individual has attained and brought to bear upon the 
process of realisation of his concerns. At the same time, the development of personal 
identity is itself dependent on an individual’s possession of social identity, for it is the 
latter that determines our social commitments and their relative position on the 
hierarchy of concerns defining our unique personalities. The relationship between 
personal and social identities, Archer (2000, p. 288) specifies, is inherently dialectical, 
meaning that “both personal and social identities are emergent and distinct, although 
they contributed to one another’s emergence and distinctiveness”. Within these 
dialectics, Archer discerns three key points of interaction between personal and social 
identities through which individuals attain the final synthesis between the two and 
thereby develop an overall personality, defined by a unique constellation of their natural, 
practical, and social concerns. At the first point of interplay, subjects’ nascent personal 
identity overpowers their preliminary social identity prompting them to draw on their 
limited experiences in the different contexts of objective reality to explore both their 
involuntary roles (e.g. those into which they have been born or placed) as well as those 
that are open for choice. Through trying and testing different roles, people draw “a 
best–guess sketch of a potential future life” (Archer, 2000, p. 290) thus getting a step 
closer to the social identity that they feel they want and can appropriate. As Archer 
contends, this is the moment where “the nascent personal identity [brings] something to 
the task of role selection. Otherwise we would be dealing with an entirely passive 
procedure of role assignment through socialisation” (2000, p. 290). This theoretical 
argument provides a useful lens through which to interpret and comprehend Lucy’s and 
Solveig’s initial attempts at cruelty-free consumption. The social identity of a 
vegetarian which they first tried on as young individuals was informed by their nascent 
personal identities defined by an evolving concern over animal welfare and life. It is this 
incipient personal identities that prompted Lucy and Solveig to push the boundaries of 
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the “passive procedure of role assignment through socialisation” (Archer, 2000, p. 290) 
and commit to what was regarded as a radically alternative diet in a traditionally meat-
eating familial and socio-cultural contexts. The particular mechanism through which the 
subjects developed their distinctive moral concerns and the essential human properties 
that ignited and propelled this intricate inner process have been discussed at length 
previously in the thesis. Our attention thus turns to the second point of interplay 
between one’s personal and social self which is when the social roles that the agent tries 
on under the impetus of his evolving personal identity start to provide experiential 
information about their material and symbolic benefits and costs. In light of this 
knowledge, subjects evaluate whether investing themselves in this particular social role 
and assuming this particular social identity is an appealing, worthwhile, and feasible 
undertaking:  
The internal conversation has begun a dialogue about the kind of person an individual 
believes they want to be: that it will undergo revision in the light of further experience is 
precisely what makes this a dialectic process (Archer, 2000, p. 290).   
 
During such reflexive self-dialogues individuals undergo significant changes 
both subjectively - by developing a better understanding of themselves, their interests, 
values, and concerns, as well as objectively - by becoming someone with different 
experiences, resources, and skills (Archer, 2000). It is this stage that Lucy’s and 
Solveig’s early experiences of being a vegetarian in an overwhelmingly meat-eating 
environment represent. Their initial attempts at sustaining a cruelty-free diet reflect the 
interplay between the moral imperatives of their evolving personal identity of an ethical 
consumer and the costs of enacting a corresponding social role. For Lucy, being a sole 
vegetarian in an omnivorous household posed a risk of undermining familial bonds – 
her explicit avoidance of meat started to create tensions at the family dinner table with 
her father getting increasingly intolerant of her eating principles. “He gave me so much 
grief (…) he’d be eating meat and wave it at me, my face, as if to say, “come on, don’t 
be silly”, recollects Lucy her unpleasant experiences of the family meals through which 
she became aware of the clash between her ethical food commitment and her role as a 
daughter, expected to share and enjoy traditional meals with the rest of the family. 
Likewise, for Solveig commitment to vegetarianism in a socio-cultural context where 
both everyday and festive cooking was heavily centred around meat became a factor 
profoundly affecting her life as a social subject. Although accepted with respect by the 
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immediate family – both her parents were green voters and supporters of liberal views – 
Solveig’s alternative food practices soon started to compete with her evolving social life 
outside the familial context. The first consequential conflict of concerns occurred 
following her move to a secondary school, where Solveig’s desire to engage in social 
activities with new friends collided with her unconventional foodways: “after school 
you go for kebab with your friends, you go for burgers with your friends, and if you 
don’t eat meat - you don’t fit in”. The experiences of social exclusion prompted Solveig 
to take a fresh look at her vegetarian practice which “wasn’t cool anymore” and “just 
wasn’t the thing you do”. Thus, both for Solveig and Lucy the initial attempts at ethical 
eating proved an important learning experience. Through them, they acquired direct 
knowledge about the symbolic costs of presenting and sustaining the identity of an 
ethical consumer in their given social contexts: for Solveig, commitment to 
vegetarianism came at the expense of her social standing by making her look different 
and “uncool”, while in Lucy’s case it took a toll on kinship relations by leaving her 
outside the family dinner table. The negative emotional import of these unsettling 
situations prompted Solveig and Lucy to engage in reflexive evaluation of the 
worthwhileness of their moral commitments and tolerability of their concomitant costs. 
Through this deliberative process, Lucy came to prioritise her dietary principles over 
her duties as a daughter - she stopped eating with her father and eventually moved out 
of the family house - thereby re-asserting food ethics as her ultimate concern and 
sustaining her vegetarian identity. For Solveig, however, it resulted in an abandonment 
of ethical pursuits following the subdual of her moral concerns to increasingly pressing 
social needs.           
 The rethinking and redesign of Lucy’s and Solveig’s commitments was a 
concomitant of their evolution as distinct individuals for as subjects’ understanding of 
their ultimate values and goals as well as opportunities to live them out improves, they 
reassess and rewrite their projects to achieve the best possible match between their 
personal and social selves (Archer, 2000). It marked the beginning of a continuous 
reflexive process of prioratisation of concerns induced and informed by the participants’ 
subjective experiences and geared towards achieving their desired identities. Thus, it is 
the need to define who they are and how they want to be seen that urged Lucy and 
Solveig to review their hierarchy of concerns and the place of ethical consumption on it. 
Since the drivers behind subjects’ efforts to sustain their ethical food commitments and 
the essential human properties which enable agents to do so were discussed at length in 
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the previous chapter, Lucy’s preferred course of action - to stay true to her moral food 
project - should not leave the readers bewildered. In contrast, Solveig’s wilful decision 
to surrender her dietary principles to her social needs and its implications for her 
personal and social identities deserve more thorough consideration.   
 This brings us back to our central concept of ultimate concerns. In the above 
accounts of Lucy’s and Solveig’s experiences one can unmistakably discern individuals 
with particular moral and social concerns – an exposé enabling me to reiterate Archer’s 
notion of a human being as someone with concerns in the different orders of reality 
which I introduced at the beginning and used to lay the foundations of my theoretical 
framework. In the preceding chapter, this concept allowed me to account for the inner 
forces that propel individuals to either continuously advance their ethical food 
initiatives or suspend and even cast them aside. In the upcoming discussion I will 
elaborate on this analysis to fulfil a key goal of this chapter, that is to reveal how the 
relationships between people’s ultimate concerns and their dietary projects extend to 
their social identities. I will achieve this by inspecting Solveig’s ultimate concerns and 
leading to an understanding of what can urge a morally committed individual to steer 
away from the role of an ethical consumer and forbid this important constituent of her 
inner self from defining her social identity. This need not be a difficult task, for 
Solveig’s own account of the reasons behind her abandonment of a vegetarian diet 
alludes to the notion of concerns: “there wasn’t a conscious decision: “oh, I want to fit 
in, I want to eat meat again”, it was more – “I don’t care enough anymore”. Despite 
Solveig’s denial of the desire to fit in as the central reason behind her return to 
conventional foodways, I argue that it is precisely concerns over social recognition that 
made her backtrack on her vegetarian commitments. Consider how she attests to the 
emotional import of these concerns: “I didn’t fit in well anyway - I’ve always been a 
very bookish child, a quiet child, and I wasn’t cool, and I wasn’t pretty (…) but, of 
course, when you are that age, that is a terrible thing…”, and links them immediately 
to her decision to return to meat-eating: “because everyone does it, you might as well go 
along with what everyone does because, perhaps, it is going to help more or less”. This 
confession reveals the real forces responsible for unsettling the continuity of Solveig’s 
moral food project. Upon moving schools, strict avoidance of meat became something 
that marked Solveig out as different from others and disabled her participation in social 
activities, such as eating out with friends. This explicit clash between ethical 
consumption and an increasingly pressing desire to fit in prompted Solveig to 
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reconsider her moral food project in light of its new costs. Through a review of her 
ultimate concerns, she came to the conclusion that she did not “care enough” about her 
ethical commitment to promote it over her social needs. Thus, in the struggle between 
two competing concerns, the need for social acceptance displaced consumption ethics 
from their superior position on Solveig’s hierarchy of priorities forcing a collapse of her 
moral food project.         
 In the above account, nothing seems to go off the script which, by now, we are 
well-familiar with: under the impetus of changing conditions and circumstances 
individuals reflexively review their subjective hierarchy of priorities and redesign their 
course of action in order to address their most important concerns. What marks this 
discussion out as worthy and pertinent to the goals of this chapter is that the concerns 
under focus are social concerns which, when embraced as ultimate, became new key 
determinants of Solveig’s distinct personality. By refusing to reaffirm animal suffering 
as her ultimate concern, Solveig failed to successfully fulfil the role of an ethical 
consumer which her personal identity had once prompted her to assume. This evolving 
part of Solveig’s inner self was subdued by the requirements of her position as a subject 
who shares the norms and practices of the group with which she identifies and to which 
she is willing to belong. Thus, by elevating her social needs over her moral commitment, 
Solveig deliberately moved away from the social identity of an ethical consumer and 
toward establishing a different social self. My account of Solveig’s experience resonates 
with the findings of Hards’ (2011) study describing how climate change activists tended 
to subdue their green identities when those clashed with the social world around them. 
Subjects’ deliberate retraction from problematic identities described by Hards and 
observed in my study might be construed through Goffman’s (1963) lens, that is as an 
attempt to avoid social stigma through the management of “spoiled identity”. 
Goffman’s definition of stigma as “the situation of the individual who is disqualified 
from full social acceptance” (1963, p. 9) and his emphasis on the key role of social 
relationships in turning a particular characteristic into a stigmatising factor seems to 
offer a fair description of Solveig’s experience. As with Goffman’s stigmatized person, 
Solveig too strove to achieve social recognition and be considered “normal”, with the 
exception that managing her social image was significantly easier than it would be for 
those whose identity was “spoiled” by less easily hidden or changed features, such as 
race, nation, disability, etc. In contrast, Solveig’s non-conformist image of a vegetarian 
could be - and was - easily discarded by returning to the mainstream practice of eating 
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meat. Such identity management has become integral to Solveig’s subsequent 
experiences of living as an ethical consumer. Her pursuit of cruelty-free consumption, 
in which she repeatedly re-engaged throughout her life, represented an uneven journey 
with several major downfalls imposed by continuously resurfacing concerns over her 
social image. Time and time again Solveig demonstrated preparedness to suspend her 
moral food project for the sake of her social needs and, despite the fact that concerns 
over animal suffering have always remained on her moral register, addressing them only 
proved possible when being a vegetarian did not come at the expense of her ability to 
succeed in her other social roles. Consider, for example, how Solveig describes one of 
her comebacks to a meat-free diet following her involvement in the Goth subculture and 
the socio-cultural factors that precipitated it: 
  I started to dress differently, started to go to different clubs, hang out with 
different people, I started university, I started going out with my now husband, and I 
became a vegetarian again. Mainly because people I spent time with were vegetarians 
and vegans, and I just thought, yeah, there was something, you know, back then, that is 
true. 
  Thus, getting engaged with the Gothic social scene and the kind of people, 
norms, attitudes, behaviours, and practices accommodated in it presented Solveig with 
an opportunity to resume her moral food project at no cost to her social worth. The 
environment where vegetarianism was not only an acceptable but a commonly pursued 
practice enabled Solveig to strike a satisfying balance between her moral and social 
concerns – being an alternative food consumer was no longer a hindrance to but, instead, 
became a means of gaining the recognition of the group. The same influences were key 
to Solveig’s transition to veganism. In the previous chapter, I have examined the 
subjective drivers (particular emotional and cognitive experiences that triggered the 
development and intensification of Solveig’s moral concerns) and objective 
enablements (e.g. availability of appropriate food choices) behind Solveig’s decision to 
go vegan. What has not been acknowledged, however, and what I am now able to argue 
in light of the preceding discussion is that this commitment could only be sustained if 
successfully married with Solveig’s social concerns. An outward manifestation of her 
ethical consumer identity proved worthwhile for Solveig not only because of its 
emotional appeal and practical feasibility, but also because of the enabling social 
environment. As we know, Solveig’s switch to veganism occurred during her 
participation in student protests when she got closely involved with activists, many of 
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whom were devoted vegans. Surrounded by like-minded individuals, Solveig was able 
to manifest her ethical self and engage in non-conventional food practices at no risk of 
becoming a social reject. It is this specific socio-cultural context, where there was no 
room for concerns over being different and challenging the norms because being 
different itself was a norm, that enabled Solveig to re-take the social identity of an 
ethical consumer and actively live it out. This analysis echoes Hards’ study (2011, p. 37) 
of personal environmental values in which she describes the need to reconcile 
“competing demands of ‘normality’ and ‘sustainability’” as a common challenge faced 
by environmentally concerned people. Hards’ conclusion that “without conducive social 
networks it may be hard to reject dominant norms, or envision alternative forms of 
normality” (2011, p. 33) clearly resonates with Solveig’s experiences. The vegetarians 
and vegans among whom she was able to realise her moral food project may then be 
construed as communities of practice - “groups of individuals who share a concern or a 
passion for something they do and learn how to do it better as they interact regularly” 
(Wenger, 2006, p. 1 cited in Hards, 2011, p. 34) - which can influence and support the 
development and transition of individual environmental values (Hards, 2011). 
  However, there is more to be inferred from Solveig’s account than merely the 
enabling or restricting impact of social environment on her food practices. What Solveig 
achieved through her subjective experiences of living as well as failing to live as an 
ethical food consumer - just as Lucy did through hers - is an enhanced understanding of 
her ultimate concerns and priorities and the kind of social roles they required her to 
assume or discard. This marks the third and final stage of negotiations between a 
subject’s inner self and its social expression which Archer defines as “the moment of 
synthesis between personal and social identity” (2000, p. 293). At this point, individuals 
demarcate their ultimate and subordinate concerns which not only determine what kind 
of persons they become, but also inform what social roles and positions they take up. At 
the end of this reflexive process, subjects achieve “the personal identity within which 
the social identity has been assigned its place in the life of an individual” (Archer, 2000, 
p. 293). That social identity represents but one aspect of subjects’ overall identities 
explains why, despite that both Lucy and Solveig have developed a self-concept of 
which ethical consumer is a key co-constituent, its imprints on their social identities are 
not equally clear and deep. In the following discussion I will demonstrate how through 
reflexive re-ordering of their ethical and social concerns Solveig and Lucy achieved the 
synthesis between their personal and social identities in which the ethical consumer has 
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been assigned its particular place. By describing, comparing, and contrasting their 
experiences - very similar, but producing opposing outcomes - I will show that the 
different ranks that the persona of an ethical consumer came to occupy in Solveig’s and 
Lucy’s social lives stem from the differing hierarchies of concerns that they reflexively 
worked out for themselves. This will bring out the force of a key argument of the 
chapter, i.e. that our ultimate concerns define the societal roles we take up and that it is 
in this relationship that the crucial links between our personal and social identities are 
exposed.           
  Let us first consider Lucy’s alliance with the ethical consumer within her who, 
as I aim to show, has not only become the central inhabitant of Lucy’s inner self, but 
has also been allowed to define her social identity and guide her relationships with the 
social world. That Lucy invested herself in the role of an ethical consumer can be 
deduced from the way it dominates over other social positions in which she has been 
involuntarily placed or which she wilfully takes up as she makes her way through the 
life: a daughter, a partner, a friend. As Lucy’s self-account reveals, social concerns 
almost never gain prominence over her ethical food commitments, whose requirements 
prevail over the duties, expectations, and norms of these various roles: “it never came 
up as a question, you know, I would not be with a guy who made me eat meat, and if 
I’ve got friends who are insisting I eat what they eat, then I don’t eat with them”, she 
declares. Particularly revealing of Lucy’s priorities is the following episode involving 
her role identities as an ethical consumer and a daughter. This was a family Christmas 
lunch organised by Lucy’s mother, who took care to provide a free-range chicken in the 
hope that her daughter will share the traditional meal with the rest of the family. Lucy, 
however, refused to transgress her moral principles thereby causing distress both to her 
mother and to herself: “I felt really guilty because she was upset, you know, I don’t 
want to upset anybody”. Lucy’s sense of guilt suggests that, firstly, she recognised that 
in refusing to eat the chicken she failed to conform to social expectations attached to the 
role of a daughter  and, secondly, that she was not completely indifferent as to how well 
she performed in this role. As Archer explains, social affectivity depends on our 
subjective acknowledgment of the emotional import of the problem situation: “there 
cannot be any sense of remorse without the personal acceptance that I have done 
something wrong" (2000, p. 216 - 217). Lucy’s expression of regret over upsetting her 
mother indicates that familial ties do hold a place among the things that Lucy values in 
life, since “for social evaluations to matter - and without mattering they are incapable of 
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generating emotionality - they have to gel with our concerns” (Archer, 2000, p. 219). 
However, the affective import of concerns over family relations was actively and 
consciously subjugated by Lucy in the interest of her ultimate concern over food ethics 
– an example of the process of emotional elaboration which I have previously illustrated 
and analysed. It is worth being highlighted since it provides yet another opportunity to 
reiterate the argument about the key role of reflexivity in the development of subjects’ 
personal and, as we are now able to see, social identities. It is through such reflexive 
inner work that Lucy managed to subdue the emotional import of her concern over 
mother-daughter relationship and prevent it from unsettling her moral food project. By 
setting her priorities in this particular way, she reaffirmed both her self-view as well as 
her social image as an ethical consumer. Thus, through an account of Lucy’s 
experiences I have illustrated the entire process of development of the social identity of 
an ethical consumer – from a subject’s initial experiments with the role, to the 
experiential recognition of its costs and subsequent reflexive reassessment of its 
feasibility and appeal, to embracing it as a dominant social image through prioritising 
its requirements over those of competing positions and roles.    
  For Solveig, however, the journey towards the all-embracing social identity of 
an ethical consumer is yet incomplete. The ease with which she discarded the image of a 
vegetarian whenever it clashed with the obligations of other social positions that she 
occupied at different points in life suggests that the identity of an ethical consumer was 
denied the leading part among Solveig’s various social roles. Despite that over recent 
years a particular combination of natural (love for vegan food), practical (e.g. 
widespread availability of meat-free foodstuffs), and social enablements (inclusive 
socio-cultural environment) allowed Solveig to not merely resume and sustain her 
ethical food commitments but, moreover, take them to the next level by going vegan, 
her moral project is riddled with occasional concessions and regular compromises 
which reveal that the real locus of Solveig’s ultimate concerns lies in the social realm. 
Her self-account provides multiple illustrations, some of which have been analysed and 
discussed above, of Solveig’s preparedness to eschew her dietary principles for the sake 
of her social needs, i.e. achieving social recognition and meeting the requirements and 
expectations attached to the various situations and roles in which she happens to be. 
One of the most interesting examples of the compromises that Solveig is willing to 
make in order to succeed in her assumed social roles relates to her passion of softball. 
Being an avid player, Solveig was keen on having her own softball glove, and she 
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consciously violated her commitment to cruelty-free consumption by buying the one 
made of natural leather. Here is how she explains this wilful concession: 
  It is sheer impossible to get faux leather gloves - they are ridiculously expensive 
and I just would not be able to afford it. And not having your own glove is not really 
good, you can borrow them from, I don’t know, the sports kit, for example, but the glove 
shapes around your hand and you just play better with your own glove. So it’s – yes, it 
is a compromise, but one I am willing to take. 
   In this situation, Solveig’s concern over her worth as a team player came into 
collision with her moral concern over animal life and its accompanying ban on the 
purchase of leather goods. To uphold her commitment to ethical consumption, Solveig 
could either buy a synthetic glove or borrow one from a sports kit - the first option 
required excessive spending, while the second one meant compromising on her worth as 
a player. Thus, both ethically satisfying solutions involved costs - material in the first 
case, symbolic in the second – that Solveig deemed too high to accept given her 
circumstances and needs. Among these competing concerns, she chose to prioritise her 
desire to perform the role of a softball player to the best possible effect thereby receding 
from the position of an ethical consumer. That the responsibilities entailed by Solveig’s 
various social roles prevail over the requirements of her ethical food practice is further 
evidenced by the following two examples. In the first, we find Solveig at a family 
dinner table, where she steps back from her ethical foodways to eat the cheesecake 
offered by her elderly grandmother. In the second, we follow her on a trip to Nigeria 
where she puts aside her vegan diet and shares seafood and meat dishes with her hosts, 
who went to great length to provide their guest with the best food available. In the 
preceding chapter, we have heard Solveig’s justification of these deliberate 
compromises: “the priority in this case was really not to hurt people’s feelings and not 
to offend people”, which I construed as an attempt to solicit moral legitimacy to her 
dietary concessions through the strategy of subjective ethical framing, i.e. the 
construction of personal ethical standards. This time, however, I shift the focus to the 
inner mental and emotional work that preceded Solveig’s decision rather than that 
which provided its ex post facto account. The dilemma situations that Solveig faced at 
the dining table required a difficult choice between her social and ethical concerns. In 
order to make it, she had to promote one over the other based on reflexive assessment of 
their emotional appeal, moral worth and, most importantly, their import in relation to 
her identity. While Solveig interprets her ethical compromises as a tribute to her 
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ultimate concern over not doing harm, what she is not conscious of is that there was 
more at stake than the feelings of her grandmother or hosts. Behind Solveig’s desire to 
avoid causing upset to her family and friends stands an aspiration to comply with the 
dominant norms and ideas about what it means to be a respectful granddaughter or 
thankful guest. “I wouldn’t have felt comfortable sitting there saying, “oh, no, I am not 
going to eat that cheesecake”; “I am a guest there (…) not accepting it [the food] 
would have been rude beyond belief” – shares Solveig her evaluations of the affective 
import of the above described situations. It is this predictive analysis of the emotional  
(the feelings of discomfort, embarrassment, guilt) and symbolic (diminished social 
worth as a result of appearing rude, disrespectful, and lacking in manners) costs of 
transgressing societal expectations that led Solveig to promote the requirements of her 
assumed social roles. Another revealing example of Solveig’s ultimate commitment to 
social norms is found in her disapproval of more aggressive solutions to ethical 
problems, such as illegal animal liberations: 
  I know that they are probably doing the right thing, but I have a feeling that 
there are other ways to get to these goals, more socially acceptable and effective ways, 
and they always seemed to be a bit extreme to me. 
  Thus, despite supporting the causes for the environmental and animal rights 
movements, Solveig opposes their radical tactics which she defines as not “socially 
acceptable”. This explicitly stated esteem for the social order explains not only why 
Solveig does not engage in such “extreme” activities, but also why her own moral food 
project is replete with compromises and downturns. It is the fear of challenging the 
“acceptable” that stands behind Solveig’s reluctance to defend the consistency of her 
dietary commitments whenever they happen to conflict with societal expectations and 
norms.           
  Finally, while concerns over fitting in no longer prevent Solveig from 
manifesting her vegan identity - an important enablement rooted in her diverse socio-
cultural environment - they continue to affect her ethical practices by defining the range 
of consumption activities that Solveig chooses to engage in. For instance, farmer’s 
markets, which have now become a popular meeting place for ethical consumers, are 




… it is mainly young professionals and young families, and it is very hipster and 
very cool to buy organic food, and I just – it just annoys me so much. So I don’t feel… I 
don’t like the atmosphere because I feel it is a bit pretentious (…) I really wouldn’t feel 
comfortable among these people.       
   
Solveig’s affective response to farmer’s markets, where she feels annoyed, 
uncomfortable, and out of place, is best construed as an emotional commentary upon 
her concerns over social belonging and fitting in: “I don’t feel like I am the kind of 
person that fits in there”, she says. It is the need to pay constant heed to these utmost 
concerns that, along with some other factors, prevents Solveig from embracing farmer’s 
markets as yet another way of sourcing more ethical food.     
 That societal pressures, evaluations, and norms repeatedly prevail over the 
requirements of Solveig’s moral food project suggests that social concerns rank highest 
on her hierarchy of priorities. It is because she has embraced her subject status as her 
ultimate concern that the affective import of societal expectations and norms 
overshadows the emotional appeal of her ethical food commitments, and it is because 
her social projects (family, friendship) and roles (a grandchild, a guest) are a means of 
addressing her ultimate concerns - and hence expressions of her identity - that their 
success or failure directly affects her sense of self-worth. As Archer reminds us, “it is 
because we have invested ourselves in these social projects that we are susceptible of 
emotionality in relation to society's normative evaluation of our performance in these 
roles” (2000, p. 219). The fact that Solveig’s social concerns prevail over her ethical 
motives explains why dietary compromises do not produce the same destabilising effect 
on her self-view as does failure to succeed in her social roles. Unlike Lucy, whose self-
image is highly dependent on the stability and coherence of her moral food project (as 
demonstrated by multiple examples from her life story which I presented and analysed 
in the first chapter), Solveig does not feel dishonest or like “a total hypocrite”, as Lucy 
has put it, whenever she fails to uphold her dietary commitments. In part, she averts the 
sense of personal discontinuity by resorting to specific accommodation strategies, 
particularly that of subjective ethical framing, as I have previously shown. But the key 
reason why Solveig readily tolerates the discontinuities and inconsistencies of her 
ethical food practice is because her inner ethical consumer acts as a co-partner rather 
than the sole proprietor of her identity. The following quote is revealing: “It is part of 
who I am, yes, but it is not… Like when I meet someone I wouldn’t say – “hi, I am 
Solveig and I am vegan” (…) It’s not the first thing I would tell someone”. It is because 
 
184 
Solveig’s self-image is much broader than the identity of a vegan that she permits the 
instability of her dietary commitments for, as Archer (2000, p. 10) notes, it is our self-
concept - “a continuous sense of self (…) universal to human beings” - that supplies 
continuity to our personal identities and consistency to our unique performances of 
selected social roles. This is precisely why Solveig’s ethical food compromises neither 
profoundly destabilise her self-image, which involves a lot more than just being a vegan, 
nor conflict with her social identity, which depends more on her triumph as a social 
being than as an ethical consumer. The key conclusion derived from the above 
discussion is that for Solveig being “a subject among subjects” (Archer, 2000, pp. 198-
199) comes before being an ethical consumer. The above analysis of Solveig’s self-
account allowed me to demonstrate that this position is informed by her ultimate 
concerns whose locus pertains to the social realm. I thereby confirmed the direct 
relationship between people’s ultimate concerns and their social identities and, building 
upon this argument, accounted for the different positions that the identity of an ethical 
consumer may come to occupy in one’s social life.     
 But if Solveig’s ultimate concerns lie in the discursive order, if it is her social 
relations that serve as a depository of her sense of self-worth, and if commitment to 
ethical consumption has been forbidden from defining her social image, then what place 
does the ethical consumer hold among the multiple facets of her identity? For, if we 
fully embrace Archer’s (2000, p. 221) idea that “which precise balance we strike 
between our concerns, and what precisely figures amongst an individual’s concerns is 
what gives us our strict identity as particular persons”, are we to assume that by refusing 
to prioritise ethical food commitments over her social obligations, desires, and needs, 
Solveig failed to achieve the identity of an ethical consumer? Does the fact that food 
ethics do not rank first on Solveig’s hierarchy of concerns mean that she is less of an 
ethical consumer than Lucy, for whom commitment to cruelty-free eating is a top 
ranking priority? Does the fact that for Solveig being a good granddaughter comes 
before being a devoted vegan mean that it necessarily comes instead? I argue that it 
does not, and that such reading of Archer would do injustice to her theory for it could 
only provide a narrow and impoverished concept of human identity. To argue that 
“which precise balance we strike between our concerns (…) is what gives us our strict 
identity” (Archer, 2000, p. 221) should not imply that, when under the weight of 
subjective conditions and objective circumstances we come to prioritise one concern 
over another, we instantly loose our once deeply held identity and put on another 
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instead. Firstly, as noted by Lawler, “no one has only one identity; and indeed those 
identities may be in tension” (2008, p. 3). Secondly, if, as Archer’s argument implies, 
people’s identity-defining concerns are not simply discarded, but re-ordered according 
to their changing priorities, then the identities reflected by those concerns can not be 
merely lost either. These identities, along with the obligations and responsibilities 
attached to them, may be overshadowed by various social roles that people assume as 
they go through the life and that may come to acquire the utmost priority. But even 
subdued, these identities do not cease to be integral constituents of subjects’ inner 
selves or influence what course of action they take. That Solveig concedes the social 
identity of a strict vegan, investing herself in some other social roles, should not suggest 
that the ethical consumer has been denied a place among the different layers of her 
distinct personality for, as has been already argued, people’s social identity constitutes 
but one aspect of their overall personal identity which, although “intertwines with their 
sociality, but exists sui generis and cannot be reduced to it” (Archer, 2000, p. 196). As 
Archer explains: 
Certainly, (…) the social positions we occupy do contribute to the person we become, 
which is why this is presented as a dialectical process: but the final synthesis is one which 
finally defines the person as someone with concerns in the natural and practical orders, as well 
as the social order. In the process, our social identity also becomes defined, but necessarily as a 
sub-set of personal identity (2000, p. 295).      
  
Thus, Solveig’s social identity is neither exhaustive of her personality, nor is it the only 
determinant of her relationships with external reality. Undoubtedly, it affects how, 
where, and when the identity of an ethical consumer is allowed to manifest itself to the 
world, but this is not a one-way relationship for, as Lawler (2008, p. 3) highlights, 
“different forms of identity (…) should be seen as interactive and mutually constitutive, 
rather than ‘additive’ ”. The principles of ethical consumption, albeit at times subdued 
by Solveig’s sociality and hence liable to compromises and trade-offs, still hold a 
prominent place among her ultimate concerns – those that contribute to defining her 
distinct personal identity and take part in shaping her pathways. Consider how Solveig 
describes the kind of person she is, or rather perceives herself to be, “I am trying to be 
accepting, and I am trying to be caring and loving, and I am trying to live a life that has 
– that does not have a negative impact on others”, and her ethical food commitments as 
a natural concomitant of her overall character: “for me eating animal products wouldn’t 
really fit in there, it is just a logical consequence”. The interplay between Solveig as an 
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ethical consumer and Solveig as a social subject might be construed as a tension 
between “the self as an autonomous entity” (Lawler, 2008, p. 39), defined by concerns 
over the morality of consumption, and “the self as the embodiment of relationships” 
(Lawler, 2008, p. 39) which places limits and constraints on whether and how Solveig’s 
autonomous self can go about realizing her ethical food concerns.    
 The above discussion, besides illuminating the relationships between subjects’ 
personal and social identities, sends out an important conceptual message. It warns 
against a narrow view of human identity which Archer’s idea of an individual as 
someone defined by concerns pertaining to the three different orders of the world allows 
to steer clear of. It is by relying on this concept that I have been able to defend the place 
of the ethical consumer in the synthesis between Solveig’s inner and outer self, and it is 
the same concept that explains why even the most devoted individuals with well-
rounded personal and social identities of an ethical consumer, such as Lucy, cannot be 
completely free of social concerns. Several brief examples from her story suffice to 
illustrate the point. So, although Lucy’s dinner party menus are invariably vegan, she 
agrees to provide her guests with regular milk – a concession made for the sake of 
hospitality: “it is just being hospitable, you know, I don’t want people go away thinking, 
“bloody hell, she put soya milk in my drink!”. Lucy’s remark reveals that not only does 
she recognize social norms and expectations about the obligations of a good host, but 
that she has internalised them thereby becoming susceptible to societal evaluations of 
her performance in this particular role. Lucy’s social concerns manifest themselves 
further in the way she goes about her ethical food commitments when being a guest 
herself. Despite not being prepared to compromise on her dietary principles on social 
events, family occasions, or friendly gatherings, Lucy never expects or demands being 
specially catered for. This tendency to keep alternative food habits as low-profile as 
possible has been observed by Janda and Trocchia (2001) in their study of 
vegetarianism. The authors interpret it as a coping strategy through which non-
mainstream consumers resolve the tension between individual freedom and social 
belonging and avoid possible criticism and judgement. Lucy admits to the same motives: 
“I just don’t really want to draw a lot of attention to myself, it’s tiresome, and then you 
got somebody thinking, “God, she is a pain in the neck!” I don’t want to irritate 
people”. Thus, despite letting the identity of an ethical consumer occupy both her inner 
and outer self, Lucy can neither escape her subject status, nor completely break free 
from social concerns. “I don’t want my food choices to put other people in a difficult 
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situation”, “I don’t want to be a complete bore” – she says, testifying to the truth of the 
argument. This is because “sociality is (…) necessarily the lot of human beings” and 
“participation in the social realm entails concerns about self-worth which cannot be 
evaded in this discursive environment” (Archer, 2000, pp. 198-199). This, however, in 
no way undermines my previous argument that Lucy’s personal and social identities are 
defined first and foremost by her concerns and commitments as an ethical consumer. 
Indeed, in none of the above examples do the requirements of particular social roles 
force Lucy to violate her personal dietary principles and compromise on the identity of 
an ethical consumer; what they do, however, is prompt her to adjust her relationships 
with other subjects (e.g. by accommodating their eating preferences or concealing her 
own) so that to avoid explicit conflicts between her ethical commitments and her social 
standing. While taking nothing away from her ethical consumer identity, Lucy’s efforts 
demonstrate that, consistent with Archer’s concept of an individual, she too, inevitably, 
has relationships and concerns in the social realm that are part of her human condition 
and that affect, even if only in minor ways, how she lives out her ethical self.  
 This concludes my account of the interplay between personal and social 
identities of ethical consumers. In this last section, I have focused on the ways in which 
individuals reflexively work out the balance between their concerns as ethical 
consumers and as social beings thus achieving an identity within which both their 
ethical and social selves have been assigned their particular places. I chose to advance 
my argument through a sharp focus on Solveig and Lucy because of their contrasting 
experiences that provide an opportunity to catch the best view of the continuum along 
which subjects shift their ethical consumer identity in relation to their social self.  The 
following quote from Archer (2012, p. 67, emphasis in original) highlights the aim of 
my effort: 
To account for variability as well as regularity in the courses of action taken by those 
similarly situated means acknowledging our singularity as persons, without denying that our 
sociality is essential for us to be recognisable as human persons. 
 
Despite the difference in the positions that the identity of an ethical consumer 
has been allowed to occupy in Solveig’s and Lucy’s social lives, my analysis of the 
process through which they achieved the final synthesis between their personal and 
social selves reveals the same underlying mechanism. This is the mechanism that I have 
described in detail in this chapter and that can be briefly summarised as follows: 
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- under the impetus of their incipient personal identity, defined by concerns over 
the morality of consumption, individuals try on the social identity of an ethical 
consumer; 
- through these exploratory role performances, subjects acquire direct knowledge 
of the costs and benefits of sustaining the social image of an ethical consumer; 
- this informs their reflexive reassessment of the role in terms of the concomitant 
losses and gains based on which subjects either make the identity of an ethical 
consumer their leading social part or confine it to the more private aspects of 
their lives and assume another social image instead; 
- no matter what position the identity of an ethical consumer gets assigned in 
individuals’ social lives, it remains an integral part of their personal identity for 
as long as food ethics reside on the list of their ultimate concerns. 
  The above synopsis summarises my explanation of the mechanism that brings 
about the social identity of an ethical consumer and accounts for the varying degrees of 
its visibility - from near-absence to sporadic appearances to full-time presence - in 
individuals’ social lives. It was conceived through an outline of Archer’s theoretical 
account of co-evolution of people’s personal and social identities brought to life by my 
analysis of subjective experiences of two concrete ethical consumers. It enabled me to 
illustrate with empirical evidence and interpret through the prism of ethical 
consumption the entire process of social identity development, while highlighting the 
key role of reflexivity in propelling individuals through its different stages. By drawing 
on Solveig’s and Lucy’s narratives, I described and analysed how aspiring ethical 
consumers try out their desired social roles; how through these identity experiments 
they become aware of their concomitant costs; how this experiential knowledge feeds 
into subjects’ evaluation of the worthwhileness of their assumed positions; how based 
on this reflexive inner work they embrace some roles while subordinating others and in 
so doing define their social identity; and, finally, how through reflexive prioritisation of 
their moral and social concerns they define the place of an ethical consumer in their 
social lives. In this account, I have demonstrated that inextricable connections between 
individuals’ ultimate concerns and personal identities extend to their social selves and 
that in determining their commitments people define not only who they are, but also 
how they are towards the social world. Building upon this argument, I have been able to 
fulfil the key aim of this chapter and reveal the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
 
189 
the emergence of the social identity of an ethical consumer. I have argued that for an 
individual to develop a yearning for such social role, concerns over food ethics have to 
appear on the list of his ultimate concerns which define his inner self and supply the 
impetus to manifest it in public. This is a necessary condition – in the absence of 
concerns over food ethics, the social identity of an ethical consumer (by which I mean a 
genuine manifestation of the true self rather than a mere performance of the scripted 
role in a pursuit of some other goals) can neither appear nor thrive, for it is our ultimate 
concerns that inform what social roles we take up and how we personify them:  
What we seek to do is reflexively defined by reference to the concerns that we wish to 
realize. Ultimately, that realization means becoming who we want to be within the social order 
by personifying selected social roles in a manner expressive of our personal concerns (Archer, 
2007, p. 88)  
 
  Further, the emotional import of ethical concerns needs to be sufficiently strong 
to prevail over the person’s inescapable social concerns and enable the requirements of 
his dietary commitments to overshadow the responsibilities and obligations of his 
various social roles. This, however, represents a sufficient condition for the appearance 
of the social identity of an ethical consumer, since a successful enactment of the role of 
a conscientious food eater does not imply that active and conscious prioritisation of 
ethical concerns over social needs has necessarily taken place. Indeed, it may be 
enabled by a simple lack of an apparent clash between agential moral food practices and 
their social projects. As Solveig’s experiences have shown, as long as commitment to 
alternative modes of consumption does not undermine a person’s social standing and 
worth, the need for a deliberate choice between the two will most likely never arise, 
meaning that the identity of an ethical consumer can be assigned its place in the social 
life of the subject and exist on a par with his other positions and roles.  
  Finally, I have argued that regardless of their relative hierarchical positions 
people’s ethical and social concerns do not cease to be indelible components of their 
personal make up – relegated to the deeper parts of the self and restricted to the more 
private aspects of life, the identity of an ethical consumer remains a significant 
determinant of Solveig’s distinct personality, just as Lucy’s social concerns continue to 
exist alongside - often muted, sometimes on a par, yet never rising above - her ethical 
self. This important point enabled me to render meaningful the decisions and actions 
that participants take both as ethical consumers and as social subjects. I have thus 
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achieved the key goal of this last section of my analysis of the participants’ accounts – 
to portray ethical consumers as human beings with particular concerns that define them 
as moral, but also as social agents who continuously negotiate their relationships with 
the discursive realm, of which they are inevitably a part, in order to achieve a satisfying 
balance between their identity-defining dietary commitments and their status as subjects. 
I have shown that people’s identities are inevitably “embedded within and produced by 
the social world” (Lawler, 2008, p. 144) by demonstrating that when individuals live 
out their ethical consumer identities in public, they improvise within scenes of 
constraint, as Butler (2004) would have it, for their idiosyncratic performances - 
creative productions of their unique singularities as persons - are always and inevitably 
restricted by the particular societal contexts in which they happen to be. By explaining 
how people’s ultimate concerns inform what social roles they take up and determine 
what position the identity of an ethical consumer comes to occupy in their social lives, I 
have revealed the crucial links between subjects’ personal and social identities while 
highlighting the key role of reflexivity in enabling individuals to achieve the final 














Ethical Consumers: From the Concrete to the Abstract, Out of the 
Particular Toward the Universal 
 
 
This thesis has told a story of ethical food consumers. It began with a human 
being with intrinsic capacities for emotionality and cognition and essential properties of 
reflexivity, intentionality, and self-awareness. It followed his evolution into a moral 
character whose subjective relationship to the world is one of concern over ethical 
living and witnessed this relationship translate into consumption projects which are not 
just a set of food practices but embodiments of commitments, expressions of beliefs, 
and reflections of distinct identities which people embrace and develop as they go 
through the life. Shaped and moulded by a variety of structural forces, these moral food 
projects are at the same time manifestations of distinct human powers, i.e. the reflexive 
capacity of agents to adjust their preferred courses of action to the enabling and 
constraining properties of the world and in defining their subjective practices transform 
the objective reality itself. This story is meant to fill the gap in the existing literature on 
consumption behaviour which has been largely oblivious of the relationship between the 
social embeddeddness of consumer practices and the role of the structure in the 
constitution of personal style and the construction of self on the one hand and the power 
of agency to define individual courses of action and contribute to social outcomes on 
the other. This study was set out to correct the imbalances underlying the dominant 
approaches to consumption and through the integration of agency-focused and socio-
centric perspectives acknowledge and analyse the complex ensemble of individual and 
systemic powers which informs, motivates, and defines consumer practices, choices, 
and pursuits. Applying the principle of analytical dualism, that is being able “to 
distinguish sharply, then between the genesis of human actions lying in the reasons, 
intentions and plans of human beings, on the one hand; and the structures governing the 
reproduction and transformation of social activities, on the other” (Bhaskar, 2010, p. 75-
76) has been critical to fulfilling a key aim of my research, that is to expose ethical 
consumption as a site and product of a continuous interplay between individual agency 
and social structure. By tracing the uneven trajectories of my participants’ moral food 
projects, I have been able to demonstrate how structural conditions shape individuals’ 
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situations in particular ways thus motivating differently positioned agents to engage in 
different practices and pursue different courses of action. I have revealed both the ways 
in which agential ethical commitments and pursuits are constrained by structural 
properties, i.e. “productive resources, roles, and associated interests” (Archer, 1998, p. 
371), which they are not responsible for creating, as well as how ethical consumers 
actively negotiate the causal powers of these structures to see their moral food projects 
through. Ultimately, then, I have showcased “how structure actually does impinge upon 
agency (who and where) and how agents in turn react back to reproduce or transform 
structure” (Archer, 1998, p. 371, emphasis in original).     
 In recounting this story, I have fulfilled the overarching aim of my research – to 
understand and explain the process of emergence and development of ethical consumer 
identities. I have grounded my account in the view of humans as “beings whose relation 
to the world is one of concern” (Sayer, 2011, p. 2). Yet, I went beyond merely 
showcasing the presence of ethical considerations in the subjects’ day-to-day choices 
and pivotal life decisions and made an ambitious attempt to penetrate deep into the 
inner lives and worlds of self-perceived ethical consumers to unravel the origins of their 
moral concerns and reveal the generative principles of their dietary commitments. I 
started by locating the roots of my participants’ ethical concerns in their subjective 
experiences of the objective world enabled and propelled by the intrinsic human 
capacities for emotionality and reason. I presented human reflexivity as the key force 
that mediates between the properties of the agents and those of external reality enabling 
subjects to elaborate on their affective and cognitive experiences and in the process of 
internal conversation with themselves define their ultimate concerns, devise subjective 
consumption projects, and work out ways to fulfil them in the specific objective 
contexts in which they are placed. By construing reflexive conversation as a site where 
human logos and pathos unite to propel individuals toward unique constellations of 
concerns and thus into distinct identities, I have contributed to the negation of the view 
that “values are merely subjective or conventional, beyond the scope of reason – not 
susceptible to evidence or argument – and have nothing to do with the kind of beings 
that we are, or with what happens” (Sayer, 2011, p. 3). To the contrary, I have 
demonstrated how in an attempt to address their identity-defining moral concerns 
individuals embark on reflexively conceived and evaluated consumption projects, and 
how in living out their ethical values and beliefs through specific shopping and eating 
practices they achieve their desired identities. I have thus construed ethical consumer 
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practices as an outcome of the process of personal morphogenesis – subjects’ evolution 
into individuals with particular moral values, principles, and concerns, from which their 
identities derive, and with specific ethical commitments, through whose fulfilment these 
identities are lived out and sustained. I have completed this account by showing how 
this personal morphogenesis spills onto people’s life as social subjects and extends to 
their social identities, and how by embracing food ethics as their ultimate concern 
individuals’ define not only who they are, but also how they are towards other people. 
By revealing crucial links between the participants’ ultimate concerns and the social 
roles they take up and pursue, I offered an insight into the process of emergence of a 
social identity of an ethical consumer.       
 By disentangling and analysing the essential steps in the evolution of the 
participants’ moral food practices – from developing concerns over ethical eating, to 
reflexively embracing them as their ultimate commitments, to engaging in and 
continuously sustaining subjectively conceived but objectively conditioned projects of 
ethical consumption – and piecing them back together in one coherent story, I have 
constructed an account of the process of becoming and being an ethical food consumer. 
I have uncovered the key factors that initiate and guide this intricate development, i.e. 
agential subjectivity and structural objectivity, and the critical force - human reflexivity 
- that drives this process forward and steers it toward specific personal and social 
outcomes. I have achieved this by demonstrating the embeddedness of ethical food 
practices in the natural, practical, and social orders of the world and the contingency of 
individual choices on the enabling and constraining effects of the structure, and by 
defending the indispensability of reflexivity to agential ability to respond to and 
continuously negotiate the properties of objective reality in order to advance their moral 
food projects and, in doing so, sustain their desired identities. I have shown that 
reflexivity is the central generative force behind individuals’ a) moral concerns, for it 
enables people to elaborate on their subjective responses to objective circumstances thus 
furthering self-knowledge and awareness of their ultimate values and beliefs; b) ethical 
food projects, for it is during reflexive conversations with themselves that subjects work 
out appropriate ways to fulfil their internal commitments within the external 
circumstances in which they are placed; and c) consumption practices, for it is only 
through reflexive negotiation of structural enablements and constraints that ethical 
consumers can ensure the consistency and continuity of their preferred lifestyles. In 
doing so, I have affirmed the key role of agential capacity for reflexive deliberations in 
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enabling individuals to attain their desired identities and live them out within the 
constraints of their personal as well as wider societal contexts. The concept of 
reflexivity has thus been critical to allowing me to integrate agential subjectivity of 
ethical consumers and structural objectivity in which they live and act into a single story 
and produce a unified, yet bilateral account of their interplay, thereby fulfilling the key 
goal of my research – to reveal and explain the generative mechanism behind ethical 
consumer identities. This mechanism represents a complex, multi-step, and multi-
dimensional process, by which these distinct identities are brought about and sustained 
through an incessant interaction between agential and structural forces, and whose key 
principles can be summarised as follows: 
 
1. The first step towards achieving the identity of an ethical consumer is 
developing a concern over a cause that can be addressed by changing one’s 
approach to consumption. 
2. Next, through internal conversations with themselves individuals embrace these 
concerns as ultimate and design subjective consumption projects through which 
to address them. 
3. By embracing consumption ethics as their ultimate concern and developing a 
moral commitment to a particular style of consumption, individuals attain the 
identity of an ethical consumer. 
4. Once achieved, the ethical consumer identity has to be continuously reaffirmed 
and maintained. In order to sustain the desired identity, individuals must 
repeatedly reassert food ethics as their ultimate concern and ensure the 
continuity of their moral food projects by accommodating them to the ever-
changing objective conditions and subjective circumstances.  
5. Emotionality plays a key role in triggering concerns and driving subjects to act 
upon them, while reflexivity enables individuals to evaluate their food projects 
in terms of their moral worth, emotional appeal, and potential to become a life-
long commitment, and, subsequently, achieve and sustain a liveable and 
satisfying balance between their ethical concerns and other inescapable concerns 
and needs. 
6. Not only do the ethics of consumption as an ultimate moral concern define 
people’s unique personalities, but they also inform their social identities. Living 
out ethical consumer commitments in public involves a complex interplay 
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between personal and social self, and the relative position of food ethics on 
agential hierarchy of concerns determines the place of being an ethical consumer 
in the subject’s social life.  
 
As I approached the end of the research process, along with an understanding of 
how individuals evolve to be ethical food consumers, a clearer vision of who an ethical 
consumer actually is started to shape up. By no means do I want to suggest that the 
identity of an ethical consumer can be construed in terms of a fixed set of predefined 
features and prescribed actions that anyone who claims to be a mindful eater should be 
able to match.  An assumption of the ethical consumer as a “fixed identity” (Cherrier, 
2007, p. 332) is, of course, a mistaken one, easily confuted by the diversity of ways in 
which individuals conceive of and enact ethical consumption and the sheer creativity 
with which they approach their dietary commitments.  Indeed, no two ethical consumers 
I met through my research could be possibly squeezed into one type. Understandably so, 
for all of them came from different walks of life, developed different concerns about the 
world, and faced different enablements and constraints on the way towards their moral 
ideals. Yet, despite all the idiosyncrasies in their ethical foodways, there are certain 
characteristics and traits that the participants of my research share and that, I argue, 
represent their essential properties as social agents and, more specifically, ethical food 
consumers.  
Firstly, the ethical consumer of my research is an emotional, morally concerned, 
and value-driven human being. He does serve to endorse the view of ethical 
consumption as a self-serving pursuit of inward-looking individuals who do good not in 
order to be good but rather to feel good about themselves. While his moral food project 
is not void of rational considerations, since all people have to evaluate their 
commitments not only in terms of their moral worth and emotional appeal, but also their 
practical feasibility and accompanying costs, his ethical practices do not result from a 
cost-benefit analysis of a “risk discounting and profit-maximising bargain-hunter” 
(Archer, 2000, p. 55), but are an outcome of a reflexive conversation about his deepest 
values and beliefs and possible ways to manifest them in life. He does not conform to 
the model of a social actor as a preference-driven agent “who knows the price of 
everything and the value of nothing” (Archer, 2000, p. 4) tendered by the rational 
choice theory, but aligns with a human being who has ultimate concerns that are “not a 
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means to anything beyond them, but are commitments which are constitutive of who we 
are, and an expression of our identities” (Archer, 2000, p. 4). 
The ethical consumer of my research is “the author of his own projects in 
society” (Archer, 2003, p. 34). She is not an over-socialised subject all of whose 
qualities are supplied by the social reality, whose values are neither individually 
developed nor personally possessed, and whose practices are determined by a fixed set 
of dominant, commonly shared norms and beliefs. The idiosyncratic ways in which she 
understands and performs ethical consumption overturn the idea of the primacy of 
societal discourses over personal thoughts which theories of social practice assume. To 
the contrary, she is “the ultimate and effective cause of social practice” (Archer, 2003, p. 
134), shaped and moulded as much by the properties of the structure as by those of the 
creative agent herself. 
The ethical consumer of my research is a reflexive and self-aware person. He 
cannot be a Bourdieusian actor whose subjective dispositions are merely a reflection of 
objective positions and whose ways are guided by habitus which is nothing other than 
internalized social structures and facts. He cannot be denied self-consciousness, for it is 
through awareness of his being, actions, and thoughts that he develops knowledge of 
himself and his beliefs, values, and ultimate concerns. Neither can he be stripped of 
reflexive capacities, for it is through incessant monitoring of the self and his 
commitments that he defends the continuity of his ethical foodways against subjective 
conditions and objective circumstances.  
The ethical consumer of my research is an intentional agent. She does not fit the 
image of a “constructed” consumer whose practices are neither deliberately chosen nor 
actively developed, but are dictated by the system and orchestrated by a set of 
strategically oriented actors in pursuit of vested interests and goals. She is not a passive 
victim of the “governing of consumption” (Barnett et al., 2010), but an agent of active 
choice - at the core of her moral food project are consumption acts that are intrinsically 
motivated, subjectively conceived, and creatively performed. Inevitably, however, the 
ethical consumer of my research is also “a wavering, suspicious, ambivalent ‘consumer’ 
juggling their choices amidst competing knowledge claims” (Adams and Raisborough, 
2010, p. 270). His project is riddled with compromises subjectively negotiated and gaps 
precariously bridged, for in the absence of fixed stereotypes or even definitive 
guidelines about what constitutes a moral food choice ethical consumption discourses 
remain fluid, meanings - open for interpretation, practices – subject to change. 
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 Finally, the ethical consumer of my research is a social actor who is embedded 
in objective reality and whose practices are contingent on his inevitable and incessant 
interactions with the natural, practical, and social orders of the world. His inner self is 
“a reflexive project” (Giddens, 1991, p. 32, emphasis in original), but the one that is 
always and necessarily externally conditioned and constrained, and while he is free to 
choose his own identity, he is not free to determine the circumstances under which he 
will make it. His agential subjectivity is always juxtaposed against structural 
subjectivity, and it is in their continuous interplay that the shaping of his practices and 
the forging of his identity occurs. The ethical consumer of my research is thus like “a 
sculptor at work fashioning a product out of existing materials using the tools available” 
(Archer, 1998, p. 360). She can also be thought of as Jonathan Haidt’s (2012) imagined 
elephant rider - another eloquent metaphor that has encouraged my understanding of 
ethical consumers as intentional agents in pursuit of subjectively conceived but 
objectively conditioned moral commitments. The rider is trying to control the elephant, 
but has only limited command of the direction in which the giant animal takes him. 
Having painted a mental picture of a little rider who wants to follow a particular course, 
but is always at the mercy of the powerful elephant, I could instantly project it onto the 
participants of my research. The idea of ethical consumers as determined travelers who 
are striving to follow certain pathways but find themselves constantly constrained by 
external forces has not only brought me closer to understanding individuals’ practices of 
ethical consumption, but also enabled me to achieve a clear vision of what exactly I had 
learned from hours of grocery shopping and in-depth interviewing. When observing 
subjects’ buying behaviors, I was looking at the riders – committed ethical consumers 
appearing to be continuously mindful of every little choice they made, capable of 
justifying their consumption decisions, rarely failing at finding a reason for why this or 
that particular product earned a place – or was rejected one – in their shopping basket. 
By learning their life stories, however, I was able to see the elephant: the family 
backgrounds, educational inputs, cultural exposures, social pressures, and structural 
opportunities - all the subjective and objective factors that have been shaping and 
moulding the participants’ courses of life leading them to become the people they are, to 
have the concerns they cherish, to develop the values they live by. This giant elephant, a 
powerful force, is not just a product of past experiences - it is caught up in an intricate 
web of subjective conditions and external circumstances that continually define the 
subjects’ ability to fulfill their moral projects and live out their ethical selves. Although 
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my version of the animal is different from that of Jonathan Haidt’s, whose elephant 
symbolises the unconscious – automatic, emotional, visceral – side of the human mind, 
his illuminating metaphor has given me yet another hint for understanding human 
practices of ethical consumption as an ongoing process of incessant negotiations 
between the rider - an active and purposeful agent in pursuit of her idiosyncratic vision 
of the good – and the elephant – the subjective and objective determinants of the overall 
direction that her moral path follows as well as every little turn that it takes. 
 In developing and presenting the above profile of an ethical food consumer, I 
aim not to promote a uniform, deterministic view of human nature, but to outline those 
aspects of it that make people evaluative, normative, reflexive human beings whose 
relationship to the world is one of concern, who deliberately act upon their concerns, 
and whose well-being directly depends on the well-being of the objects of their ultimate 
commitments. Suggesting that there are universal, intrinsic features that make us beings 
“for whom things matter” (Sayer, 2011, p. 99) and who conduct their life accordingly 
does not entail the denial of the prodigious diversity of people’s identities and the ways 
in which those identities reveal themselves to the world for, as Sayer (2011, p. 104) 
argues, “making claims about the particular capacities of human beings does not mean 
that they are all manifested equally or in the same way everywhere and never change”. 
By describing how - and explaining why - ethical consumer identities are necessarily 
subjectively conceived and enacted, I have guarded my research account against the 
assumption that these identities are, or can be, pre-determined and fixed. Yet, I have 
also uncovered fundamental similarities which reveal what the ethical consumers of my 
research have in common and which help to explain “what is it about people that makes 
them both ethical subjects and objects of ethical concerns” (Sayer, 2011, p. 98). These 
admittedly universalist assumptions about social agents inform a specific conception of 
a human being which lies at the very basis of my research account and without which 
no understanding of human society and behaviour can be achieved – as Sayer points out,  
“it is hard to say anything much about people or indeed interact with them without 
presupposing something about what they have in common” (2011, p. 106). Such 
universalism, Sayer explains, need not imply uniformity – in fact, our differentiation is 
enabled precisely by our essential commonalities. Indeed, it is what the ethical 
consumers of my research have in common - susceptibility to moral concerns, capacity 
for emotionality and cognition, reflexive abilities, creativity, self-awareness, and 
intentionality - that is responsible for the variety of their moral food projects, practices, 
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and pursuits through which their unique identities are lived out and sustained.   
 
Further research: beyond individual identities 
So where to from here for deepening the understanding of an ethical food 
consumer and further exploring the multiple dimensions of her hybrid, complex, and 
fluid identity? In this thesis, I placed primary emphasis upon subjective meanings and 
experiences of ethical consumption and explored ethical food practices from the 
standpoint of an individual consumer in pursuit of an authentic identity through 
personal commitment to particular foodways. I focused on individual subjectivity, 
human agency, and reflexive capacity as they manifest themselves as a morally 
concerned consumer advances her ethical food project through enabling and 
constraining contexts of objective reality. However, it should not escape our view that 
consumption in general and eating in particular is rarely a purely individual experience, 
but more often a social one (Carù and Cova, 2003; Warde, 1997). In a bid to 
counterbalance the emphasis on individualized practices and personalized choices of 
individualistic consumers in the context of ethical consumption, Cherrier highlights that 
“an ethical consumption experience goes beyond an individual act in the marketplace 
(…) Consuming ethically links consumers to family members, friends, the state, and the 
market” (2007, p. 323). Indeed, as my study has clearly shown, consumers’ engagement 
with and performance of ethical practices, while informed by subjectively defined 
concerns and moral imperatives generated by their distinct identities, is contingent upon 
societal context, cultural environment, and commitments to other social subjects and 
their needs. This means that the process of formation, development, and realization of 
ethical consumer identities does not occur in isolation or some kind of a social vacuum, 
but is shaped by continuous negotiations between the subject’s inner and social self. 
The point resonates with the argument developed by Lawler (2008), who negates the 
common perception of an individual’s “‘true’ or ‘deep’ self” (p.5) as “something which 
belongs to the person in question and is nothing to do with the social world” (2008, p. 5). 
Contrary to viewing identity as “outside, or nothing to do with, the social, or as coming 
fully formed into the social world” (Lawler, 2008, p. 7), Lawler suggests to understand 
it as “formed between, rather than within persons”, that is through continuous social 
interactions. Building upon this argument, Cherrier (2007, p. 323) points out that “the 
key reference points for constructing ethical consumption lifestyles come from not only 
the inside (self-identity) but also the outside (collective identity)”. It is on this basis that 
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she advocates approaching the questions of identity formation from a dialectical 
perspective, which is sensitive to the fact that identities are “both individually and 
socially constructed” (Cherrier, 2007, p. 323). 
 
The meanings ascribed to ethical consumer identity necessarily and inevitably connect 
with social relations and collective experiences, so researchers should never conceptualize 
ethical consumer identity as fixed (McDonald et al., 2006) and must treat it instead as constantly 
evolving through processes of identification and recognition (Cherrier, 2007, p. 332) 
While I have partially responded to this call by exploring the intricate 
relationships between personal and social identities of my ethical food consumers, 
future research should place a greater emphasis on the idea that “the notion of identity 
does not emerge from an individual process of self-identification and therefore, should 
not be regarded solely as individualistic” (Cherrier, 2007, p. 329). Having presented the 
process of identity construction as an outcome of agential reflexive examination of the 
self and its relationship with the world, I nevertheless recognize that “the inner 
conversation cannot be portrayed as the fully independent activity of the isolated monad, 
who only takes cognisance of his external social context in the same way that he 
consults the weather” (Archer, 2003, p. 117), and that the reflexive practice “is shaped 
by the networks of relations within which it takes place because these profoundly affect 
what does and can satisfy the subject and be sustained by each of them” (Archer, 2012, 
p. 97). It is therefore important to consider that “the ability to choose an ethical 
consumption lifestyle and identity (…), does not result purely from a process of self-
inquiry” (Cherrier, 2007, p. 323). Although none of the ethical consumers of my 
research have explicitly framed their moral food practices as part of “collective 
participation” (Shaw, Newholm and Dickinson, 2006, p. 1062), there are, no doubt, 
many committed individuals for whom the meaning of being involved in ethical 
consumption goes beyond personal choice to give rise to the feelings of shared morality 
and collective identity. Thus, further research, while continuing to acknowledge the 
heterogeneity of ethical consumers and the diversity of meanings that they attach to 
their moral food commitments, should examine ethical consumption as a communal 
activity and shared domain of moral values, principles, and beliefs and explore the 
collective identities that emerge and develop within it. Turning the spotlight on shared 
emotions, concerns, meanings, as well as social interactions through which they are 
spread and exchanged might offer a means to broaden our view on the different ways in 
which individuals develop as and into ethical consumers, while seeing individual and 
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collective identity as mutually constituted may open up new perspectives on the process 
of individuals’ formation as particular persons. It is by following these avenues that the 
future research can offer “a new level of sensitivity in considering the development of 
ethical consumer identities” (Cherrier, 2007, p. 332).    
 The scale of debate on consumer practices and identities is extensive and 
multifaceted at both individual and social levels. By producing a sociological account of 
ethical consumption practices that takes people’s “first-person view of the world 
seriously, both recognising their agency and what their concerns tell us about them and 
their situations” (Sayer, 2011, p. 10), I have contributed to this debate and hopefully 
helped to steer its course toward a more balanced methodological approach to and more 
integrated conceptual understanding of the phenomenon – that which explores ethical 
consumption both at the level of concrete experiences, practices, and circumstances as 
well as that of abstract relations, mechanisms, and processes and thereby provides both 
micro-level and macro-level explanations of the complex ensemble of the driving forces 
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Appendix A  
Participant consent form 
 
This project explores the motivations, experiences, perceptions and attitudes of people 
who incorporate ethical commitments into their daily food consumption habits and 
practices. Its purpose is to understand the relationships between individual identities and 
specific food product choices.  
If ethical considerations are one of the key factors in your food purchase decisions, and 
you are you regularly shop for foods with ethical attributes, such as fair-trade, free-
range, organic and more, then your participant will benefit this research. 
As part of the project, I would like to speak with you about your experience of being an 
ethical consumer and shopping for ethical foods. This will be an informal discussion, at 
a time and a place of your choosing, that will last for about one to two hours. With your 
permission, I will record the conversation to help me remember your valuable insights.   
To help me better understand your experiences and practices of ethical food 
consumption, I would also like you to take me on a couple of your weekly grocery 
shopping trips. It will be entirely up to you when, where and for how long I will 
accompany you – I will appreciate any opportunity to learn a little bit more about how 
you choose and shop for foods with ethical attributes. I would also appreciate the 
opportunity to interview you to learn more about your experiences as an ethical 
consumer. 
There are no known risks associated with your participation in this project. The 
expected benefits are the opportunity to participate in a research study and the 
information about individual experiences of ethical food consumption. I will be happy 
to share my findings with you once the research is completed. You will also have a 
chance to review and comment on the draft analysis of the data; your feedback will be 
discussed and acted upon as appropriate.   
Read the information overleaf carefully to help you decide if you want to take part in 
the study. Should you have any questions either before or in the course of your 
participation, please do not hesitate to contact me using the details below. 
 
Yana Manyukhina   
ssym@leeds.ac.uk  





Consent to take part in the research project Add your initials next to 
the statement 
if you agree 
I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated 
[date] explaining the above research project and I have had the 
opportunity to ask questions about the project. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time before the data analysis begins (date) without giving 
any reason and without there being any negative consequences. In 
addition, should I not wish to answer any particular question or questions, 
I am free to decline. In case of withdrawal from the study, all data already 
provided will be destroyed.  
Researcher’s contact email address is                                                
ssym@leeds.ac.uk 
 
I give permission for members of the research team to have access to my 
anonymised responses. I understand that my name will not be linked with 
the research materials, and I will not be identified or identifiable in the 
report or reports that result from the research.   
 
I agree for the data collected from me to be used in relevant future 
research in an anonymised form.   
I agree to take part in the above research project and will inform the lead 
researcher should my contact details change.  
 
Name of participant  
Participant’s signature  
Date  
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